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West Europe Report



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15 March 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ATTITUDES TOWARD PEACE MOVEMENT, DEFENSE POLLED

Bonn DIE NEUE GESELLSCHAFT in German Jan 84 pp 47-53

[Article by Helmut Wenger: "Security Policy, Alliance Policy, Peace Movement; on a SINUS Institute Study Commissioned by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation"]

[Text] Dr. Helmut Wenger, born 1953, is a scientific collaborator at the SINUS Institute in Munich.

Last summer when the discussions concerning the counterarming policy of the NATO states neared their climax, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation commissioned the SINUS Institute in Munich to carry out a representative poll of German potential voters concerning questions of current security and alliance policy. A significant part of this poll was supposed to be a determination of the acceptance of the NATO dual-track decision by the FRG population. The study was performed with 1600 potential voters from 10 August to 9 September 1983, in other words in part before and in part (about 450 interviewees) after the shooting down of a Korean jumbo jet by Soviet interceptor aircraft on 1 September. The following is a brief version of this report. The final report of this study was published by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in October 1983.

Introductory Remark

It is a matter of course that questions of national defense and safeguarding peace are not simply regarded as problems of strategic calculations but also, and perhaps predominantly, are judged by moral categories. Since such tendencies had become very clear in the qualitative talks preparatory to the representative poll, a program of questions was prepared that also left room for answers that are not only or predominantly answers to questions of knowledge. The reason for doing so was the consideration that every mere questioning on approval or rejection of defense policy concepts would have to remain problematical for a political interpretation of the findings. And finally: the results of the polls on the counterarming policy, the SINUS study included, meanwhile coming for various sources must not be used by one side or the other as a kind of mandate for or against a specific defense policy. Not least, the high quota of those refusing to answer, more or less clearly the result of admitted

uncertainty on questions concerning defense policy concepts, was the reason for interpreting the polling results not simply as objective facts which were not to be subjected to further analysis. That is the reason for the effort to go back to explanations and statements of voters, which could be explored in greater detail as part of this study, in interpreting the results of the representative poll. Now to the details of the most important results of the study:

How Do Citizens Assess Defense Policy Concepts Now Under Discussion

Insofar as a coherent cross section of opinions can be ascertained at all in the FRG population regarding acceptance of an extended-term supportable defense policy strategy (beyond the single question of counterarming that is being predominantly discussed at this time), this cross section is determined especially by two components:

--Greater distrust toward a strategy of unilateral military superiority (this applies to the United States, too) and

--Loss of credibility of the defense strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Opinions in Europe are divided on the usefulness of nuclear deterrence in the past and in the future, primarily on the risks of a possible renunciation of this defense doctrine. While a relative majority of the citizens still considers it possible that in the past the "nuclear protective shield" saved Europe from a war, just as many doubt that this will be true for the future. And fewer than one third of the interviewees believe that NATO renunciation of nuclear deterrence would increase the danger of a conventional war in Europe.

<u>Poll Questions</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
It is especially thanks to nuclear deterrence that we in Western Europe have not been attacked by the Soviet Union during the past 30 years	43%	37%	19%
Only nuclear deterrence can maintain the security of the FRG and Western Europe against a Soviet attack also for the foreseeable future	34%	42%	25%
NATO renunciation of nuclear deterrence would increase the danger of a conventional war in Europe	32%	34%	34%

Increasing rejection of global deterrence strategies is becoming apparent also in the assessment of instruments for long-term safeguarding of peace and freedom in the FRG, while on the other hand a unilateral reduction of mass destruction systems is considered after all by over one third of the potential voters as an appropriate instrument of safeguarding peace:

<u>Poll Questions</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
Stationing of more and new U.S. nuclear weapons in the FRG and Western Europe is not regarded as an appropriate instrument for safeguarding peace	60%	64%	74%	72%
The West's first own steps for disarmament in Europe even though the USSR and the Warsaw Pact do not immediately follow suit considered as appropriate for safeguarding peace	--	--	32%	35%

The Image of the United States

The image of the United States held by the FRG citizens has strongly negatively shaped features and thus confirms the trends indicated already in past years. Though the United States continues to have a clearly more positive assessment as a world power than the USSR as regards its image, the image structures of the two superpowers, however, for years have been growing more alike.

Compared with earlier SINUS studies, it emerges that negative characteristics formerly broadly attributed to the USSR alone, are now applied equally to both states.

However, to prevent false argumentation right on the spot: This worsening of the U.S. image is rooted in present problems with counterarming only in some groups which actively support the peace movement. The indicated trend has existed for years and can primarily be explained by the economic development during the past decade and the tensions in the economic policy field between the FRG or Europe and the United States. In addition, there is a longer-term trend of emphasizing a more independent national and European policy.

<u>Poll Questions</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
A country				
--that interferes in the internal affairs of smaller countries				
Applies to the USSR only	49%	45%	29%	28%
to the USSR and the U.S.	38%	41%	54%	61%
--that pursues an increased arms race between East and West				
Applies to the USSR only	--	36%	30%	23%
to the USSR and the U.S.	--	42%	40%	50%

<u>Poll Questions</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
--that tries to impose its social and economic order also on other countries				
Applies to the USSR only	--	50%	42%	43%
to the USSR and the U.S.	--	28%	34%	43%
--that frequently disregards the interests of its allies				
Applies to the USSR only	65%	48%	36%	34%
to the USSR and the U.S.	14%	26%	35%	42%

As the SINUS studies indicate, Ronald Reagan's election was soon recorded by the FRG voters as a turning point in U.S. policy. Numerous elements of the new U.S. administration's policy met and meet with little understanding or even with clear rejection. First of all it can be noted that the discernible dissociation of the new administration from the detente policy has led to a more critical assessment of U.S. policy by the FRG voters. Now over 60 percent of the FRG voters do not agree with the policy of the U.S. president and there is great uncertainty as regards the attitude of the Americans toward the detente policy in general. As regards the detente policy, only 11 percent firmly state that the Americans do not have a reserved attitude towards it, 30 percent are unsure of the answer to this question. That indicates that roughly 60 percent think that they can observe such a new policy of the Americans, but only 18 percent approve of such a dissociation of the Americans from the detente policy, while 42 percent expressly reject such a U.S. policy.

The FRG and NATO

FRG membership in NATO is not being questioned by the overwhelming majority of the voters (78 percent); it is regarded as good or necessary. Nevertheless for many voters there are political developments in the FRG and in Europe as well as also in the United States which, in their opinion, jeopardize the cohesion of the alliance. Only a minority regards as endangering factors the organized peace movement (23 percent), but nearly half, "increasing anti-Americanism" in the FRG and in other European countries. Both results combined indicate that the citizens by no means consider the peace movement as the cause for anti-Americanism. On the other hand, many citizens view the U.S. demand that the Europeans should restrict their trade with the Soviet Union, or efforts to expand the area of NATO competence to other parts of the world or also the increased armament and development of new weapons systems in the United States as policies jeopardizing NATO cohesion.

<u>Poll Question</u>	<u>1980</u> <u>(Carter)</u>	<u>1981</u> <u>(Reagan)</u>	<u>1982</u> <u>(Reagan)</u>	<u>1983</u> <u>(Reagan)</u>
Attitude toward policy of U.S. president				
--Agree	42%	29%	18%	19%
--Disagree	31%	43%	62%	61%
--Don't know/no response	27%	27%	21%	20%

NATO cohesion is jeopardized by

- | | |
|---|-----|
| --growing anti-Americanism in the FRG and other European countries | 49% |
| --the demand of the Americans that the Europeans should restrict their trade with the Soviet Union | 43% |
| --efforts to expand the NATO area of competence also to other parts of the world, e.g., the Near East with its oil deposits | 41% |
| --the unfavorable economic development in Europe with its high unemployment figures | 39% |
| --increased armament and development of new weapons systems in the United States | 36% |
| --the peace movement in the FRG and in Europe | 23% |

The Geneva Negotiations on INF Missiles

The Geneva negotiations, then still going on, as a whole are judged quite pessimistically according to the results of the study. More than half of the interviewees doubts whether both sides or one side seriously want to reach agreement. Accordingly, 78 percent pessimistically no longer believed in agreement during the current round of negotiations. Nevertheless a large majority (74 percent) rejected implementation of the NATO dual-track decision if the Geneva negotiating round were to fail. The vast majority of the citizens do not regard, or no longer regard, stationing new nuclear weapons on FRG territory as a peace guarantee. Quite to the contrary, it appears as a real threat to the military security of the Federal Republic. These trends have even grown stronger in recent years.

In case the Geneva negotiations do not lead to an agreement this fall, I agree with the view that

- | | |
|---|-----|
| --the Americans and the Russians should continue negotiating, the Federal Government should request the Americans not yet to deploy the new missiles here | 74% |
| --the Americans should continue negotiating with the Russians but at the same time they should deploy the new missiles here | 22% |
| --the Americans should break off the negotiations and deploy the new missiles in the FRG | 3% |

By the way, according to the results of the study, the broad rejection of the counterarming part of the NATO dual-track decision has not changed even after the shooting down of the Korean jumbo jet by the Soviets. There were no indications whatsoever of a higher approval rate for stationing the U.S. missiles following the air incident. Rather, the sympathy potential of the peace movement apparently has increased even further with the start of the first protest

actions in September and the positive image of the movement has been additionally strengthened. Thus the share of the interviewees inclined to be negative towards the peace movement declined from 34 percent prior to August 1983 to 23 percent after 1 September 1983.

Protests Against Counterarming

As the study shows, nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the potential voters would welcome protests and demonstrations against the stationing of the U.S. missiles and (a smaller part) would also actively participate in them. The protest potential extends far into all social groups and the followers of the various parties. Thus 42 percent of the potential CDU/CSU voters and 60 percent of those 45-60 years of age support such protests. The strongest support for the protest comes from the followers of the Greens and the Alternatives (of which 57 percent wanted to participate actively in the protests) and from the younger age groups of which 75-80 percent favor the protests and over 20 percent stated that they would actively participate in them. The spectrum of protest forms generally supported goes far beyond the traditional protests of organized demonstrations: 26 percent would also support unauthorized demonstrations, nearly half sit-ins in front of U.S. missile bases in the FRG or enterprise warning strikes.

The broad rejection of the implementation of the NATO dual-track decision in case of a failure of the Geneva negotiations consequently is expressed in the fact that the majority of the potential voters in this question do not want to leave the decision-making power to the Federal Government or to the Bundestag alone without reservations. Instead almost 60 percent of the voters would support holding a plebiscite prior to the decision on missile stationing.

Potential Participants and Sympathizers of Demonstrations Against Stationing of New U.S. Nuclear Missiles (63% of All Interviewees)

<u>Poll Questions</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Reject</u>
Demonstrations on public streets and places authorized by the municipal public affairs offices and the police	97%	1%
Peace marches through all parts of the FRG	91%	3%
Rogation services in the churches against stationing of nuclear missiles	77%	13%
Brief warning strikes in FRG enterprises against stationing of nuclear missiles	48%	37%
Blocking access roads to missile bases by sit-ins of the demonstrators	46%	40%
Appeal to the Bundeswehr military personnel to burn their service book, thus expressing		

their protest against the U.S. stationing plans	16%	70%
Demonstrations on public streets and places unauthorized by the municipal public affairs offices and the police	26%	63%
Hunger strike by demonstrators in front of military barracks	33%	51%
General strike of the labor unions against stationing of nuclear missiles	34%	50%

The Sympathy Potential of the Peace Movement

The majority rejection of a stationing of the new missiles overall is translated into a very positive image of the peace movement. Negative assessments of it are predominantly rejected now. All evaluations inputting to it ideological closeness to the Soviet Union are not regarded as credible. Only 18 percent of the interviewees in the poll agree with the assertion of ideological closeness to the Soviet Union.

The camp of the peace movement sympathizers is widely scattered: it extends deep into all party-follower and social groups. Overall, 69 percent of the voters describe themselves as followers or sympathizers of the peace movement (in 1981, there were only 52 percent) and among the CDU/CSU followers also nearly half exhibit a positive attitude towards the peace movement.

<u>Potentials of the Peace Movement</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
I consider myself as part of the peace movement	6%	7%	8%
I sympathize with the peace movement	46%	59%	61%
I really have little sympathy for the peace movement	28%	20%	23%
I personally reject the peace movement	19%	13%	8%

<u>Potential Voters</u>	Followers and Sympathizers of the Peace Movement (in %)		
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
CDU/CSU	42	56	49
SPD	64	78	83
FDP	61	78	76
Greens/Alternatives	92	93	97
Age Groups			
18-24	64	81	85
25-34	57	77	78
35-44	49	65	68
45-59	49	62	65
60 and over	46	57	59
Occupational Groups			
Ordinary workers	48	56	65
Skilled workers	54	67	69
Management/qualified employees	46	68	57
Middle-grade/senior civil servants	58	72	72
Executives	57	67	75
Education			
Elementary school	48	62	65
Intermediate high school graduates	57	70	74
Secondary school graduates	66	80	75

What accounts for the growth of the sympathy potential of the peace movement in the FRG? This question can hardly be definitively answered with the instruments of a standardized representative poll: it requires a differentiated procedure, such as, e.g., the historical analysis of the development of opinion structures and explorative probing of motivation structures lying behind the individual opinions that can be elicited. Therefore, as part of the study an attempt was made to analyze some of the opinion data on the peace movement, those already known for some time and those newly ascertained, with explorative research processes (group discussions, and freely conducted intensive interviews with selected voter groups). The result of these efforts is not a comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon "peace movement" in the FRG; however, some hypotheses appearing to us to be sufficiently supported are to be established for closer determination of the widespread impact of the peace movement.

First Hypothesis:

Rejection of the traditional armament program or approval of the peace movement occurs with quite varied patterns of justification: they range from an at least subjectively as rational regarded rejection of further armament on the basis of (more or less) differentiated subject knowledge, an assessment of armament

questions on the basis of moral categories and everyday practical reasoning up to the rejection of the stationing of missiles with arguments which are supported by an American image with relatively negative image components.

Second Hypothesis:

Compared to other areas of politics, the experts' comprehensive claim to competence are being rejected more decisively for the field of armament and safeguarding of peace and claimed for one's own authority of assessment and decision. The action and negotiating of the experts occurs far away from people's own scope of experience and only provides fragmentary glimpses to the public from which the individual obtains his information. This contradiction between the public interest in the facts to be negotiated and the hardly ascertainable procedures of decision finding leads to a redefinition of the relationship between experts and laymen in this field.

Third Hypothesis:

Finally, the protest against the armament policy, at least as long as it is not expressed in active participation in demonstrations, etc, appears "innocuous" to many. The disputes on the armament policy in the Federal Republic do not constitute a conflict in which there must be winners and losers, such as, e.g., in the disputes concerning allocation policy in the economic and social spheres. Even a potential follower of the government parties can be opposed to the official government defense policy because he sees his own opposition as supported by a broad consensus. The proclaimed goals of the peace movement, the publicly well known personalities appearing as supporters and finally the protest movement comprising all NATO states make supporting it in the FRG relatively unproblematical and socially acceptable.

How Long Is the Peace Movement Going to Be as United as it Is Right Now

The report on the study has also dealt with the question of the long-term existence of the peace movement. The majority of the interviewees (49 percent) does not regard the peace movement as a phenomenon that would soon again lose importance. It is believed that this movement will be in existence and active even after the missiles have been deployed here. But some doubts can also be raised against this view.

For one thing: Among the followers of the peace movement, while there is agreement on some fundamental questions, there are clearly recognizable points of differences between the activist group and the sympathizers. In this sense the peace movement does not constitute a united action unit. In general the summary evaluation of the present complete political situation in the Federal Republic by the sympathizers of the peace movement is relatively very similar to that of the groups having a negative view of the peace movement. This probably has to do with a less dramatic assessment of the East-West relations in this group as compared to the active followers of the peace movement.

Secondly: Furthermore, the field of sympathizers has a clearly more critical attitude toward a military threat to the Federal Republic by the USSR. A clear

difference also arises in the question of unilateral disarmament by the West, which is supported by two-thirds of the active peace movement followers but by only one third of the sympathizers. However, especially the relations to the United States are being assessed clearly less critically by the sympathizers, especially concerning the dependence of the Federal Republic on the United States, the necessity of close friendly relations with the United States and the reliability of the Americans in case of a necessary defense of the Federal Republic. A relatively negative America image, at least in the military area, is dominant merely among the active followers of the peace movement and in final analysis is expressed by the fact that in this group, far above average, 42 percent see in the stationing of U.S. troops in the Federal Republic advantages especially for the United States but less so for the Federal Republic, a view definitely not shared by the sympathizers. This also coincides with the fact that the sympathizers of the peace movement hardly differ from the voter groups aloof from the peace movement as regards acknowledgement of the U.S. leadership role in the military and foreign policy fields, while the majority of the active core group of the peace movement rejects a U.S. leadership role.

From the above it can be deduced that the active followers and the sympathizers of the peace movement are united first of all only on the concrete immediate goal, to prevent implementation of the NATO double-track decision, but that, however, in far-reaching questions of global peace and alliance policy they are much further apart from one another, especially as regards the future relationship with the United States. This heterogeneity in questions of an extended-term political strategy could become more pronounced following implementation of the NATO double-track decision. Hereby it will be shown to what extent the peace movement under these conditions can remain a political grouping of its present breadth or whether the contradictions between the sympathizers and the active followers will lead to a dwindling of the sympathizers. The opinion on the continued existence of the peace movement at least between its supporters and the interviewees with negative attitudes toward it are strongly contradictory: While 60-80 percent of the former believe in continued existence of the peace movement, only about 23-27 percent of the latter hold this opinion.

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PROBABLE EFFECTS OF PROPORTIONAL ELECTION SYSTEM

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French No 6, Dec 83
pp 987-1008

[Article by Jean-Luc Parodi*]

[Text] What changes in the functioning of the French political system might be brought about by the introduction of proportional representation for legislative elections? That is the question which this article will attempt to answer, while we await an eventual confirmation by reality.

The procedure chosen for providing some elements of a response differs somewhat from the one used by Maurice Duverger in his pioneering work of 1951, or from the method used by Douglas Rae in his work which revitalized electoral studies in the 1970s. In LES PARTIS POLITIQUES, Maurice Duverger studied methods of voting and the general operation of the systems in which these elections take place. In a prudent but insightful manner, he attributed to the balloting methods used the responsibility for the effects observed in the corresponding systems¹. From his comparative empirical analysis, from which France was quite noticeably absent, Douglas Rae drew some cautious conclusions, limited to relations between electoral laws and party systems on a parliamentary level². The election simulations done for the Fifth Republic³ could do no more than calculate the distribution of seats that would have resulted from the application of RP [Proportional Representation], with all other things being equal.

* This text expands and develops a paper presented at the colloquium on "semi-presidential systems," held on 20 and 21 January 1983 by the Center for the Comparative Analysis of Political Systems, directed by Maurice Duverger. I thank Mr Duverger for his permission to publish this article here.

And in reality, of course, all other things are not equal⁴: a method of voting is not limited to the exact proportionality which it introduces between votes cast and seats; it also has consequences on the number of political participants, on their independence, and their scope of action. This means that we often forget to consider the entire functioning of democratic representation, that is, all of the procedures through which the multiplicity of the voters' opinions is transformed into the will of the majority, into a parliamentary and government coalition bringing together at least 50 percent of the seats plus one.

The procedure we are proposing here, which is more structural in nature, will start from three propositions which form the basis for a strategic analysis of institutions⁵:

- a. Each institutional or electoral mechanism has its own potential implications which a theoretical approach must try to reveal;
- b. But each of these mechanisms operates within a more general institutional system, whose other components may impede or accentuate these potentialities;
- c. Any change in one of the constituent elements of the system necessarily brings about an evolution of its functioning. The extent of this evolution will depend primarily on the degree of constraint being modified.

When applied to the initial problem, this triple hypothesis enables us to determine the questions to be considered in this article. First of all, what are the constituent elements of the political system of the Fifth Republic, and how do they combine? What are the potential implications of the various electoral methods considered? How will these implications affect the different components of the system? Then, to what extent will they obstruct or reinforce the implications thus revealed?


Statement of the Problem: Constraint and System

To begin, we must return to two words used above, which will form the key concepts of this analysis: constraint and system.

Any institutional procedure, any electoral mechanism, in short, any rule, because it creates prohibitions and prescribes

behaviors, presents a certain degree of constraint on which its relative importance in the system considered depends. The greater the constraint, the more important the rule; and for that very reason, it becomes more "predictive." And what is true of each of the constitutional procedures analyzed separately is even more true of the system which they form when added to one another.

Going beyond the classic typologies of balloting methods⁶, we can classify in this way all electoral laws, by placing them on an axis ranging from maximum constraint to minimum constraint. Here we are calling "constraint" the obligations to join forces which these different balloting methods bring to bear on the participants in political life (graph 1).



Graph 1: Schema for classification of balloting methods, based on their more or less constraining nature.

Key:

1. Maximum constraint
2. Minimum constraint
3. One-round, one-person majority ballot
4. Two-round, one-person majority ballot
5. Two-round, slate majority ballot
6. Two-round, slate majority ballot with minority representation
7. Departmental proportional representation

8. National proportional representation, 81 seats, 5 percent threshold
9. National proportional representation, 500 seats, no threshold
10. National proportional representation, n seats, no threshold, largest remainders, partial slates

At one end of this theoretical axis we might find the different varieties (one candidate or slate) of single-round majority balloting, whose constraining nature hardly requires any comment; at the other extreme we could classify the least constraining forms of proportional representation, that is, integral RP, without a threshold and possibly including as many seats as there are voters. Between these two extremes, we can place all types of balloting according to their greater or lesser degree of constraint.

When applied to our problem, this model invite us to restate the problem.

In the first place, what type of proportional system is to be used? Within proportionalist balloting methods, we can list the five major variables which will serve to reinforce or attenuate the constraints, and study their cumulative or contradictory combined impacts (graph 2).

	(6) <i>Contrainte faible</i>	(7) <i>Contrainte forte</i>	
	(8) <i>Nationale</i>	(9) <i>Régionale</i>	(10) <i>Départementale</i>
1. Nature de la circonscription électorale	Elevé(11)	Moyen(12)	Faible(13)
2. Nombre de sièges par circonscription	Pas de seuil(14)	Seuil faible(15)	Seuil élevé(16)
3. Existence d'un seuil pour la distribution des sièges	(17)	Plus forte moyenne(18)	
4. Répartition des restes	Plus forts restes	Plus forte moyenne	
5. Nature des listes	Listes incomplètes(19)	Listes complètes(20)	

Graph 2: Some constraint variables in a proportional system.

Key:

1. Nature of election district
2. Number of seats per district
3. Existence of threshold for seat distribution
4. Distribution of remainders
5. Nature of slates

6. Weak constraint
7. Strong constraint
8. National
9. Regional
10. Departmental
11. High
12. Medium
13. Low
14. No threshold
15. Low threshold
16. High threshold
17. Largest remainders
18. Highest average
19. Partial slates
20. Full slates

The first two variables (nature of the election district and number of seats per district) determine what Douglas Rae called the "amplitude" of the district. He used this as one of the fundamental factors of his analysis. The smaller the number of seats to be distributed per district, the stronger the constraint. This actually makes the existence of a threshold for the distribution of seats useless, while on the contrary, such a threshold regains its validity as the number of seats rises. We could also illustrate this constraint theory by showing that, in all systems using proportional representation, electoral controversies have always focussed on the mechanism introducing the strongest constraint (in France, in the case of the European election, on the 5 percent threshold). The five variables listed--and this list is not intended to be exhaustive--will thus, by their combined impact, determine the degree of constraint they will have on political participants. Here our reasoning is based on the hypothesis of proportional representation with a weak constraint factor (wide "amplitude" of the district and nonexistent threshold), giving political forces free sway. Here "free" means, of course, depending on other variables.

Secondly, if the establishment of a type of balloting is analyzed with priority given to the degree of constraint it introduces or it eliminates, in the end the use of the proportional system seems less significant than the abandoning of the SUMADT [Two-Round Majority Balloting] system. But we must still ask some additional questions, both about the potential implications of the type of balloting system abandoned, and also about the features of the balloting system under consideration.

So this first key for our analysis, the concept of constraint, indicates both that the replacement of the SUMADT by the RP will be accompanied by a lessening of constraints, and that this lessening will be all the greater when the RP chosen contains fewer elements which in themselves act as constraints.

Once again we can use the concept of constraint to analyze the various constituent elements of the French political system, clustered under three headings: the electoral system, mechanisms of adaptation between the electoral level and the parliamentary level, and the bipolar and quadripolar remodeling of the partisan system⁷.

Here we will call "electoral system" all of the procedures and mechanisms which govern and distinguish the electoral circuits linking institutional authorities to the voters. Any electoral system is defined by the number of electoral circuits it has, by its periodic or irregular, rare or frequent returns to face the voters, and finally, by the range of options it offers the voters. For each of these points, the electoral system used in the Fifth Republic has created new constraints. The multiplication of electoral circuits (legislative elections, presidential elections, and referendums), the reduction in the number of options offered the voter (mechanisms of a binary nature in the second round of the presidential election and in the referendum process, the quadripolar space of the first legislative and presidential round), and finally, the acceleration of the electoral pace, which has helped to stabilize new configurations of the party system, have all combined to create an original system.

The need for dual confidence, both presidential and parliamentary, for the creation of government power forms a second constraint. Beyond the discussions of legal forms which surrounded their creation, all the Fifth Republic governments have needed two conditions to ensure their survival: not having a parliamentary opposition majority united and determined enough to censure them, and having sufficient majority support to pass their legislative bills.

Since the change by an election of one of the two institutional authorities bestowing this confidence threatens to affect the second party indirectly, each of these authorities will be inclined to intervene in the election of the other party. In order to preserve to a maximum degree their latitude of choice in the creation of the government, the Fifth Republic's presidents have been forced to play a role in preparations for the

legislative elections. But the more presidents intervene in parliamentary elections, the more they run the risk of a possible rejection.

As there are also binary procedures on the parliamentary level, first of all the censure motion, and since the 1958 reestablishment of dissolution has given back to the executive an essential tool in support of coalition unity and of cleavages and alliances, both in elections and in parliament, the system has been further reinforced by the cumulative nature of these new constraints.

The French party system, remodeled and bipolarized by the binary characteristics of electoral procedures, homogenized at the electoral and parliamentary levels by adaptive mechanisms (censure motion, blocked vote, dissolution), and given a more durable status by the acceleration of the electoral pace, has in turn become a factor determining the functioning of the political system.

By means of this system, this bipolar structure has gradually spread throughout all of society. This structure completely distinguishes the Fifth Republic system from former systems. This is true of local elections which have gradually come to align themselves, about a decade later, on the national model. And it is also true of elections in other areas of society, or even of the press, which is gradually being reorganized according to this bipolar model.

This introduction enables us to position the problem more accurately. On one hand, it shows that the eventual establishment of the proportional system must be analyzed at least as thoroughly from the viewpoint of lessening constraints inherent in the two-round majority ballot as from the viewpoint of the actual effects of RP itself. For this reason, we will examine the potential implications of these two electoral modes on each of the elements of the system considered. Such a method encourages caution in considering the evolution of presumed changes by recalling the cumulative constraints of its other components, which remain unchanged.

Potential Implications: Lessening of Constraints

The first phase of the procedure chosen consists of determining the potential effects of two-round majority balloting, since its possible elimination would logically cause these effects to disappear with it. As this demonstration has been given elsewhere⁸, we will simply list these effects here.

a. Binary dominance.

Because the second round is the decisive round, because its very existence weighs on the conditions of the first round, in short, because the voting system is a "majority" system before it is a "two-round" system, the binary dominance of the SUMADT must be considered first.

By forcing the voters to behave in a binary manner, by automatically awarding the victory to a group that does not split over one that divides, or over one that does not manage to unite, the second round--so long as local conditions do not intervene to distort the nature of the contest--provides a fundamental factor for structuring the party system. The second round is clearly "the moment of truth," which reveals all. In the second round, tiny groups and minor contenders fade away. In the second round, alliances and coalitions are perceived most clearly. This majority requirement in the second round naturally tends to reduce the number of candidates and may, therefore, after restricting the choices offered to the voter, limit the variety of political groups represented in the National Assembly. This reducing effect operates most strongly when the party system is structured and bipolar, as it tends to homogenize political contests throughout the entire territory, and also when the intensity of political cleavages is not strong enough to create configurations of a triangular nature.


b. Quadripolar space.

The first round, acting as an introduction of flexibility into a constraining mechanism, contains contradictory potentialities; since this round doesn't count, unless one political force dominates the district so clearly that it eliminates the problem, each political group, and first of all the smallest and newest of these forces, can make use of this opportunity to "stand up and be counted," and by so doing, it may have an impact on larger political groups. This is a ballot without obligation or sanction. The first round of the two-round electoral system thus theoretically encompasses a trend toward the multiplication of political forces, which justifies a comparison with proportional representation.

In the opposite case, in the context of the French majority system, the bipolar dominance of the second round does have some consequences on the first round. Theoretically, in fact, the more the second round brings into opposition two clearly defined coalitions represented everywhere, the more the impact

of the first round may have an effect. In other words, there is room for a confrontation, and this confrontation will be binary in nature. The first round, an internal competition, then takes on the abruptness of the English-style electoral system, and automatically awards the victory to the group which does not divide over one that does, or over one that fails to unite. This means that the SUMADT creates a potential quadripolar space which may be occupied by participants in the political process.

It is this quadripolar constraint which in essence explains the results of the major remodeling of the French party system which we have witnessed since the start of the Fifth Republic. Without this key, we would understand neither the diminished importance of the opposition's centrist movement, nor the creation of the FGDS [Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left] (graph 3) and the Socialist Party's current domination over the entire non-communist left, nor the dominance of the UDF [French Democratic Union] (graph 4).



Graph 3: Quadripolar space: the creation of the FGDS (1965-1967).


Key:

1. Left
2. Right
3. Second round
4. First round
5. Communist Party
6. Socialist Party
7. Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left

8. Radical Party
9. expansion unknown
10. Majority
11. Center
12. Union for the New Republic
13. Independent Republicans

c. Pre-election construction of parliamentary alliances.

Electoral alliances fostered by the constraints inherent in the second round naturally determine parliamentary and governmental alliances, at least for the first government of the legislature. Whether these alliances remain or change depends on other variables of the system, and first of all, on dissolution.




Graph 4: Quadripolar space: the creation of the UDF (1978).

Key:

1. Left
2. Right
3. Second round
4. First round
5. Communist Party
6. Socialist Party
7. Radical Left Movement
8. French Democratic Union
9. Radical Party
10. expansion unknown
11. expansion unknown
12. Rally for the Republic

d. Creation of bipolar electoral behavior.

While the first round provides an opportunity for an election confrontation between rival associates, this confrontation is, however, considerably attenuated and neutralized by preparations for the second round of the election. This common combat, which the two parties of the left (and the two parties of the right) have to wage together, tends to create a united behavior and to facilitate transfers from one party to another within the two coalitions (graph 5).



Graph 5: Electoral competitions (↔) and parliamentary alliances (...).

e. Personal impacts.

The single-candidate dimension of the election gives a certain amount of importance to the personal impact of the candidates. This variable is most important when the political space is not organized according to strong ideological cleavages, but it is always present. We will cite two examples among many others: in 1978, the PC [Communist Party] declined by an average of 0.7 percent in the 58 districts where the outgoing communist deputy was running for re-election, and by 4.5 percent in the 15 districts where the outgoing communist deputy was leaving his seat to another candidate. Another example comes from the right: the competition between the RPR (Rally for the Republic) and the UDF has been entirely structured by the different levels of name-recognition of their candidates⁹.

f. Stabilization of disproportionate balances of power and amplification of electoral changes with a balance of power in equilibrium.

Three variables determine the more or less stabilizing nature of the single-candidate two-round majority ballot system. These

variables are: the nature of the party system; the initial balance of power between the parties in competition; and finally, the geographic distribution of their respective strength.

If the party system is weak, multipolar, and split into tiny groups, the election will tend to act as the addition of several hundreds of local competitions. The majority imperatives of the second round will continue to affect the electoral configurations of the first round, but they will do so within the limited context of each voting district. In periods when a party is on the decline, each political group will tend to concentrate on its areas of strength, and the rising party will have to fight everywhere, but against adversaries that differ in each case. But if, on the contrary, the party system is structured, bipolar, and homogenous, the election will tend to act everywhere in a similar manner. The mode of balloting will stabilize or amplify movements of the electorate, depending on the equilibrium of power between the groups in competition, and on their distribution throughout the territory.

If, in terms of elections, the political groups in competition are of unequal size, the majority method of balloting will tend to hurt the weaker party and to break any electoral movements which might act in its favor, at least so long as such movements do not attain a groundswell size. But on the contrary, if the opposing forces are of the same size, the majority ballot method will tend to amplify electoral changes, but this eventual amplification will depend in turn on the geographic distribution of the forces in competition.

The more the distribution of votes in the various districts is similar for opposing political forces, the more a weak shift in votes may cause a strong evolution in respective party positions in the districts. But on the contrary, if the distribution of votes is different, or in other words, if the areas of strength are not identical, this heterogeneity will tend to attenuate any sharp effects of the majority balloting system.

We will conclude this list of the potential effects of the majority balloting system here. We have already pointed out that other elements of the French political system have reinforced its constraining nature. It is sufficient to mention that the first consequence of the establishment of the proportional system would be to lessen each of these constraints.

To this lessening of constraints would be added the actual implications and consequences of RP itself. By this we mean the direct or indirect effects of this method of balloting, with the exception of those resulting from an attenuated constraint. In other words, we will not attribute to the RP method a multiplying effect on political forces, but we will recognize in it a reduced constraint on all the political and social forces which at one moment or another consider entering an election campaign.

Among these potential implications inherent in RP, we will mention four in particular:


- a. The contradiction between electoral competition and parliamentary alliances.

Any electoral competition entails a struggle by each party to hold onto its former voters and to win those hesitating between it and another party (here, for the purposes of this demonstration, we are not including people who do not vote and new voters). In a stable party system, structured along a dominant axis, this electoral competition will take place in a special manner between close neighbors (graph 5).

Thus, Party A will have to emphasize how different from, and how much better it is than Party B, which will have to do the same thing, but on two fronts, etc. In the absence of an alliance, the electoral competition actually divides close rivals more than it opposes distant competitors. The paradox is that on a parliamentary level, possible coalitions will necessarily include brothers who were enemies in the elections.

- b. The increase in the parliamentary weight of central parties to the detriment of peripheral parties.

If we continue this reasoning, using the hypothesis of a stable party system, arranged along a dominant axis, without a pre-parliamentary alliance, we will find (graph 6) that among the different parliamentary coalitions which may total more than a majority of the seats (these coalitions would be formed of adjacent parties), here with alliances A + B + C, B + C + D, and C + D + E, no alliance can be created without the backing of the central party¹⁰.



Graph 6: When a party's situation carries more weight than its strength.

Key:

1. Electoral rivalry
2. Parliamentary alliances

This central party, therefore, is not only assured of belonging to the definitive government coalition, but even more important, it is certain of being in a position to choose among the three theoretically possible coalitions. More precisely, the central party can veto coalitions including one or more peripheral parties which it opposes. In the end, its situation creates its strength, even more than its voters do.

- c. An expanded role for the parties in candidate selection.

- d. A greater possibility of balancing the slates, and therefore, the candidates elected.

It is, of course, useless to dwell further on these classic aspects of election campaigns.

At this point in our reasoning, we can group together all of the potential theoretical consequences of the establishment of RP, whether these consequences may be due to the elimination of majority constraints or may be the effects of RP itself (see table on the following page). The problem now lies in determining how these consequences would fit in with the other components of the French institutional system.

Return to the System: Impediments, Combined Impacts, and Probabilities

At this phase in our institutional simulation, two questions must be addressed before we can get into the hypothetical institutional changes that would be brought into French political life by the replacement of the SUMADT with RP. What restraints would the institutional system, whose constraining combined impacts we described earlier, bring to bear on these potential implications? And what sort of proportional system would this be, given the desire of the political participants and their awareness of the costs and benefits of such a reform? At the end of this attempt to respond to these two questions, we will be in a position to consider the eventual modifications, both in the hypothesis of this double polarization being maintained, and in the hypothesis of a depolarization of the French political system.

Two Impediments

Of all the elements which form part of the majority system of the Fifth Republic, here we will mention only the two that would be most likely to halt the general lessening of constraints: the binary aspect of the presidential election; and today's structuring character of the party system, after 20 years of doubly bipolar restructuring¹¹.

The presidential election, which is doubly constraining because of its majority political implications and its legal restrictions on access to the second round, even when combined with proportionalized legislative elections, would still continue to

Potential Theoretical Consequences of the Establishment of Proportional Representation

	Caused by the Elimination of Majority Constraints	Due to the Effects of RP Itself
Number of electorally autonomous parties	End of quadripolar constraints	
Candidate selection		Increased party role
Type of electoral competition	Reduced competition between blocs	Increased competition between close parties
Site of alliance creation	Greater need for pre-parliamentary alliances	
Alternation	More unlikely on a parliamentary level	
Composition of parliament members		More "balanced"
Number of parties represented in the National Assembly	End of quadripolar constraints	Possible increase in the number of parliamentary groups
Parliamentary discipline		Strong discipline, but under a constant threat of party split
Strength of parties in the National Assembly		Significant increase in the weight of central parties, to the detriment of peripheral parties

Parliamentary coalitions	Decreased probability of bipolar coalitions	Greater probability of centrist coalitions
Selection of prime minister	More of a "negotiating" profile	Increased proportionality (in relation to groups making up the parliamentary majority)
Partisan composition of government	Less room for action by the president	Less certain
Parliamentary, non-parliamentary equilibrium	Lessened power of dissension over majority fringes and dominated party	Attenuated use after a possibly fruitless attempt
Government stability		Threatened by the possibility of centrist coalitions
Dissolution		Weakened by the need to negotiate with autonomous parties
Existence of opposition		
Presidential leadership	Less threatened by a parliamentary opposition majority arising from new elections	Attenuated by a reduced probability of bipolarization and of pre-parliamentary alliances
Clearness of the system		Attenuated by the possibility of the coexistence of electoral bipolarization for the presidential election and of parliamentary centrism

create bipolar and quadripolar competitions every 7 years. The memory of the last presidential election and the prospect of the next one would thus "surround" the legislative race and would limit its depolarizing potential. Here, once again, time appears to be an extremely important variable. The longer the period of time separating the parliamentary election from the following presidential election, the weaker this constraint. This means that shortening the presidential term by changing it to a 5-year term in office would further strengthen the bipolar constraints of the presidential election.

As we have already said, the French party system, remodeled by the doubly bipolar characteristics of electoral procedures, has become a decisive factor in the functioning of our political system. Dominating national political life, its bipolar organization has gradually spread to local political life and it has become widespread in parapolitical organizations, in pressure groups, and in the press. It has been internalized by party members, and has generally been accepted by the public, which favors a less opaque political system than prevailed in the past. This means that what was once structured has now become a structuring force, and today the French party system serves as a brake against the eventual lessening of constraints. A comparative analysis further reminds us that the proportional system permits the maintenance (as in Austria) or the construction (as in the Federal Republic of Germany) of party systems with fewer partisan participants than France with a quadripolar system, and that there are potential implications and consequences for the development of systems with two major parties.

The eventual lessening of legislative constraints should thus be doubly limited by the combined effect of presidential election constraints and of partisan bipolarization.

A Still Constraining Proportional System

To this limitation would be added the characteristics of RP itself, if it were established. To the extent that it is possible to predict the intentions of the politicians in a position to decide on this issue, we can suggest, though perhaps somewhat rashly:

- a. That the number of seats in the National Assembly would very probably be increased¹²;
- b. That this increase, in itself a factor for lessening constraints, would undoubtedly be accompanied by a

relatively high seat distribution threshold, as neither of the two coalitions would be interested in having the final decision-making power subject to the control of the environmentalists movement, and the Socialist Party would have to protect itself from splits (or threatened splits) by its minority factions¹³;

- c. That the proportionalist principle would without a doubt be accompanied by procedures designed to unite the members of each coalition. As this appeal to unity, to be effective, would have to be constraining, we would be back at the starting point and the circle would be complete.

We will continue, however, to reason on the basis of a less constraining proportional representation system.

The Hypothesis of Dual Polarization Being Maintained

Our first hypothesis is a proportional representation system limited by the other elements of the system which, at least in the first phase, functions in the context of the quadripolar and bipolar structure of the party system. However, we can list some plausible modifications, without bothering to develop them here:

- a. The end of the dominant majority party; we would no longer see a situation like that of the UDF in 1968-1973 or of the PS in 1981-1986;
- b. As a correlation, there would be increased power for the dominated party, which would become more able to use its support as a bargaining tool;
- c. A difference in tonality between the presidential election, which would stress unity, and the legislative elections, which would emphasize the differences between the members of the two coalitions;
- d. A weakening of the deterrent power of dissolution (because of the non-amplification of electoral changes).

Hypothesis of Depolarization of the French Political System

The most probable hypothesis, however (given the prospect of a slightly constraining proportional representation system) is

naturally the hypothesis in which elected presidents would not have the majority equivalent of their electorate in the National Assembly. We will have to determine which parties the first victims (and the major beneficiaries) of this situation would be, and examine the probable workings of the system.

We should distinguish between victims created by splits and victims created by exclusion.

We can assume that the political families most endangered by depolarization would be, with all other things being equal, the ones that have most benefitted from polarization. The demonstration given at the start of this analysis showed that the PS and the UDF both owe their present power to polarization. These are the parties which would run the most risk of being hurt by a proportional system, which would hit them harder, the greater the lessening of constraints.

To these victims of electoral fragmentation we can add victims created by government exclusion. We have seen that, in the absence of a clearly bipolarized majority, the central position of a party gives it a veto power over the members of the government coalition. When applied to the French political system, this model suggests the exclusion of peripheral parties, particularly of those that are perceived as being of a different nature. To put it plainly, the PC is naturally the political group that would be most likely to suffer from this exclusionary power.

Paradoxically, at the very time when the PC might benefit in parliament from an increase in its representation, it would suffer in terms of its representation within the cabinet. As things are never simple, we can envisage a theoretical situation in which the PC, after helping the left to get a president elected, might be excluded from any government responsibilities and from the parliamentary coalition. It would then return to holding a monopoly on the opposition, with the electoral advantages that entails. Another paradox is found in the fact that the centrist political groups which might be weakened by being splintered would, through their parliamentary situation, recover increased bargaining power. The struggle to occupy the parliamentary center would thus promise some hard-fought battles.

About the general functioning of the system, we will cite only some mid-term probabilities:

- a. Quickly succeeding cycles, with the possible alternation of a bipolar dominant party immediately after the

presidential election, and a centrist dominant coalition shortly before and after the legislative elections;

- b. Dissolution neutralized by the non-amplification of electoral changes;
- c. A presidential leadership attenuated by parliamentary centrism and by the decreased independence of the prime minister, acting as a "negotiator";
- d. A possible distortion of the majorities; this would be probable even when the left wins the presidential election, since it needs the support of the PC (both leaders and voters) to win such a victory. But, as has been shown, the PC would run the risk of being shut out of the cabinet by centrist political groups;
- e. A more threatening governmental instability, brought about by this distortion;
- f. A return to a pattern of homogenous minority governments;
- g. Increased electoral competition between philosophically close parties;
- h. The end of alternation, in the strict meaning of this term; and
- i. More generally, a system that is viewed as more opaque by the citizens.

We will stop this list at this point.

At the conclusion of this hypothetical and deductive analysis, we can group together all of our observations into a few major propositions.

- a. A mode of voting, far from being simply a technique for transforming votes into seats, represents a fundamental element of this mysterious process, the creation of majority power. The eventual effects of proportional representation must thus be considered on all levels of this process.

- b. The possible replacement of the SUMADT by RP would first of all be accompanied by the lessening of the constraints introduced by the electoral system that was abandoned and reinforced by other elements of the system.
- c. The decision to introduce RP will be even harder to make when the price of its introduction becomes higher for the politicians who will have to make this decision.
- d. Once established, the potential effects of RP would be limited when other elements of the system were left unchanged, and the more numerous and the stronger the constraints introduced in this type of electoral system.
- e. But the hypothesis of depolarization of the French political system by the introduction of a less constraining RP can not be rejected. Everything indicates that, without returning to the system prevailing in the years from 1945 to 1958, this change would fundamentally modify the functioning of the Fifth Republic. For it is quite true that any change in one factor that is a component of a system, by definition affects the equilibrium and functioning of the entire system.

Annex: Some Electoral Simulations

1. Results of the 1973 legislative elections if conducted according to proportional representation (within metropolitan France)

	(1) RP départe- mentale	(2) RP régionale	(3) RP nationale	(4) Rappel des résultats réels de 1973
<i>(5) A la plus forte moyenne</i>				
{6} PC	101	105	101	73
{7} Extrême gauche.....	2	12	15	1
(8) PS et radicaux de gauche	106	101	99	102
(9) Divers gauche	—	—	1	—
(10) Réformateurs	48	62	63	—
	52	78	81	37
(11) Modérés.....	4	16	18	—
{12} Divers majorité	—	—	2	—
(13) Majorité.....	211	176	171	260
(14) Extrême droite.....	—	1	3	—
<i>(15) Au plus fort reste</i>				
{6} PC	110	102	101	73
{7} Extrême gauche.....	7	16	15	1
{8} PS et radicaux de gauche	117	98	99	102
{9} Divers gauche	—	1	1	—
(10) Réformateurs	57	62	63	—
	68	80	81	37
(11) Modérés.....	11	18	18	—
(12) Divers majorité	—	3	2	—
(13) Majorité.....	170	171	171	260
(14) Extrême droite.....	1	2	3	—

These are naturally first round results. Source: Roland Cayrol, Jerome Jaffre. "What Would Proportional Representation Do?", LA CROIX, 18 May 1977.

Key:

1. Departmental RP
2. Regional RP
3. National RP
4. Real results of 1973 elections
5. Based on highest average
6. Communist Party
7. Far left
8. Socialist Party and left radicals
9. Miscellaneous left
10. Reformers
11. Moderates
12. Miscellaneous majority
13. Majority
14. Far right
15. Based on largest remainder

2. Results of the 1978 legislative elections if conducted according to proportional representation

	(1) L'Assemblée élue en 1978	(2) Ce qu'aurait donné la proportionnelle départementale
(3) Parti communiste.....	86	107
(4) Extrême gauche	—	6
(5) Parti socialiste, mouvement des radicaux de gauche.....	114	134
(6) Divers gauche.....	1	2
(7) TCTAL GAUCHE.....	201	249
UDF	137	100
RPR	148	119
(8) Divers majorité	5	18
(9) Extrême droite	—	2
(10) TOTAL DROITE	290	239
(11) Ecologistes	—	3

Again these are first round results. If calculated for the final round, they give an opposite result. Source: Francis Meyer. "What If France Had Voted According to Proportional Representation?", LE MATIN DE PARIS, LE DOSSIER DES LEGISLATIVES 1978, March 1978, p 27.

3. Results of the 1981 legislative elections if conducted according to proportional representation (within metropolitan France)

	(12) RP nationale			(14) Rappel résultats (scrutin majoritaire à 2 tours)	
	Au plus fort reste	A la plus moyenne	Plus fort départemental	Plus fort reste national	
(19) PSU Extrême gauche.....	6	6	—	6	—
(20) PC.....	77	77	72	74	43
(21) PS, MRG et apparentés	179	180	184	179	282
(6) Divers gauche.....	2	2	—	1	—
(11) Ecologistes.....	5	5	3	6	—
RPR	99	100	105	101	80
(22) UDF et divers droite	104	103	110	105	69
(9) Extrême droite	2	1	—	2	—

First round results. Source: Roland Cayrol, P.-O. Flavigny, and Irene Fournier. "What Would Proportional Representation Do?", LE MONDE, 19 August 1981.

Key for tables on preceding page:

1. The Assembly elected in 1978
2. What departmental proportional representation would have produced
3. Communist Party
4. Far left
5. Socialist Party, Left Radicals Movement
6. Miscellaneous left
7. Total left
8. Miscellaneous majority
9. Far right
10. Total right
11. Environmentalists
12. National RP
13. Departmental RP
14. Actual results (two-round majority ballot)
15. Based on largest remainder
16. Based on highest average
17. Departmental largest remainder
18. National largest remainder
19. Unified Socialist Party, far left
20. Communist Party
21. Socialist Party, Left Radicals Movement, and related groups
22. French Democratic Union and miscellaneous right

FOOTNOTES

1. Duverger, Maurice. LES PARTIS POLITIQUES [Political Parties], Paris, A. Colin, 1951, pp 238-285.
2. Rae, Douglas. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS, London, Yale University Press, 1967, 173 pages.
3. For example, see for 1967: Jean-Pierre Aubert, SYSTEMES ELECTORAUX ET REPRESENTATION PARLEMENTAIRE, LES ELECTIONS DE 1967 [Electoral Systems and Parliamentary Representation, the 1967 Elections], Paris, PUF, 1969, 92 pages. For 1973: Roland Cayrol and Jerome Jaffre, "What Would Proportional Representation Do?", LA CROIX, 18 May 1977, and Frederic Bon, "The Elections in France," HISTOIRE ET SOCIOLOGIE, Paris, Le Seuil, 1978, pp 119-129. For 1978: Francis Meyer, "What if France Had Voted According to Proportional Representation?", LE MATIN DE PARIS, LE DOSSIER DES LEGISLATIVES 1978, March 1978, p 27.

For 1981: Roland Cayrol, P.-O. Flavigny, and Irene Fournier, "What Would Proportional Representation Do?", LE MONDE, 19 August 1981. Generally speaking, these simulations indicate the following: a) in a two-round majority election, the underestimation of the defeated coalition; b) the underestimation of forces which reject bipolarization; c) the underestimation of marginal groups on the right and on the left; d) within the left, the underestimation of the PC; and e) the importance of the "amplitude" of the electoral district: the far left, the far right, and to a lesser extent, the environmentalists, can only pick up seats in the context of national RP (or departmental, but with vote distribution on a national basis), and naturally without a distribution threshold. The results of these simulations are given in an annex to this report.

4. The simple choice of either the first round or the final round for this type of simulation leads to a good many surprises. For example, we know that, when applied to the 1978 legislative elections, RP produces a leftist majority if we apply it to the first round results, and a majority for the right if we use it for the final round.
5. By a strategic analysis of institutions, I mean one which places the emphasis on the competition between institutional authorities, the importance of their number, the tools which they can make use of in this competition, and quite specially, their creative legitimacy and the weapons they have to use against each other, the potential implications of each institutional mechanism, the cumulative or contradictory interaction between the different components of the institutional systems, and finally, recourse to history to determine the balance of strength governing the first constitutional confrontations and structuring their former equilibrium. The general problematic background of such a strategic analysis is given in "Political Institutions in Western Democracies," Jean-Luc Parodi, director, LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE, Paris, CEPL-Hachette, 1971, pp 246-285. Applied to France, see Jean-Luc Parodi, LA CINQUIEME REPUBLIQUE ET LE SYSTEME MAJORITAIRE [The Fifth Republic and the Majority System], academic thesis, mimeographed, 1973, 293 pages. It has been extended to other pluralistic regimes: see Jean-Claude Colliard, LES

REGIMES PARLEMENTAIRES CONTEMPORAINS [Contemporary Parliamentary Regimes], Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1978, 372 pages; systematized for the case of "semi-presidential" systems by Maurice Duverger, ECHEC AU ROI [Checkmate for the King], Paris, A. Michel, 1978; deepened in terms of the dimension of conflict by Olivier Duhamel, "The Fifth Republic's Constitution and Alternation," POUVOIRS, 1, 1977, and LA GAUCHE ET LA CINQUIEME REPUBLIQUE [The Left and the Fifth Republic], Paris, PUF, 1980, 589 pages. But as early as 1958, Georges Vedel had clearly indicated the way to follow in his "General Report on the Problems of Relations between the Legislative and the Executive," at the congress of the International Political Science Association, published in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 8 (4), December 1958, pp 757-778. The adjective used, "strategic," was borrowed from Michel Troper, in "The Constitution and its Representations in the Fifth Republic," POUVOIRS, 4, 1978, pp 61-72.

6. For a survey of recent literature, see for example: Arend Lijphart, "Advances in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems," WORLD POLITICS (to be published in 1984) and the extensive collection of studies published by Jacques Cadart, director, LES MODES DE SCRUTIN DES DIX-HUIT PAYS LIBRES DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE. LEURS RESULTATS ET LEURS EFFETS COMPARES. ELECTIONS NATIONALES ET EUROPEENNES [Modes of Voting in the 18 Free Countries of West Europe. A Comparison of their Results and Effects. National and European Elections], Paris, PUF, 1983, 480 pages.
7. We should point out that by emphasizing a single dimension, that of constraint, in this general analysis in terms of constituent elements, combined impacts, and systems, we can obtain only effects of addition, but not effects of composition.
8. For example, see Jean-Luc Parodi, "The Single-Candidate, Two-Round Majority Ballot in France: an Attempt at Electoral Technology," French Political Science Association, 1980, 19 pages (report presented at colloquium, "Institutional Techniques and Functioning of Political Systems: Reflections on French and Italian Examples").

9. See Jerome Jaffre. "The French Electorate in March 1978" in H. R. Penniman, FRANCE AT THE POLLS 1978, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980, p 63.
10. See Abraham De Swaan. COALITION THEORIES AND CABINET FORMATION, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1974.
11. Georges Vedel very rightly emphasizes this point in his excellent and insightful "Reflections on Proportional Representation," COMMENTAIRE, 3, autumn 1978, pp 245-260.
12. As a simple application of RP to the balance of strength (exceptional for the left and the PS) in June 1981 would have caused the Socialist Party to lose nearly a hundred seats (and naturally more in the event of a downturn for the PS), only an increase in seats could make this measure tolerable for those whose agreement is indispensable for its implementation.
13. We will include in the record the level of the new municipal threshold, 10 percent to have the right to run in the second round (and 5 percent for the distribution of seats.. for the minority).

7679
CSO: 3519/184

ANALYSIS OF CGT MEMBERSHIP LOSS, CHARACTER CHANGE

Paris EST & OUEST in French Jan 84 pp 4-8

[Article by Claude Harmel]

[Text] With 28.25 percent of the votes cast in the elections for the boards of directors of the health insurance funds and 28.35 percent of those cast for the boards of directors of the family allowance funds, the CGT wound up with less than one-third of the vote and not much more--3 or 4 points at most--than its most detested rival, the FO [Workers Force], which won 25.16 percent and 24.88 percent of the votes cast. The CGT had never made such a poor showing in an overall election.

The Communists who head the CGT have faced up to the wave of unfavorable comment concerning their organization that broke out after what one must truly call a defeat. They have done so all the more boldly in that, unlike most of the commentators, they were expecting the defeat and perhaps expected it to be greater than it was.

New Voters

They began by stressing the ranking achieved by the CGT: "The CGT is certainly the largest French union confederation: that is the main fact to come out of the elections," said Krasucki (L'HUMANITE, 20 October 1983).

Calling it the "main fact" is really saying a lot!

Then they used the makeup of the voters as an excuse, saying that it made comparison with the results of any other election impossible.

It would not be scientific and, putting it plainly, it would not be honest to compare the election results of 19 October 1983 with the results of the elections for the labor conciliation boards in 1979 and 1982.

In 1979, when the first elections of this type were held, the CGT received 3,172,115 votes, or 42.4 percent of the votes cast.

When those elections were held again in 1982, it received 2,813,458 votes, or 36.8 percent of the votes cast.

Labor Conciliation Board Elections

1979			1982		
Union	Votes	Percentage	Union	Votes	Percentage
CGT	3,172,115	42.4	CGT	2,813,458	36.8
FO	1,305,736	17.4	FO	1,359,126	17.7
CFDT	1,725,792	23.1	CFDT	1,796,641	23.5
CFTC	519,843	6.9	CFTC	647,169	8.4
CGC*	387,325	5.1	CGC	737,064	9.6
Other	360,086	4.6	Other	289,099	3.7

* [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel.]

The drop was sharp and significant, all the more since the number of registered voters increased between the two elections. But the 36.8 percent in 1982 cannot be compared to the 28.25 percent in 1983 because the makeup of the voters was not the same in both cases.

In 1982 there were 13,547,411 registered to vote, and 7,642,557 actually voted (compared to 12,236,239 and 7,470,897 in 1979), while in 1983, 28,206,925 were registered to vote, and 14,005,100 actually voted--the 1983 figures are twice as high.

Elections of 19 October 1983
Health Insurance Fund

Registered	28,206,925
Abstentions	47.4 percent
Votes cast	14,005,100

Union	Votes	%	Seats	%
CGT	3,957,825	28.25	583	29.22
FO	3,523,982	25.17	506	25.36
CFDT	2,572,705	18.36	378	18.94
CGC	2,226,158	15.89	268	13.43
CFTC	1,725,430	12.31	260	13.03
			1,995	

And that difference is not just numerical. It is also sociological. As was pointed out by Krasucki, this was the first time that participation in the voting had been opened up to "several million voters who are not wage earners: company heads, merchants, craftsmen, and certain liberal professions." That is perfectly true, but it is not the whole truth. The Communist leader mentioned only the "new" categories of voter (new in terms of the labor conciliation boards) that are disinclined to vote communist. He "forgot" two very important categories: employees of the central and local government bodies (3,400,000), who do not generally hold rightwing views, and pensioners--the largest group

(some 7 million, or one-fourth of the registered total). And it happens that the CGT takes an interest in pensioners. It even claims to be their chief protector, their most effective organization, and the confederation with the most pensioners among its members (284,208 in 1980, which is the latest year for which the figures are known). A very large number of pensioners voted for the CGT when they were still working. In 1946-1947, the CGT must have had 6 million members, and a great many of those members are now pensioners.

They did not vote for the CGT in massive numbers on 19 October.

Of all the no-shows and desertions that led to the CGT's defeat, it was probably the defection of the pensioners that caused the most bitterness among the Communists.

Elections of 1962

All in all, it would be less arbitrary to compare the elections of 1983 with the social security elections of December 1962, which were the last to be held before the reforms of 1967 abolished that type of election.

There were fewer voters then: 11,680,178 in the college [constituency] of wage earners and 854,483 in the college of employers. But the social makeup was about the same, particularly if the two colleges are added together.

Primary Social Security Funds (13 December 1962) College of Wage Earners

Registered: 11,680,179
Votes cast: 8,040,541 (68.8%)

Organization	Votes	%
CGT	3,561,447	44.9
FO	1,184,747	14.6
CFTC	1,685,370	21.0
Mutual Benefit Societies	702,594	8.7
CGC	374,056	4.7
Other	532,227	6.6

The CGT received 3,561,447 votes, or 44.3 percent of the votes cast by the wage earners, and the "leftist list" received 59,123, or 11.1 percent, from the employers.

In 1983 (in the elections for the health insurance fund), the CGT received 3,957,825 votes, an increase of less than 400,000 over 1962, even though there were 17 million more voters.

Less Supervision of Voters

The third retort: According to Krasucki, the difference in the results is also due to the change in voting procedures. In the case of the labor conciliation boards, people voted at their workplace--in the commune where their firm was

located. In the case of the social security elections, they voted at their places of residence--that is, in the communes where they lived.

An argument of the same kind was also heard in 1979, when the first elections for the labor conciliation boards were held. Since they yielded different results than the elections for the enterprise committees (CE's), the CGT leaders pointed out that in the case of the CE's, the polling places were located at the firms, while in the case of the labor conciliation boards, they were located outside the firms.

What this very certainly must be taken to mean--strange as such an admission may seem--is that when the voters go to the polls in the firms, they are more closely supervised than when they vote outside. With all the more reason, then, they escape the influence of the militants in their firms when they vote in their home communes, where the human environment enveloping them is different than it is when they are with the other workers in their firms.

Left-Leaning Electorate

Lastly, Krasucki alluded to "certain general political considerations" which supposedly gave this election an exceptional character. It is very true that by the force of things, the voters had to choose between, on the one hand, two "government-supporting" organizations--the CGT and the CFDT--which generally approve of and support the economic and social policy of the government which, for that matter, they inspire to a large degree, and, on the other hand, three organizations that we could call "nongovernment supporting"--the FO, the CGC, and the CFTC--concerning which the least that can be said is that they have reservations concerning that same policy.

To conclude from this that we are faced with the same cleavage between right and left that exists in political elections is an easy step to take, but it would be wrong to do so. The fact is that there were over 13 million abstentions. And there is every reason to believe that the abstentions were much more numerous among the voters in the national rightwing, and especially the liberal rightwing, than among Communist or Socialist voters.

It is not a matter of slander or of mudslinging to say that political voters on the right are less sensitive than those on the left to social security issues and social issues in general. It is even more certain that voters on the right feel more repugnance for union organizations than those on the left. In the eyes of the rightwing voter, those organizations constitute an unknown world that is distrusted in the same way that one distrusts anything unfamiliar. It is probable that among the voters in the current opposition, some grasped the political significance of the voting--those who are, as we say, the most "politicized"--but while things have changed considerably in recent years, the percentage of "politicized" voters is still lower on the right than on the left. In short, a very large number of rightwing voters had no desire to go vote for a union, as they say--even for a moderate union--and so they did not go.

It therefore does not seem risky to say that there were more abstentions on the right than there were on the left. In other words, all indications are that

among the 14 million voters who validly cast their votes, the number who had voted leftist on 10 May 1981 was certainly higher, and probably clearly higher, than the number who had voted for the right. This leads us to the conclusion that many of those who had voted for the left in the spring of 1981--in April, May, and June--voted this time for union organizations which, let us repeat, show only moderate appreciation for the government's economic and social policy.

This only makes the political significance of the voting even more characteristic.¹

Elections for Enterprise Committees

The social elections of the past 4 years--for the labor conciliation boards in 1979 and 1982 and for the boards of directors of the health insurance and family allowance funds in 1983--are enough to prove that the CGT's electoral influence is declining seriously. But since those elections coincide in time with the Socialist-Communist government experience, one could believe that there is a close relationship between the two phenomena: in other words, the CGT lost votes because in the eyes of the voters, it is regarded as supporting the government--because voting for the CGT after June 1981 has meant a vote for the government.

There is a large degree of truth in that opinion. But it must not conceal from us the fact that while the current political situation has precipitated or accentuated the CGT's electoral decline, it is not the only factor responsible. The CGT's decline began long before, immediately after the revolution of May 1968, and it has continued since, year after year, without--or almost without--a pause.

Proof of that can be seen in the elections for the enterprise committees.

Those elections have been held since 1946 in industrial and commercial firms or establishments in the private sector with more than 50 wage earners (some firms with less than 50 wage earners also have enterprise committees, but they are extremely few in number). These are not general elections--that is, the elections are not held in all firms at the same time. Each firm has its own election day, the only rule being that the elections must be held every 2 years. One result, among others, is that the overall results (in aggregate statistics) cannot be compared from 1 year to the next, but only every 2 years.

That is why we have grouped the known results into two series: even years in one series and odd years in the other.

Voters are divided into several "colleges": the first is the college of hourly and clerical employees. The second included practically everyone else until 1973, but since 1974, it has been divided into two colleges: the second (foremen and technicians) and the third (engineers and executives).

Regardless of the series observed (first, second, third, or all colleges combined), the trend is the same: a constant "compression," which is what the Communists call it to avoid using the word "collapse," which would be pejorative.

Elections for Enterprise Committees

Even Years				Odd Years					
Year	College	Votes cast	CGT vote	Year	College	Votes cast	CGT vote		
			%				%		
1966	1	887,137	512,821	57.8	1967	1	445,640	229,535	51.5
	2	211,990	45,091	21.3		2	99,409	15,647	15.8
	C	1,099,127	557,912	50.8		C	545,049	245,182	45.0
1968	1	998,112	554,675	55.6	1969	1	616,503	293,069	47.5
	2	247,878	41,580	16.8		2	146,112	19,194	13.1
	C	1,245,990	596,255	47.9		C	762,615	312,263	40.9
1970	1	1,117,734	602,702	53.9	1971	1	801,951	399,906	50.5
	2	301,993	49,739	16.5		2	213,002	33,442	16.2
	C	1,419,727	652,441	46.0		C	1,014,953	427,348	43.3
1972	1	1,430,813	735,337	51.4	1973	1	881,592	424,046	48.1
	2	417,890	77,574	18.7		2	262,685	43,239	16.5
	C	1,844,703	812,911	44.1		C	1,144,277	467,285	40.8
1974	1	1,611,813	790,284	49.0	1975	1	1,274,008	568,357	44.6
	2	341,940	87,350	25.5		2	287,462	59,787	20.8
	3	121,036	9,541	7.8		3	109,691	9,504	8.6
	C	2,074,789	887,175	42.7		C	1,671,101	637,648	38.1
1976	1	1,714,587	821,435	47.9	1977	1	1,299,061	566,352	43.5
	2	392,975	98,573	25.0		2	274,729	55,676	20.2
	3	136,118	11,168	8.2		3	107,527	7,681	7.1
	C	2,243,680	931,176	41.5		C	1,681,317	629,710	37.4
1978	1	1,602,324	721,029	44.9	1979	1	1,280,102	516,142	40.3
	2	397,775	90,903	22.8		2	299,768	51,159	18.0
	3	138,261	12,348	8.9		3	93,148	6,172	6.6
	C	2,138,360	824,280	38.5		C	1,673,018	576,473	34.4
1980	1	1,507,587	651,455	43.2	1981	For 1981, we have only one figure: 32.0% of the votes in all colleges.			
	2	398,222	78,893	19.8					
	3	111,441	7,901	7.0					
	C	2,017,250	738,249	36.5					
1982	1	1,399,535		39.0					
	2	406,700		15.9					
	3	96,229		5.0					
	C	1,902,464	616,168	32.3					

C = Combined total, all colleges
 Source: Ministry of Labor

There was only one interruption of the trend: in 1971 and 1973 in comparison with 1969 and in 1972 in comparison with 1970, the percentage of the vote obtained in the second college (foremen and technicians) rose. But that recovery did not last.

The tables show a strong shift by votes in the second college toward the CGT in 1974 and following years, but that is an illusion: beginning in 1974, the votes of the engineers and executives (third college) were counted separately, and the percentage of votes for the CGT in that category is lower than it is among foremen and technicians (especially the latter). So when the second college was reduced to include only foremen and technicians, the CGT's strength in that college appeared proportionately greater. But that artificial advantage did not last. In 1982, the CGT's percentage in the second college reached its lowest level.

Voters Desert

One comment is necessary in order to interpret these statistics correctly: in using them, we are comparing results which are not entirely comparable. The reason is that the makeup of voters in each of the two series has changed considerably in the years since 1966. There are several reasons for that change, the most important being the steady increase (except in recent years as a result of the economic crisis with its trail of bankruptcies and unemployment) in the number of firms where elections for enterprise committees are held and, consequently, in the number of voters.

Probably because the need for such a body made itself felt only gradually, the law was not applied immediately to all firms or establishments with more than 50 wage earners. In 1966, statisticians counted only 4,884 firms where elections had been held. In 1980, the number was 12,021 (in 1976 it was 12,533). The same trend is observable in the second series (covering the odd years). There were 3,734 such firms in 1967 and 11,831 in 1979.

The increase in the number of votes cast, and therefore in the number of voters, can be seen from the tables.

For several years, however, that growth concealed the decline in the CGT's electoral influence. The CGT was losing in percentages but gaining in number of votes. It could therefore be thought that while it was receiving few votes in the firms setting up an enterprise committee for the first time and where it had established itself more recently, its original voters were remaining loyal to it.

After hitting a peak in 1975 and 1976, however, the CGT lost votes, not only relatively but also absolutely. Voters who had been voting for it were withholding their votes.

If it were possible to refine the analysis, one would probably have to make allowance for the fact that the CGT was established most solidly in "old industry" (iron and steel, for example), where firms are being hit especially hard

by the economic crisis, of course, but also and especially by technological innovation and the resulting loss of jobs.

But is the CGT's situation not made worse by the fact that it is not as well rooted in new industries as it is in those where all future development appears impossible?

Militants Number 100,000

It is undeniable that the CGT's electoral influence has grown steadily weaker since 1966 and is continuing to do so. And that same impression of decline emerges when one considers changes in the confederation's membership totals as supplied to us by official sources as well as in the number of readers for its publications, particularly LA VIE OUVRIERE.²

Those reverses are significant: they prove that even behind their union mask (which is being increasingly seen through), the Communists are losing their hold on public opinion, including worker opinion.

But it would be a mistake to conclude from this that there is a corresponding decline in communist power and, more especially, the power of the CGT. The CGT is losing members, it is losing voters, and it is losing readers for its newspapers (and it is losing them in proportions that would be catastrophic for other organizations). But it is far from being on the verge of collapse.

More than in any other organization, truly much more (the difference being not only quantitative but qualitative as well), what counts in a communist or communist-controlled organization is not its members but its militants, or, to use the language employed in the CP, the apparatus men--the apparatus itself.

The CGT of today is basically an organization of some 100,000 or 120,000 militants, almost all of whom (85 or 90 percent) are members of the PCF. They constitute the backbone that supports the entire structure. As long as that backbone holds up, the CGT will remain a formidable weapon in the hands of the PCF.

From 1977 to 1981, the breakup of the union of the left, the Kabul affair, and the proclamation of martial law in Poland caused the CGT to experience internal upheavals which affected that backbone--slightly, perhaps, but affected it nevertheless. This shows that if anyone took the trouble, the PCF's domination of the CGT would not remain invulnerable. It can be imagined that if Krasucki was sent in to replace Georges Seguy (who is 3 years younger), it was because Krasucki seemed more capable than his predecessor of putting the house back in order. In any case, that is what he did with a steady hand and an undaunted heart.³

Today, despite the acrobatics being forced on them by Communist participation in the government and, as a consequence, its "policy of rigor," Krasucki and his colleagues still have the CGT apparatus firmly in hand. When they take note of its losses, they probably reassure themselves by remembering that Lenin conceived of revolution in the way that Blanqui did--as being the work of a minority (a meager minority) that is solidly organized, strongly disciplined,

present in all kinds of organizations and institutions through its cells and infiltrators, and thus capable of taking control, at the proper moment, of a mass movement that will give it both the numerical strength it lacks and the possibility of making people believe that it expresses the will of a majority.⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. In the first round of balloting in June 1981, the leftist parties received some 13.8 million votes (out of a total of just over 35 million registered to vote). It can be assumed that the 6.53 million voters who voted for the CGT and CFDT on 19 October had voted for the left in the last legislative elections. What happened to the other 7.2 million leftist voters from June 1981? It cannot be imagined that they are all included among the 7 million citizens who could not participate in the social security elections (let us say 9 million--a very rough approximation--to take into account the foreign workers registered on the social security election lists).

Regardless of how sketchy those calculations are (they merit refining), they confirm what we say in the text, which is that many of those who voted for the political left in 1981 gave their votes on 19 October to organizations which, in general, do not approve of the government's economic and social policy.

2. I take the liberty of referring the reader to the paper I devoted to this question under the title "The CGT's Decline Is not Something New," which appeared in one of the last issues of the preceding volume of EST & OUEST (No 664, June 1982). Since that date, the CGT has not come up with any new figures concerning its press circulation or the number of its members.

We recall that according to what it says, active members (as opposed to pensioners) declined in number from 2,043,404 in 1976 to 1,634,375 in 1980, for a drop of 409,029, or 20 percent.

All indications are that the situation has continued to deteriorate.

3. I described how the PCF brought the CGT back under control in a small book entitled "How the Communist Party Controls the CGT" (Paris, Library of Social History, 1982, 1 vol, 96 pp, 28 francs). It is available from EST & OUEST.
4. Another proof of the CGT's decline even among the electoral clients whose privileged representative it claims to be: the workers.

Statistics sometimes break down the results for the first college into three series: one in which hourly and clerical employees vote together and two others in which the two groups vote separately as a result of special agreements in the firms (with one covering only hourly workers and the other covering only clerical employees).

Unfortunately, the two series (even years and odd years) are incomplete. Here are the percentages they show for the CGT (hourly workers only):

	<u>Even Years</u>	<u>Odd Years</u>
1966	62.3%	1967 55.2%
1968	60.3	1969 51.2
1972	59.6	1971 56.1
1974	55.7	1973 55.8
1980	51.3	1975 53.7

The decline seems less pronounced in this socio-occupational category than in the others. It is nevertheless very marked.

11798
 CSO: 3519/201

PCF SITUATION REVEALED IN COMMUNIST WRITINGS

Paris EST & OUEST in French Jan 84 pp 1-3

[Article by Branko Lazitch]

[Text] What do the Communists want? That question, which people began asking just after the first communist victory in Petrograd on 7 November 1917, remains the burning question of the hour. In France, it takes on a double character: first, it is general in scope and extends to the Soviet communists, and second, it applies specifically to the French communists and has been especially acute since the PCF entered the government.

As experience shows, the answer to that question seems less ambiguous when one consults communist sources themselves than it does when one questions noncommunist "observers." When Communists undertake a political "long march," they indicate clearly from the start what their final objective is. It is only on the way to their objective that they are obliged to beat around the bush, take detours, and sometimes even go backward temporarily. In France today, the Communists have undertaken a political long march whose start was announced in May and June 1981 with the support they threw to Francois Mitterrand in the second round of balloting in the presidential election and then with the entry of four of them into Pierre Mauroy's government. With this legislature at midterm, and following the meeting between leaders of the PCF and the PS, this seems to be a favorable time to put the record straight on the basis of the following four "keys," which make the party's policy intelligible.

1. Relations Between PCF and CPSU

In its official form, of course, the Communist International ceased to exist 40 years ago. The international communist movement has nevertheless continued to develop since then. No one disputes the PCF's membership in that movement, and no one denies the CPSU's supremacy in it. But relations between the PCF and the CPSU are no longer permanently set at "good," as they were formerly. Recently--from 1975 to 1977--they even cooled, and that was an important phenomenon because on the domestic level, it had an immediate effect on relations between the PCF and the Socialist Party. When there was tension between the Kremlin and Colonel Fabien Square, there was harmony between the PCF and the PS. But when relations between Marchais and Brezhnev began to improve, they deteriorated between Marchais and Mitterrand, as everyone could see in 1978, 1979, and 1980.

The PCF's objective today is both to be on good terms with the CPSU and to be represented in the government with the Socialist Party. It is a tricky undertaking. So far it has been successful.

Concerning the state of the PCF's relations with Moscow, there are three different opinions that deserve examination: that of the CPSU itself, that of the PCF, and that of the Socialist Party.

As far as the CPSU is concerned, the answer is clear: it is satisfied with its relations with the PCF and is quite open about the fact. Very recently--during his visit to France in October--Vadim Zagladine, the Kremlin's official in charge of relations with the PCF, described those relations as "excellent."

External signs of this situation are not in short supply. In a recent issue (No 21) of the BULLETIN D'INFORMATION, which is published in Prague under Soviet control, the summary included a statement by Yuri Andropov, a statement by the Soviet Government concerning the downed South Korean Boeing, and, immediately after that, the joint communique by Todor Zhivkov and Georges Marchais. Fidel Castro's speech on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the attack on Moncada Barracks was only in fourth place.

Another example: on 21 November, PRAVDA published a communique announcing the departure for France of a CPSU delegation "at the invitation of the PCF Central Committee." Adopting a different attitude, the PCF was more discreet: the Soviet delegation's arrival in France was not mentioned in L'HUMANITE.

As for Georges Marchais, he did not repeat the formula used by Zagladine, saying instead: "But who among us does not know how much that constant and dishonest reference to 'Moscow' in speaking of us can still prevent us from making ourselves understood?" (L'HUMANITE, 14 November 1983). In other words, as far as the good relations existing between the Kremlin and Colonel Fabien Square are concerned, the attitude over there can be summed up by saying that good relations exist and one says so. But here, the preferred attitude is that they exist but one does not say so.

The PCF is not alone in remaining silent about relations between the PCF and Moscow. The subject is also taboo among French Socialists (with the single exception of Jean Poperen). The reason is simple: admitting the true nature of the relations linking the PCF to Moscow would amount to condemning, ipso facto, the presence of the Communists in the government.

2. Relations Between PCF and PS

As the Communists have explained from the beginning--and as we pointed out in our previous issue ("Strategy and Tactics of the PCF," page 33)--the key word "strategy" that they employed to explain their entry into the government gave reason to predict that in their minds, the experiment could not be a brief one. That key word remains valid, as was proven just recently by Georges Marchais when he said: "Our presence in the government is neither circumstantial nor temporary: it is based on our party's strategy for advancing, step by step, toward French-style socialism" (L'HUMANITE, 28 November 1983). In its duration,

that experiment has already exceeded the previous experiment in West Europe, which was the participation by Portuguese Communists in the Lisbon government just after the "revolution of the carnations" in 1974.

Naturally, Communist cooperation with the Socialists in the government does not extend to other spheres--elections excepted. It is revealing that the PCF and the PS have held only four meetings between their leaders since they began cooperating in the government--a period of 2.5 years! And that throughout that period, they have not been able to organize a single mass demonstration together. When the PS calls for a demonstration on behalf of Poland, the PCF stays out of it; when the PCF organizes "pacifist" demonstrations, the PS, through its veto, keeps Socialist militants away!

In the PCF's view, the presence of four Communist ministers in the government makes up for the numerous setbacks it has suffered in other spheres. On the subject of its membership, the bragging about the alleged 700,000 party members stopped by itself, and Communist militants (not to be confused with the permanent "apparatchiks") are becoming increasingly rare. In the sphere of vote-getting, the elections, both political and social, bear irrefutable witness to the great "leap backward" that has been accomplished by the party and the CGT. In this negative situation, the Communist presence in the government appears positive. That is why, when wondering whether the Communists will remain in the government or not, the proper question is not "when will the Communists leave the government?" but "when will Francois Mitterrand consider the time right for giving the Communists their notice?"

3. Georges Marchais' Health

If the Communist Party were a party like others, Georges Marchais would have ceased being its secretary general long ago. Not only because of the series of defeats suffered by the PCF, but also because of the state of his health as characterized by his heart attack in January 1975 and the slight relapse in Bulgaria in the summer of 1982. But Georges Marchais continues to head the party. When reporters question him about his presence at the head of the party, he answers: "The question does not present itself because it has not been brought up by the party and because I myself have not brought it up. I have no intention of retiring" (LE MONDE, 22 November 1983).

A few days earlier, Charles Fiterman--the only Communist to hold three posts simultaneously: he is a member of the Politburo, the Central Committee Secretariat, and the government--had said the same thing: "The question of the post of secretary general does not present itself except in the fevered imagination of a few carping critics" (L'HUMANITE, 8 November 1983).

So far, two different solutions have always been adopted when the secretary general of a CP has suffered a serious and prolonged illness.

In the West, he eventually resigns for health reasons (Luigi Longo and Waldeck Rochet) or even for political reasons, as was the case with Aarne Saarinen, chairman of the Finnish CP, and with the secretary general of the Spanish CP, Santiago Carrillo.

In Moscow as in the other communist capitals, including Tirana, the No 1 man is duty bound to stay at his post until his last breath. Visibly, Georges Marchais would like to be placed in the "Eastern" category.

Will he be able to hang on until the end?

4. Situation in the PCF

For the first time since the end of World War II, the PCF is under attack in the two bastions on which its entrenchment in France depends: the municipalities and the unions. And it is not the least of paradoxes that this is happening just when it is represented in the government for the first time since 1947!

But the trouble affecting the PCF does not lie only in the eroded manpower and evaporating vote which characterize both it and the CGT. The trouble is to be found in the party and the CGT themselves. What was once called monolithism and what still remains the alpha and omega of democratic centralism--that is, the party's internal cohesion--is no longer what it was. The incidents being provoked by Jean-Baptiste Doumeng would have been unimaginable before. And the party's reaction would have been different. It would not have been limited solely to this assessment attributed to Georges Marchais: "He then expressed the opinion that there was too much talk about Jean-Baptiste Doumeng and that the latter was also talking too much." "When answering people, a certain propriety must be observed" (L'HUMANITE, 28 November 1983).

The Communist decline in France is not an isolated event. It is part of the almost general decline being experienced by the communist movement in Europe. The local elections in Italy gave new proof of this recently. Is it not paradoxical that at present, the only three European communist parties holding on to their voters and members are all ultra-Stalinist in their thinking and unconditional supporters of Moscow in their policy? They are the CP's in Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus. All the other "brother parties," including the PCF, are suffering a decline which has progressed from being a short-term phenomenon to being a historic event.

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ANTIDEMOCRATIC ELECTION PRACTICES INTRODUCED INTO SNCF

Paris EST & OUEST in French Jan 84 pp 21-22

[Text] Taking advantage of the influential protection provided by the minister of transportation, who is a member of the PCF Politburo, Communists in the SNCF [French National Railroads] are applying themselves to setting up the institutions and practices of a people's democracy already.

On 3 November 1983, Henri Krasucki, himself a member of the PCF Politburo who was assigned by the party to be secretary general of the CGT (that is really the way things should be viewed), addressed the railroad workers in Bordeaux at their place of work, proving that the Communists are exploiting their victory: they have finally obtained from the legislators the right for a union figure from outside a firm to enter that firm's premises if he is invited there by a union section recognized by the firm in question.

Krasucki himself stressed that victory: "Before 1981, I could not visit the firms, sometimes even public service firms, except when they were on strike" (L'HUMANITE, 4 November 1983).

He congratulated the CGT's Federation of Railroad Workers and its secretary general, Communist Georges Lanoue--a member of the PCF Central Committee since 1973--on "introducing something new" in union democracy:

"You will soon hold important elections throughout the SNCF for enterprise committees and employee delegates." (Editor's note: this by virtue of the new statute on the SNCF that Charles Fiterman got adopted at the end of 1982.) "In its newspaper (the TRIBUNE DES CHEMINOTS), the federation publicly issued the following appeal to all railroad workers in the various departments: 'In your opinion, who is the man or woman who would be the CGT's best candidate?' And it promises to take the opinions of the railroad workers into account in drawing up its lists" (L'HUMANITE, 4 November 1983).

Krasucki again commented on that initiative a few days later:

"For the first time, the railroad workers are going to elect employee delegates and members of the enterprise committees. The federation regards this as a good opportunity to give an in-depth account of itself by department and shop, and it is telling the railroad workers: 'Whom do you consider most capable of

representing you? We will take your opinion into account in drawing up our list.'

"Demagoguery? No. On the contrary, democracy! Democracy with the union members and democracy with the workers. What better proof of confidence is there than to tell everyone: choose the best candidates yourselves in association with us? But also, what better occasion is there for the candidates, old and new, to look to their sources? It provides an opportunity for union members and workers to tell each other what is on their minds. It is a great mingling of ideas, confirmation and confidence, and also of justified renewal" (L'HUMANITE, 7 November 1983).

Two weeks later (24 November 1983), L'HUMANITE reported that the railroad workers at the Montrouge depot (in Hauts-de-Seine), in cooperation with CGT activists, had drawn up the list of the CGT union's candidates in the upcoming industrial elections "even though for some time now, the depot's management has been docking workers' wages every time the CGT has something to say" (that is, to put it clearly, every time the railroad workers stop work either to harangue their fellow workers or to go listen to a speaker).

As we saw above, it is in the name of democracy that the secretary general of the CGT is encouraging this new practice: the nomination of candidates during a meeting open to all those who will participate in the elections. And since the basic principles of representative liberal democracy are no longer very clear in the minds of many, the CGT's new methods have some chance of being accepted as an enrichment or further development of democracy.

It is the opposite that is true.

One will realize this immediately by remembering that exactly the same method is used in the USSR, for example, during elections to the Supreme Soviet.

TEMPS NOUVEAUX No 4 (January 1979) provided the following description of the preelection meetings being held in the USSR at the time--meetings in which the "people" (or perhaps it was the "workers") nominated the candidates to run in the elections for the Supreme Soviet:

"The present stage of the election campaign... combines the elements of representative democracy and direct democracy--that is, the two principal forms provided by the socialist political system. The nomination of parliamentary candidates... discussion concerning their business (sic) and political qualities, and voting in the preelection meetings are invested among us with the features of both representative democracy and direct democracy--in other words, the direct and concrete expression of the will of the citizens.... It was not by chance that the new law on elections... considerably extended the time allowed for a free and responsible examination of the candidates."

Is it not to election meetings of that kind that the railroad workers are now being invited?

Analysis confirms what a consideration of the Soviet example leads one to think. The fact is that on taking a close look, one realizes that what is involved is a particularly significant application of democratic centralism, which has never been regarded as an ideal or superior form of democracy. Everyone is apparently given the opportunity to speak. Everyone is allowed to express himself, and the opportunity to do so is provided. But in fact, that system provides the leaders with a singularly effective means of strengthening their power, imposing their will, and preventing or repressing possible opposition.

Ordinary people, the rank and file, and all and sundry have the feeling that they are being consulted and that their views are therefore being taken into account. Perhaps they feel, more or less obscurely, that they are not really participating, but at least at first, they will be very careful not to say so or to admit it to themselves (so as not to admit their incompetence). But there is participation. They feel bound by the decisions reached, even if all they did was raise their hands in a reflex action reflecting the gregarious instinct or the laws of imitation. And that participation, no matter how vague, will in their eyes confer more authority and legitimacy on the decisions reached and on the body thus elected to power even though, as we will see, the decisions in question are actually dictated by the people running the show.

On the other hand, some of them--and their number will increase as time goes on--will very quickly grow disgusted with those meetings in which they are compelled to say aloud in public what they think of such-and-such a person, organization, or plan. They will probably try to avoid the obligation by staying away, but society does not need to be very far along on its path to totalitarianism before the moral pressure of the group suffices to prevent them from taking refuge in absence--this even before the police institution starts seeing to it.

"Let mouths open!" That formula, like the one calling for "mouths shut," is regrettably well known in the history of the PCF. "Let 100 flowers bloom!" is a plea equally famous in the history of the CCP. And precisely the same technique is being used here.

When an oppressive, despotic, or totalitarian regime reaches a certain point of perfection in its class, the government's masters no longer know what people are thinking, and there is great danger in that ignorance. Making the rank and file talk also means trying to learn what is in people's minds, discover troublemakers, pick out the ones who keep quiet, and use fear to force nonconformists to hide their disagreement even more completely--to the point of stifling it. The freedom to say nothing is one of the last refuges of freedom.

Lastly, and perhaps this is not the least important point, consulting the rank and file is an excellent means of exercising effective and decisive control over militants who might be harboring ideas different from those of the ruling group.

The reader may have noted, in passing, the expressions used by Krasucki. He spoke of "democracy with the union members" and "democracy with the workers." The more usual expressions are "union democracy" and "worker democracy." Union

democracy consists of consulting the union members and them alone in accordance with the rules of discussion and voting that are those of an organized group. Worker democracy means consulting everyone in the rank and file, whether a union member or not. And experience proves that manipulating an inorganic mass is easier than manipulating an organized group. With a little skill, one can make the inorganic mass say more or less whatever one wants, and the larger the meeting, the easier the manipulation in question usually is. In particular, it is very easy to induce such a mass to condemn those militants who might have a different opinion, since it is disposed in principle--if the idea is suggested to it--to regard such people as ambitious men, troublemakers or plotters, or even as the instruments or agents of a foreign power.

In short, thanks to an odd dialectical reversal, what may seem to be the height of democracy is, on the contrary, its ruin. The Communists are establishing election practices within the SNCF which, if they spread and continue, will constitute a formidable danger to personal freedoms--first those of the railroad workers and then those of everyone.

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PAPANDREOU SEEN ABANDONING THIRD WORLD SOCIALISM

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5-6 Feb 84 pp 5, 15

[Article by Khr. Karanikas]

[Text] Premier A. Papandreu is being forced to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis, and in fact at a considerable speed, sometimes going beyond even the "safety" rules which his party has. Up to now he has proved that he is able to travel in a dead calm, occasionally even gaining the lead, but the moment has arrived for him to reveal that he himself is able to effectively transcend also the mutually opposing pressures which he is receiving from the various wings of his party. The centrist political identity which he has tried to give to his government, with his reshuffling even before he has made headway among the people, is being questioned by the party-line and third-world technocrats who have considerable influence even within his own faction.

The difficulties are becoming even greater, because the premier has "been informed" at last that the recovery of the economy will be delayed to far in the future, following a relevant explicit confirmation by the technocratic ministers. The same ministers are advising A. Papandreu to gamble more at the political level, with a continuation of the third-world identity which he had even up to a short time ago, so as to preserve the "militancy" of his party's youth. Regardless of how much weight the counsels of the technocrats finally carry at Kastri or to what extent the third-world visions continue to be attractive, his political choices are now almost entirely limited and confining.

In writing off the economy and disavowing third-world socialism, and in doing without its former "good" friends and wards of the last 2 1/2 years, Kastri is obliged to sail into unknown waters full of "pirates" as well as reefs. At the same time Papandreu realizes, and he is very much aware of this, that the responsibility for this journey falls exclusively and solely on himself. Without the enchantment of economicistic propaganda and the visionary projecting of all problems, Kastri knows now that it must present the image of being statesmanly, democratic, and responsible. Does its chief have the strength for all these things, can he change suddenly his political image and transform himself into an amicable and democratic leader?

The political developments of last week show that Papandreu is having great difficulty in sustaining the image of the democratic leader, as well as in putting up with the criticism and sarcasm which necessarily accompany this. The government's reaction vis-a-vis the junta elements was curious, as was the reciprocal attitude which the extreme rightists observed in avoiding any criticism of the present majority party in their public expressions. But the worst thing is its contempt for democratic institutions, in that the government has not yet learned (or perhaps other considerations are involved) that a person is one thing and an institution is another. The leader of the official opposition is an institution of democracy, and to him his counterpart, the premier, should respond only respectfully and responsibly, regardless of whether the answer is unyielding or not.

Assigning of Accountabilities

The centrist political identity which Papandreu is striving for, together with his numerous confessions about how he has neglected the centrists, is being sifted through the fine sieve of democratic practice. At this time the government is passing through its most difficult juncture after 2 1/2 years in power. The Euro-elections are coming, and it is obliged to present a certain political image, with the slogans and the demagogic which will necessarily accompany this. As an opposition party, it was able to pass off anything at all as its political image, since its role within the framework of the democracy consisted more in leveling criticism and not so much in giving an account of its own work. The latter would be judged by the people when it became a government, as A. Papandreu was fond of saying at that time. Time passed, and the "awkward" hour came for criticism and giving an account.

Thus, now the government is being judged on the basis of its work and its projects, and in fact it is not so much its individual officers who are being judged, since they have never counted, as much as it is the premier himself. Holding all powers in one person has the advantages of absolute sovereignty, but also the attendant consequences of utter ruin, as Georgios Papandreu would say. The blame for the government's lack of success falls solely on the premier, and he is the object of the criticism which is leveled because of all the negative things brought about by the exercise of his power. Whether it is unfortunate or fortunate for himself or for the country, the effort which Papandreu has made to distance himself from the government's accountabilities--at least to the degree that he participates, directly or indirectly, in the relevant decisions--has not borne fruit. The people are aware of Papandreu alone, and they impute the blame to him, just as they have expected from him whatever they were expecting.

For Greeks, the assigning of accountabilities is considered to be and is an integral, or rather the best, part of democracy, from ancient times, from the time of the city-state. This holds true in fact within that order which constitutes the essential part of the democratic practice of the people, and which is held together by all those who believe in the centrist political identity, not so much in the sense of the Center which appeared and developed after the war, but rather in the political form of the mid-

point and measure of democracy. This political dimension transcends the specific persons who had struggled under the banner of the Center and extends to the democratic practice of each citizen.

In this society with its centrist political mentality and democratic roots, the strange attitude of the government vis-a-vis the junta elements was a grievous affront. The ostensibly neutral attitude, as if their activity was of no concern to our country and did not take place in Athens, and as if these people did not have their history--a history which is still fresh in the minds of all of us--had its complement in their reciprocal action of going easy on the governing faction. These things suggest a frivolous and not at all earnest treatment of an issue which is a very sensitive one to society. Because the problem is not what the junta elements represent, but the fact that they alone have put themselves outside democracy, have become carriers of a contagious disease. The government's indulgence toward them can be interpreted only as the result of a fear of losing the majority vote from the people, and for this reason it is enduring anything which will diminish its opponent, and "let the chips fall where they may."

The Democratic Consensus

The regrettable thing in connection with the government is that it exposed its own weakness considerably before this was exploited by its opponents; these prefer to quarrel among themselves, being as indifferent to the country itself as PASOK is. As a government they had done everything that came to hand to bring Papandreu into power, and as the official opposition they are continuing the same work from the reverse direction. But it seems that since society criticizes the government more than the opposition, it has had the perception that the work of its opponent has been taken over by the present majority party. The government is doing what it can to undermine itself, the public sees this, and thus those who are leaving the majority party are not going to the official opposition, but are remaining at the crossroads.

On the other hand, at Kastri they know that since any recovery of the economy is ruled out, the only remaining solution for attracting people is political maneuvers, persuasion, and obtaining the consensus of the democratic community. In fact, as it becomes known that the new loans are being concluded abroad with two outfits at the interbank interest rate, its maneuvers must be all the more flexible and persuasive. But this means a change in the psychology of Papandreu and in the entire attitude emanating from Kastri, even in view of its new composition. In some areas these things are meeting with difficulties, because the premier is the one who is the chairman of PASOK, with the third-world visions, American background, and the populist image.

Thus necessarily such a consensus is dissipated even before it begins to function politically. The efforts of the premier to maintain delicate balances with the KKE for the sake of labor-union peace infuriate still more those leftists who do not equate economic indulgence with the desires of Moscow. Similarly, the concessions by Papandreu to his executive officers may have some restraining effect on the political operations of

some, but they greatly tarnish Papandreu himself in the eyes of the democratic community. Certain moves which were tolerated as political games and as part of the shortcomings of the leader of the official opposition provoke the anger of the people when they are done by the government, where they are considered to be abuses.

Perhaps this may be the greatest problem which faces Kastri--it has not understood that the political practice of the premier ought to be different from that of the leader of the official opposition. The tale about the wife of Caesar is well known, and Papandreu with his executive officers, technocrats, and professors from America has quite wearied the people, because it seems that he believes that the country is like the head of a bald man, where anyone can learn to be a barber.

12114
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BILL ON POLITICAL REFUGEE PROPERTY RETURN**Athens TA NEA in Greek 26 Jan 84 p 7**

[Text] At the same time that the first pensions for those of the National Resistance have begun to be approved, the government is also going to implement soon a new measure for national reconciliation, with the returning to the political refugees of their properties.

The relevant bill was signed by the appropriate parties, Minister of Finance Giannis Pottakis and Minister of Agriculture Kostas Simitis, and it will be introduced soon in the Chamber of Deputies. According to the provisions of the bill, all the agricultural and city properties which had been seized during the civil war and later are being released and returned to their legal owners. All assignments of these properties by the Greek State to a municipality, community, or other legal entity are canceled, whatever the reasons why they had taken place. As for such properties which have been made use of all these years (a house on a lot, a single-family house turned into an apartment building, and so forth), the payment of compensation by the Ministry of Finance is decreed, in accordance with the present prices for the value of the former property. It will be possible to compensate the owners in these cases either through sums of money or by the assignment of public land or property of equal value. In addition, if these properties have been trespassed on, it is decreed that the right of adverse possession for the trespassers is not in effect. According to data of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture, the lands seized for political reasons (farms, lots) come to 170,000 stremmas, and the homes number about 3,000, of which 700 are in urban centers.

12114
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PCI DIRECTORATE APPROVES BUDGET FOR 1983

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 29 Jan 84 p 11

[Document: "PCI Budget for Fiscal Year 1983"]

[Text] The Italian Communist Party Directorate approved the financial budget for fiscal year 1983 and 1984 budget estimate at a meeting on 11 January 1984 with the chairmen of the Senate and Chamber parliamentary groups and with regional secretaries. Also present was the chairman of the Central Collegium of Mayors.

The budget for 1984 closed with a deficit of 3,560,319,636 lire. This compared with a 1982 budget deficit of 5,642,983,914 lire. This was caused by an increase in income over estimates of 21.4 percent against an increase in expenditures of 17.8 percent and indicates the first sign of a reversal of trend even though some basic problems remain which have made it impossible to balance the budget. Particularly, there was a large increase in costs caused by the high rate of inflation and a persistent burden of financial costs. Income from self-financing totaled 61,030,046,039 lire including the sums paid in by communist parliamentarians, while the public contribution totaled only 27 percent of overall income. Furthermore as of 31 December 1983 the sum of 5,707,604,639 lire from the special L'UNITA fund-raising effort was turned over entirely to the publishing company. As of 22 January 1984, funds from that special effort totaled 8,623,256,718 lire.

Overall, the party dealt with the general increase in costs and a decrease in the real value of public contribution by developing--with greater commitment in the large majority of its organizations--the initiative for a fund raising campaign through membership, L'UNITA festivals, and forcefully reviving door-to-door solicitation.

As in 1982, funds from public financing were distributed according to the objective parameter of the votes in the area of each organization and in relation to the need to strengthen field units operating under particularly difficult conditions. Ordinary income from self-financing was distributed as follows: 28.4 percent to the party central administration; 71.6 percent to the field organizations. Altogether, including income resulting from legislation on public financing, field organizations received 55,087,338,866 lire of the party's total income of 97,094,853,828 lire.

The budget for fiscal year 1983 confirms that PCI financial policy is governed by democratically established rules; that its resources were fully decentralized and were used for the achievement of precise political objectives; and that the party's mass character, its organizational structure broadly spread throughout the country, and the rank and file relationship with citizens which characterizes the great fund raising campaign for the communist press, are guarantees which insure the increasingly broader development of political initiative.

Because of inflation and the complex mix of political problems labelled the "moral question," the slow but constant erosion of the value of monies appropriated through public financing pose the need for a reexamination of the 1974 law according to three basic lines: (1) Adoption of measures that would directly and indirectly contribute to creating the conditions to guarantee the development of party political initiative and the broadest and most widespread participation of citizens in the nation's political life. (2) Identification of the most suitable instruments that would permit--with respect for the political independence of each party--the maximum exposure of budgets and a real and more effective control by the voters and public review organizations. (3) Initiation of a broad political battle that would commit all democratic forces, even those not organized in parties, to revitalize all the country's democratic structures, freeing them from all that tangle of hidden mixtures and illegal interests that have already caused serious damage.

The rapid approval of the law regarding the juridical-economic status of public administrators, in addition to eliminating government delays and nonperformance, could constitute a first useful step along the road indicated.

On the basis of initiatives promoted and the results obtained in 1983, the party directorate believes that conditions exist that would permit all field organizations to prepare a balanced budget estimate for 1984 and to begin a gradual elimination of past budget deficits.

The process of reorganizing L'UNITA in which all interested parties participated in a positive way, will already in 1984 lead to a substantial cost decrease. The L'UNITA budget deficit, which will be covered by the party budget, is estimated on the order of 7.5 billion lire.

A further serious contribution to cost reduction must come from a considerable increase in daily newsstand sales, from militant distribution on festival days and from further increases in the number of subscribers. Important signs of recovery in this area appeared during 1983 which, with the great success of 18 December for the distribution of the newspaper at 5,000 lire, marked a high point of mobilization and political commitment throughout the whole party.

As a further step in balancing the budget, it is furthermore indispensable to develop an intense membership and recruiting campaign asking every member to contribute with a membership assessment equal to 1 day of work, an application of the principle that each must contribute according to his economic means.

A further push must be given to the unified fund drive for elections and the communist press so as to ensure that the party will have the instruments it needs to deal with the commitments for next June's election campaign for the renewal of the European Parliament and to strengthen L'UNITA on its 60th anniversary through initiatives which, in many forms, would contribute to guaranteeing the characteristics of a modern, national newspaper widely distributed among the masses.

All this, however, will not be sufficient without a wise reduction of expenditures and above all a continued control of administration which must require commitment from all executive groups; control of the administration is above all a selective approach to expenditures and, therefore, activities. This political commitment cannot be delegated to anyone.

Once more the PCI directorate invites all organizations, beginning with sectional organizations, to make their budgets public thus permitting all citizens to see how the party distributes its financial resources and for what purposes it uses them.

In compliance with requirements of existing regulations referring to public contributions to the financing of parties, the PCI directorate announces that no variation has taken place in regard to what was stated in the report attached to the 1982 budget in reference to participation in capital enterprises. As a consequence it confirms that the party's only direct participation in capital enterprises consists of the stock it holds in Unita, Inc., whose main office is in Rome, 19 via dei Taurini. Its administrative personnel furthermore hold stock in the following companies:

--Liberia Rinascita s.r.l. [Rinascita Book Store, Ltd.] main office in Rome, 2 via delle Botteghe Oscure.

--Editori Riuniti S.p.A. [Riuniti Publishers, Inc.] main office in Rome, 9/11 via Serchio.

--Societa Finanziaria Editoriale, SOFINED, s.r.l. [Publishing Finance Company, Ltd.] main office in Rome, 82 via Crescenzio.

--Societa Finanziaria Sviluppo Industriale, SOFISVIND, s.r.l. [Industrial Development Finance Company, Ltd.] (publishing operations) main office in Rome, 82 via Crescenzio.

The above-mentioned companies do not produce any income, but rather are financed through the party budget. The attachment indicates the sources which, in various forms, made free contributions totalling more than 5 million lire to the party in 1983.

Furthermore, considering the special juridical nature of political parties, no real estate is listed directly in the name of the PCI. Several pieces of real estate throughout various parts of the country, woned by capital companies whose shares or stocks are in the name of individuals who are members of the PCI, are turned over to party offices or political, cultural and social associations in order to carry out their activities according to regulations. The PCI receives no income from any of these companies including the decentralized organizations. On the contrary, individual organizational budgets bear the cost of real estate investments whose aim is to strengthen the democratic tissue of the nation.

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Income	TOTALS
(1) Annual membership income:	
--Membership dues: L 25,438,488,817	
--Amount of assessment which each communist member of parliament pays to the party: L 5,134,033,222	L 30,572,522,039
(2) Government contributions:	
(a) reimbursement for election campaign expenses: 4,573,928,013	
(b) annual contribution to party activity: 21,152,430,513	
(c) annual contribution to mixed parliamentary group activity (independent and left sectors) in the Chamber and the Senate: 496,798,606	26,223,157,132
(3) Foreign contributions:	
(a) from foreign or international parties or movements: 0	
(b) from other foreign sources: 0	0
(4) Other contributions:	
(a) special contributions by members: 0	
(b) nonmember contributions (individuals, private institutions, trade union organizations): 0	0
(5) Receipts from other sources:	
(a) paid rents: 0	
(b) interest on securities: 2,684,000	
(c) interest on financial activity: 175,087,569	

- (d) dividends on investments and income from companies and other economic activities: 0
- (e) other financial sources:
- from Chamber and Senate groups for reimbursement of pay to group personnel: 286,950,507
 - contributions by parliamentary groups for political and cultural demonstrations: 494,627,000
 - contributions by communist parliamentary group to the European parliament for demonstrations: 778,905,841
 - contributions by the European Parliament for reimbursement of expenses for European elections: 1,029,639,900

Total (e): 2,590,123,248 2,767,894,817

(6) Various receipts:

- (a) from publishing activities: 0
- (b) from demonstrations (L'UNITA festivals and press fund drives): 30,457,524,000

Total (a) and (b): 30,457,524,000

- (c) from other prescribed activities:
 - subscriptions to organizations for the South: 626,406,431
 - subscription certificates for L'UNITA: 4,005,473,314
 - special distribution of L'UNITA on 18 December: 1,702,131,325

Total (c): 6,334,011,070

- (d) other sources: 739,744,770

37,531,279,840

- - -

Total income	97,094,853,828
Fiscal year deficit	3,560,319,636
Total balanced budget	<u>L 100,655,173,464</u>

Expenditures

(1) Contributions to:

(a)	Chamber of Deputies parliamentary group:	141,979,760
(b)	Senate parliamentary group:	69,075,032
(c)	institutions and national sources:	0
(d)	foreign institutions and sources:	0
(e)	field headquarters and organizations: --for contributions:	11,355,612,035
	--share for membership:	20,859,560,830
	--share for press subscription: 22,872,166,001	
		55,298,393,658

(2) Personnel expenditures:

(a)	salaries, reimbursement of expenses and daily allowances and expenses: 3,789,583,742	
(b)	contributions for Social Security and welfare: 767,175,572	
		4,556,759.314

(3) General expenditures:

(a)	interest on debt and finance costs: 7,677,134,707	
(b)	unpaid rents: 205,884,326	
(c)	duties and taxes: 2,036,301	
(d)	maintenance and repair: 582,140,900	
(e)	administrative expenditures: 1,597,655,445	
(f)	other expenditures: --departmental and sectional work: 1,078,176,800 --research and study centers: 526,077,749 --party schools and courses: 553,466,630 --contributions to elderly comrades and for support: 373,143,935 --national political activities: 421,161,689 --activities and militant actions for unity: 92,698,510 --international activities: 428,359,042 --data analysis center: 610,756,550	

14,148,692,584

(4) Expenses for information and publicity publications:

(a) for publishing activities:

--L'UNITA: 16,207,604,639

--RINASCITA: 500,000,000

--printing plants: 396,000,000

--various publications: 7,500,000

--party magazines: 350,000,000

(b) for cultural and information activities:

--books for organizations and comrades:

44,424,956

--radio and RV: 562,428,945

--new centers for cultural activities:

28,322,003

(c) for political information and propaganda activities:

--publication of the budget: 16,571,330

--activities of the department of propaganda and information: 1,529,544,669

19,742,396,542

(5) Expenses for election campaigns 5,503,417,147

(6) Expenses for other activities (16th PCI Congress) 1,405,514,219

Total expenditures 100,655,173,464

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Actual financial situation at the close of fiscal year 1983

Fiscal year income 97,094,853,828

Fiscal year expenditures 100,655,173,464

FY 1983 deficit 3,560,319,636

Cumulative deficit from preceding fiscal years 20,238,757,420

Cumulative deficit at close of FY 1983 L 23,799,077,056

6034

CSO: 3528/51

PCP 10TH CONGRESS CLOSING ADDRESS BY SECRETARY GENERAL CUNHAL

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 22 Dec 83 Supplement p 2

[Text of address by Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the Portuguese Communist Party, at the closing session of the 10th PCP Congress, held in Porto from 15 to 18 December 1983]

[Text] Comrades

The 10th congress, which is concluding its proceedings, is not only an important event in the life of our party.

For everything our party is and represents for Portugal, it was also an important event for the workers, for the people, for the country.

The news media, controlled by the PS/PSD [Socialist Party/ Social Democratic Party] government, may well virtually ignore the congress and thus attempt to prevent the analyses, opinions, policies and proposals of our party from reaching the people.

We will intensify our efforts, our information, our propaganda and our political actions so that an ever growing number of Portuguese men and women will learn the truth about what the communists want, because when they know what the communists truly want, more people will join our ranks or struggle on our side.

Our 10th congress was a magnificent affirmation of the organized force of our party, of its unity and cohesion (which has reached the level of militant fraternity), of its democratic internal life (of which our congress was an admirable example), of its solid roots in the working class and the masses, of its deep understanding of the problems and its role in the people's struggle and in the economic, social and political life of the country.

But our 10th congress was something more.

It was an affirmation of the powerful force of the popular labor and democratic movement and the heroic struggle of the Portuguese people in defense of the April conquests, the democratic regime, national independence and peace.

It was also an affirmation of the vitality of the April conquests, specifically the nationalizations, agrarian reform, workers' rights and democratic local government, and their total correspondence to the needs of the people and the country; an affirmation of the need for their consolidation and perpetuation as an essential condition to overcome the crisis, to improve the people's living standard, to build a democratic society and to guarantee national independence.

It is no exaggeration to declare that the tribune of our congress was the tribune of the Portugal of April.

Our congress closely examined the country's revolutionary process, the crisis and its causes, the development of the offensive to restore capitalism, latifundism and imperialism, the policy of the PS/PSD government and the disaster to which that policy is leading Portugal. The congress proposed a new alternative policy, capable of rescuing the country from the crisis and solving the nation's problems.

The 10th congress drafted some guidelines for all aspects of party activity.

As the congress comes to an end, the work of implementing its decisions begins.

From everything we have seen and heard here--the deep seriousness with which the problems were treated, the determination, the enthusiasm that breathed here and that we know breathes in all the party organizations--we are confident that our great party will throw itself enthusiastically into the work of carrying out the decisions.

We are certain that--always with the workers, always with the peasants, always with the popular masses, counting always on the courage and initiative of the communist women and the enthusiastic militancy of the JCP [Portuguese Communist Youth]--we will achieve the tasks determined by the 10th congress of our party.

The urgent tasks are to organize, promote, broaden and intensify the struggle of the workers and all the antimonopolistic classes and sectors in defense of their basic interests and rights, in defense of the freedoms and other great conquests of April.

The central political tasks are to stay the advance of the counterrevolutionary process and to lead the struggle to put down the PS/PSD government--the government of desolation, hunger, unemployment, poverty, national disaster--and to form a democratic government that under the foreseeable circumstances could become a true democratic government of national salvation.

To put a definitive end to the counterrevolutionary process and to the restoration of capitalism, latifundism and imperialism which lead the country to poverty and disaster; to mobilize the national resources; to relaunch the economic activities; to promote production; to improve the people's living conditions, to rescue the country from the crisis; to undertake a development policy within the framework of democracy and national independence: these are the basic objectives of the democratic and patriotic policy.

The enormous audience greeted these words with prolonged applause, demonstrating the consensus of the Communists and the broad mass of workers and democrats, which was also demonstrated by the applause that came several times during the passages in the address regarding the national political situation.

"The peace struggle in Portugal," Cunhal said, "is developing in two basic directions. There is the struggle for the general goals that are shared by all the peoples of Europe, against the installation of the missiles, for disarmament, for demilitarization and for other demands, other goals which are valid for us as Portuguese, which are valid for the French people, for the English people, for the German people, for the peoples of Europe. But there is also another form of the peace struggle in Portugal, another direction to our peace struggle, and this is the struggle against a government that bows to imperialism, that has become the servant of North American imperialism and is willing to grant facilities to the Americans for their aggressive policy. In struggling against the PS/PSD, for its resignation, for a democratic alternative, for a democratic government with a democratic policy and a foreign policy of peace and friendship with all peoples, we are also making a contribution, and a serious contribution, to the cause of peace."

The secretary general went on to analyze the Portuguese political situation, based on the conclusions of the congress. He particularly stressed the aggravation of the social situation by a government whose policy is exclusively for the benefit of the "great capitalists and latifundists, the rich landlords and the great speculators. Our people," he declared, "are strong enough to overthrow the counterrevolution."

The analysis of the crisis; the people's struggle in defense of the revolution; the weakness of the present coalition government; the party situation, in which there is room for new parties that can attract those who, although they no longer see themselves in the PS of Mario Soares, do not see themselves in the PCP either; the prospect of and the need for a democratic alternative: these were some of the other issues addressed by the Communist leader.

Finally, speaking about the strengthening of the party, Alvaro Cunhal concluded: "'With the PCP, April will continue.' This was the slogan of our congress, and we will do everything in our power to live up to this slogan."

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CSO: 3542/28

REPORT ON CLOSING SESSION OF PCP 10TH CONGRESS

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 22 Dec 83 Supplement p 3

[Report on comments by Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the Portuguese Communist Party, at the closing session of the 10th PCP Congress, held in Porto from 15 to 18 December 1983]

[Excerpt] For about 1 hour, Alvaro Cunhal summarized the achievements of the congress, beginning with an analysis of the international situation.

"In fact, if we look at world developments," Comrade Alvaro Cunhal stressed, "we see that in the last decades the workers and the peasants have not only grown stronger but have won great victories in the process of building socialism, in the conquest of national independence and democratic regimes, in the defense of the basic interests of the workers and peoples of the world. These are historic victories, which the imperialist aggressors cannot conceal. And responding to the intensive propaganda to the contrary, we must have confidence that, just as world developments in the last decades have favored the forces working to liberate humanity from exploitation and oppression, in the years ahead the struggle will go forward to liberate the workers and peoples throughout the world."

Later, referring to the struggle for peace and against the imperialist aggression, the PCP secretary general declared:

"Reading certain newspapers in our country, above all, some newspapers that claim to be independent and neutral, it would be said that the responsibility for the aggravation of the international situation lies, when all is said and done, with the two 'superpowers,' that we must divide the responsibility in half--at best, let's say most of it on one side, four fifths on one side and one fifth on the other--but that the responsibility lies basically with the United States and the Soviet Union. For our part, we wish to state, as clearly as possible, that we feel it is impossible to put a country which defends the peace, which supports the peoples' liberation struggles and effectively contributes to the defense of world peace, in the same bag with an aggressive imperialist state, a state which carries out aggressive military action to put down the peoples' liberation struggles and challenges the conquests already achieved in the socialist countries themselves."

Our 10th congress illustrated that the PCP is not only ready to examine the institutional, political and social feasibility of a democratic government of national salvation; it is not only ready but fully prepared to assume its responsibilities in a democratic solution and to contribute directly to overcoming the crisis and solving the nation's serious problems.

In its organizational and technical aspects, the 10th congress was the result of the collective efforts of thousands of comrades, many of whom worked day and night, to the point of exhaustion, many of whom are not here, many of whom are around in this hall, in the gardens, at the gates, in the streets of Porto, in the Labor Centers, at the reception centers and in the most varied services. Their joint efforts, working efficiently and quietly behind the scenes, were essential in making the congress function simply, naturally and smoothly. It is this fine organizational and technical work and the dedication of thousands of comrades that, with your permission, I warmly salute in the name of the delegates to this congress.

There was the assembling and installation, the decoration and the beautiful arrangement of this hall of our congress, in which we can sense the technical competency, the artistic taste and the firm hand of the worker.

There were the complex solutions to the problems of lighting and sound, reception, seating and transportation, inside and outside wiring, the typing, printing and distribution of documents, which amounted to 1.3 million pages in the course of the congress, not including the printed text of the political resolution and the opening address.

There were the archives and the registry of documents, the reception and escort for the invited delegations, the interpreting, the written translations, the simultaneous interpretation in five languages (French, English, Russian, Spanish and French).

There were the food and lodging, the security and assistance, the janitorial and restroom services.

There will also be the very hard work of many, many militants who will remain to dismantle the congress.

It has been an enormous effort, possible only because of great conscientiousness and dedication.

In all this, we sense not only the efficient, competent and organized labor but also the vitality and the heart of all the Communists who took part in it and also those non-Communists who contributed magnificently and to whom we give our heart-felt thanks.

But the congress was not just the work of the comrades who took part in its organization and technical aspects.

In every aspect, without exception, our 10th congress was the work of the entire party.

--Of militants present and absent.

I believe, comrades, that I express the sentiment of all when I say that here in our congress we felt the activity and the struggle of all our organizations and militants, the incomparable value of the common effort, the sure, bold and creative result of the labor and the struggle of our great party collective, created, expanded, forged and united in the life and struggle of our glorious party.

During these days the eyes of the party members, the workers, democrats and patriots have been turned to our congress.

We can say equally truthfully that our 10th congress labored always with eyes turned to all the members of our great party, to all democrats and patriots (to whom we appeal for united action), to our people and country (to whose service the Communist Party always has been and always will be dedicated).

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words to our guests, to thank them for taking part in the proceedings of our congress.

They brought to our congress not only their vibrant solidarity with our party and our people but the reports on their experiences and news of their struggles.

To all of you, we express once again the deep gratitude of the Portuguese Communists and the assurance of our active solidarity.

As you return to your countries, dear comrades and friends, we ask you to say for us that the democratic conquests are alive in Portugal, that the struggle continues and that the Portuguese Communist Party will spare no labor or efforts to merit the trust that the Portuguese people place in it.

Viva the Portugal of April!

Viva the Portuguese Communist Party!

6362
CSO: 3542/28

CONSERVATIVES' CARL BILDT CONTINUES ATTACK ON DEFENSE POLICY**Questions Nuclear-Free Zone**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Feb 84 p 8

[Article by Sven Thiessen]

[Text] "The basic conditions for a Nordic nuclear-free zone do not exist today. There is a risk that a too activist conduct on Sweden's part will be regarded as an effort to influence other countries' choice of security policy. It is a sacred unwritten Nordic law that we do not criticize or try to influence each other in our choice of security policy."

The Conservative Party's foreign policy expert, Riksdag member Carl Bildt, said this in an interview with TT.

Sweden's parliament has instructed the government to keep in contact with other Nordic governments concerning the conditions that exist for a Nordic nuclear-free zone in a broader European context. The government feels such a zone could reduce tensions in all of Europe.

"I think the Nordic zone idea should be viewed in a very long time perspective," said Bildt. "We in Sweden should be prepared to act in a situation in which the zone issue may become relevant. That will not happen until there is a European agreement on various types of security involvement that includes both conventional and nuclear weapons."

Soviet Force

"Neither superpower is interested in a major conflict at the present time. But both are working for their own interests in different parts of the world. This is most noticeable in the case of the Soviet Union which uses military force to secure various kinds of political gains."

Does he think that the increased tension should cause Sweden to review its neutrality and security policy?

"Of course not. However we are being influenced in an entirely different way than before by the increased strategic interest in the Northern European and North Atlantic areas. We are no longer living on a flank but in an area regarded as central by both superpowers. This requires that we sharpen our security policy attitude substantially.

"Since the late 1960's and early 1970's there has been a tendency to disparage the role of the armed forces in security policy. Today our military resources are insufficient to handle fundamental security policy tasks, such as protecting our territory in peacetime."

Bildt wants a firmer and tighter security policy as well as greater caution in foreign policy actions.

"The first year of the Palme government has been characterized by vacillation back and forth in the area of foreign policy, including central security policy matters. The government has tried to stand on different legs. This applies to both the Nordic nuclear-free zone and the European corridor, for which the proposal was written by a foreign opposition politician."

Criticizes Palme's Disarmament Stands

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Feb 84 p 7

[Article by Kurt Malarstedt]

[Text] There is often an anxious expression on Carl Bildt's young countenance and his almost 35-year-old shoulders are burdened with grave responsibilities.

This awareness of responsibility is expressed verbally in the media so often that responsible observers wonder if the young Conservative will one day work so hard that he breaks his suspenders, if not his neck.

Olof Palme is one of those who would like to grab Carl Bildt by the ear, sometimes quite roughly, when he expresses a deviating opinion on some foreign or security policy issue.

"It is nice that the prime minister takes my statements seriously," Bildt says with the dry controlled choice of words that distinguishes his way of expressing himself.

He himself feels that the fact that he seems to have so many opinions so often is due to the fact that journalists so often want to ask him about something "and actually I only say something when I have an opinion; there are times when I have nothing to say."

Most recently this happened in connection with Nicaragua and whether the prime minister's visit to that country was appropriate when its regime--at least for a few days--was preparing to hold a general election.

Palme "should seriously reconsider his trip" and he "should think seriously about not going there," Carl Bildt was quoted as saying in SVENSKA DAGBLADET Monday morning.

Due to the time difference it took several days before Palme's irritated snorting reached Sweden from Mexico.

By then Bildt had found an occasion to modify his standpoint or, if you will, soften his criticism.

Skeptical

During a conversation in the middle of the week, he said:

"It is hard to know how to behave with regard to something like the Nicaragua visit. One cannot really take a stand before one has seen the results. I am skeptical about attending mass meetings. But it is something else to sit down and hold a discussion with the leaders of the country. There one can be critical."

Bildt is not at all averse to praising Olof Palme's conduct in foreign policy issues. After the prime minister's speech on the first day of the Stockholm conference, Bildt commented approvingly.

And during our conversation he pointed out that Palme began his present period as prime minister by rushing down to the EC Commission in Brussels for the purpose of improving the contacts that the nonsocialist government had neglected.

But in general, Carl Bildt is concerned about Olof Palme and his foreign policy, especially his security policy, and he sees it as his task, his responsibility perhaps, to speak out clearly when he thinks the course is becoming skewed, meaning to the East.

Although STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN thinks Bildt manages "with the accuracy of a sleepwalker to always come down on one side--he always wants us to be harsher and more reckless in our attacks on the East, more considerate and more cautious if the West has been up to something."

Carl Bildt sighs.

Neanderthals

He does not care for debate on the "Neanderthal level," he said with regard to the attacks he is sometimes exposed to in Social Democratic newspapers.

"As far as the Labor press is concerned one cannot say anything without its being 'NATO membership.'"

No, he does not think Sweden should join NATO.

Nicaragua must be regarded as a moderate attack on Palme by Bildt compared with what he later had to say in connection with such things as the Bahr affair and the Ferm-SVENSKA DAGBLADET affair and compared with what Palme had to say about the young Conservative in connection with the Bildt affair.

Bildt is so fond of talking about Olof Palme that this is interesting in itself and may tell us something about Bildt too:

"To an increasing extent Palme has equated Swedish foreign and security policy with his own policy. The problem is that there are different trends within the Social Democratic Party and Palme wavers between the different lines."

Bildt spoke of the "Theorin wing" (after arms reduction delegate Maj Britt Theorin) "which actually represents a very clear break with the security policy tradition shared by the major parties during the entire postwar period."

Bildt calls the other line the "Osten Unden-Sven Andersson line" and he feels that in addition to the former Social Democratic foreign ministers it was also expressed in some editorials in the Social Democratic periodical TIDEN recently. Defense Minister Anders Thunborg is a responsible advocate of this line.

"The distance between the Theorin wing--which wants sizable reductions in Swedish defense and a totally different foreign policy profile--and the Unden-Andersson school is actually much greater than the distance between the official government line and our line on the nonsocialist side," Carl Bildt maintains now.

Worried

Is he worried that Palme will go more toward the Theorin line?

"Yes, you could say that. There is an ambiguity in foreign policy. At times Palme has appeared more in the role of international peace apostle. We have had 'mutual security' and the playing down of military defense, the playing down of national security and foreign policy activism, tendencies in the Theorin direction.

"But at times, for example after the Submarine Defense Commission issued its report, Palme has placed himself quite solidly on the national security line."

It is precisely the "touch of unpredictability" in Palme that worries Bildt.

"He is an actor who plays parts in different dramas and he throws himself into his roles. But he plays so many parts in such varied dramas that one does not know what is there underneath it all.

"One would like to trust him. But he himself has created some of the distrust we have in Swedish politics now. It is regrettable that he has helped produce some of the brutalization of the political debate."

Palme and Bildt are frequently compared. There are similarities: the humble background, the quick intelligence, the meteor on the political sky, the intellectualism.

No, Carl Bildt says, he feels no grudging admiration for Olof Palme. He neither dislikes nor admires him.

One detects a fascination.

Friendly Terms With Media

The fact that Carl Bildt receives as much space in the media as Conservative leader Ulf Adelsohn--sometimes more--is not just due to his ability to express himself in complete and easily-edited sentences.

He is also well-informed, well-read, energetic, generally capable and a weighty voice in the Conservative Party and not just on foreign and security policy issues.

He travels a lot and has good contacts in most important capital cities in Western Europe, as well as in the United States, as we know. He prefers to travel alone or with a small group, evidently because this provides more opportunities to "get acquainted with the issues and discuss them with people.

At one time--when he was a student politician--he acted as political consultant for Salens. Now he works for himself and for the Conservatives.

Perhaps deep down Carl Bildt has an ambition to follow in the footsteps of his prospective father-in-law, Gosta Bohman, and become party leader.

But is he considering acting as foreign minister, for example, in the non-socialist government he is convinced could be a reality as early as 1985?

He actually considered the question for 10 seconds.

"I really don't know. I am unsure about that. There are elements in the everyday life of a foreign minister that are of an extremely ceremonial nature. He stands under the crystal chandelier and shakes hands. He meets various visitors, some of whom are interesting and some of whom are, to be honest, genuinely uninteresting. I may not be very interested in these elements."

Issues interest him more than positions, Bildt said.

Child of the 1960's

He was formed in the 1960's. How about 1968?

"One is influenced by trends. No standpoint was self-evident. One was forced to think through one's views and to explain and defend them. One got a clear idea of where one stood."

Did he at any time feel any sympathy with the thinking of the new left?

His reply was indirect:

"I regarded these ideas as confused. One couldn't really tell what they involved. There was an enthusiasm and a freshness in the new left that was a challenge. But the new left quickly degenerated into dogmatism and Stalinism."

Wasn't there this kind of enthusiasm among the Conservatives?

"The entire world of political ideas was in retreat. The left had the initiative. At the same time there was a redefinition of many aspects of liberal-conservative policy which made it more modern and more effective.

"After 1976 and the debate that was held on freedom and socialism--a debate I think we Conservatives won--the Social Democrats have been in retreat. All they do now in the realm of political ideas is to conduct adjustment maneuvers. Ingvar Carlsson is more a minister of adjustment than a future minister."

Political Science

Back then, in the 1960's, he studied political science at the University of Stockholm and everything was in chaos. He is still a student of political science.

"I never planned to be a politician or a member of Riksdag. I went into politics because of interest and involvement, interest in specific issues, curiosity and an active determination to try and accomplish something. That means more than the formal positions. That sounds terribly modest, but I think that is the way it is."

Could he imagine being a member of Riksdag until he is 65 years old?

"No, no, no."

If one asks, he says he is open to the idea of an international career or a career in business or in the newspaper branch or in diplomacy--"without there being anything special behind my saying so.

"And young? Thank heavens, I am not young any longer, surely."

VPK Chairman: Conservatives Security Risk

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Feb 84 p 7

[Article by Sven Thiessen]

[Text] In a future government the Conservatives would represent a security risk that would jeopardize the confidence the rest of the world has in Swedish neutrality policy. This claim was made by the chairman of the Left-Communist Party [VPK], member of Riksdag Lars Werner in a TT interview.

"I am unsure of what the Conservatives stand for today," said Werner. "They do not openly advocate getting closer to NATO, but if you carry their arguments to its final conclusion, it means that we should abandon the line of remaining free of alliances and form closer ties with the western defense alliance.

"That is especially apparent in their security policy evaluations.

"In recent years the Conservatives have withdrawn from the fellowship of agreement on backing traditional Swedish foreign policy. Today I do not regard the Conservatives as very reliable when it comes to Swedish security policy."

Lars Werner recalls that there is a Riksdag resolution on a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

"The Conservatives also backed the resolution formally, but in practice they are working against the idea of a zone. On this point they have moved closer to the Conservative parties in Norway and Denmark. They are conducting an open campaign against a nuclear-free zone in Europe that is free of combat weapons. This is a step away from the Swedish foreign policy the other parties support.

"We think the government is pursuing a wise policy for peace and arms reduction in Europe. We are in complete agreement with the government there, but the Conservatives are not. They do everything they can to cast doubts on the government's efforts.

"Today the Conservatives are not a security risk--they are not big enough to play that role. But they would be if they were in the government."

Why is the Warsaw Pact but not NATO positive toward a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region and in central Europe?

"I think it is basically a question of different strategies. The leading power in NATO is the United States and the United States wants the NATO lands in Europe as a buffer. The Reagan administration sits thousands of miles away and discusses security matters while the people in Europe will have to take the punches.

"It is part of Reagan's simplified view of the world that future nuclear wars can be limited to and fought in Europe. This cynical view is the basis for the negative view of nuclear-free zones. The reason why the East bloc views the idea positively is connected with their experiences from World War II. People in the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia have much too vivid recollections of what war means."

Does he share the Swedish military view that NATO cruise missiles would be shot down if they pass over Sweden?

"Sweden must assert its neutrality by doing everything possible to prevent the cruise missiles from passing over Swedish territory. But brash assertions that we can shoot them down are dangerous if we do not know that we can shoot them all down. In that case the power that is hit by the cruise missiles can accuse us of letting some through.

"On this point we are involved in the nuclear strategies of the great powers. But there should be no lack of clarity here. Therefore it is necessary that the defense minister, as spokesman for the government, makes the Swedish position on the cruise missiles absolutely clear. Can we shoot them down? Should we shoot them down? Does that mean that we would release nuclear charges over Sweden?"

Arms Purchase

Would he consider purchasing weapons from the Soviet Union and other East bloc nations in order to reduce what VPK considers its overdependence on the United States in that case?

"I think that would be a mistake. We are critical of the fact that a large part of the JAS [fighter-bomber-reconnaissance plane] project consists of components from the United States. But it would not increase the credibility of our party or Swedish freedom from alliances if we suggested purchasing parts from another bloc, in this case the Soviet Union.

"Reduced dependence must involve seeking other markets. Switzerland is one when it comes to electronics, Austria is another. At times we must be prepared to accept higher costs in order to be independent.

"We want to eliminate the entire JAS project because it is a poor one both economically and militarily. It wrecks large parts of the Swedish defense system's continued expansion. Already now we see that the heavy investments in airplanes leave the navy sitting there. There are military men who share this view."

Swedish officers study at military schools in the United States? Should they also study at military schools in the Soviet Union?

"That depends entirely on what they are studying. I regard studying in the United States as an expression of the close ties between Swedish defense and NATO. If things were so simple that these ties could be broken by studying at military schools in Moscow, then I think they should study there."

Can Sweden set a good example and start disarming unilaterally?

"If there are any countries that should be able to take the lead in arms reduction, they are the nonaligned countries. Therefore Swedish security policy should rely more on measures to create trust, on an active foreign and security policy, than on the conventional arms buildup.

"As the situation is today, I think there are some difficulties. But while waiting for a better international situation in which Sweden could start to disarm unilaterally, I think we could make a redistribution within Swedish defense for the benefit of civil defense and economic defense."

How would VPK tighten up regulations for Swedish arms exports?

"Arms shipments to East Timor and Burma (where the governments use the arms against freedom movements) show that there are loopholes that must be closed. Such arms shipments damage confidence in Sweden's neutrality policy. The same is true of the liberal view toward reinvestments in South Africa."

VPK supports the Palme Commission's proposal for a 12-month freeze on deployment of new nuclear weapons and the resumption of the arms reduction talks in Geneva. What initiatives should Sweden take?

"It is possible that some initiative could be taken during the security conference, but I am not sure of that. The most important thing is getting broad support for the Palme Commission's proposal for a moratorium. If nuclear weapons are not deployed, it is a step forward, but it is a long way from that to going back and dismantling those that are in place. There can be occasions when I think Sweden, along with other nonaligned countries that want to play an active role, should take a concrete initiative."

Bildt Appointed to Defense Study Panel

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Feb 84 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Riksdag member Carl Bildt will be the Conservatives' representative on the new defense study panel the government will appoint when it meets on Thursday. The Conservative parliamentary group decided this on Tuesday.

The nomination indicates a generation shift in the Conservative Party. Bildt replaces the chairman of the Riksdag Defense Committee, Per Petersson of Gaddvik. He has been on many defense study panels in the past.

Per Petersson told DAGENS NYHETER:

"I have nothing against Bildt being on the new defense panel. He needs to learn about this."

As reported previously, the chairman of the new defense study group will be former LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] chairman, Gunnar Nilsson.

In all there will be seven members on the defense committee, compared to more than a dozen on the last study panel.

This means that the Social Democrats can name three members, the nonsocialist parties one each and that Gunnar Nilsson will have the deciding vote.

The nonsocialist parties named their members on the committee themselves. The Conservatives wanted to have two members at the expense of the Liberal Party, to begin with. But the others would not agree to that.

With two seats, both Per Petersson and Carl Bildt would have been on the committee. In the situation that arose, the Conservatives decided to go with Bildt.

The Liberal Party will be represented by former Riksdag member Hans Lindblad, who was also a member of the last defense panel. The Center Party has not made up its mind yet, but it is assumed that Gunnar Bjork of Gavle will be the Center Party's representative. He served as chairman in the final phase of the last defense committee.

The Social Democratic representatives, in addition to Gunnar Nilsson, are not yet clear. Olle Goransson will be one and probably also Barbro Evermo, who is a member of the Defense Committee. A possible third choice is Roland Brannstrom, who is chairman of the Conscription Committee.

One of the defense study group's most important tasks will be to plan to reduce the peacetime organization of the armed forces in the 1990's and a personal contact with the Conscription Committee would make this easier.

The defense group will make suggestions for defense organization in peace and in wartime for the 5-year period following 1987. It will follow the old working procedures.

This means that the group will first issue a security policy report and then work out an organizational plan for defense.

Important tasks in addition to reducing the peacetime organization will be to formulate rules for air defense and submarine defense.

A special task will be to formulate rules for how changes in the exchange rate of currency will affect defense budgets.

MILITARY

FRANCE

SODERN VISUALIZATION SYSTEM FOR AIR COMBAT SIMULATORS

Paris L'AERONAUTIQUE ET L'ASTRONAUTIQUE in French No 103, 1983-6 pp 53-59

Article by F. Desvignes, J. R. Huriet, and R. A. Sultan*/

Text In a first chapter, the needs for visualization in air combat simulation are given, then the description of the Sodern Visualization System (SVS) mode of operation is done and as a conclusion the good fit between the SVS characteristics and the required performance is demonstrated. Other fields of application are mentioned due to specific SVS capabilities. Abstract published in English

Visualization in Air Combat Simulators

Evolution of Simulators

The major purpose of the first simulators was pilot training, and consequently they required imagery with only limited information content in a restricted field of observation: for example, a runway and horizon profile with a few ground reference points. For lack of other means of providing the student with visual information, the method used was cinematographic projection of a landscape as the student would see it in normal flying, the instructor being charged with noting student errors in relation to instructions given. That technique is also applied in automobile driver training.

In time it became necessary to improve the realism of the visual environment and cabin motion in order to meet the requirements of air combat or ground attack missions. One solution, still in use, consists of presenting a landscape image to a student positioned in a cockpit. This can be a virtual image provided by a television cathode ray tube, and projected to infinity with a large field by means of a large scale optical system. Or it can be a true long distance image obtained by projection onto a screen, usually

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spherical. The image itself is created by a television camera moving over a reduced terrain model, with the same motions as those of the aircraft, in response to commands from the pilot's position. The pilot sees before him the image received by the camera and presented within a field of approximately 60 degrees; beyond that field is a quasi-uniform blue sky and a dark "ground" serving primarily to mark the horizon (fig. 1).

Current projects aim to give the pilot a quasi-total visual ambience. To that end, in the arrangement presently most favored, the cockpit is placed at the center of a sphere on which multiple images are precisely coordinated. Since the pilot must generally observe images at long distances--over 100 m --the images must themselves be projected at a distance not entailing parallax error: that is, at least 4 to 6 m. Consequently the spheres in use have diameters of 8 to 12 m, with the pilot's head positioned at the center. Most often, it is desired to link two spheres (fig. 2) so that two pilots can either fight each other or fly in formation. Moreover, in order to extend the flight range beyond the limitations imposed by the dimensions of the reduced terrain model, computer-generated synthetic images are employed which can create the illusion of a much more extensive landscape.

Realism of Simulation

For the greatest possible realism of simulation the pilot's major needs are:

That luminosity of the observed image be sufficient so as not to reduce his visual capacities;

That the observed image include all important details which would appear naturally in an actual landscape;

That there be no lag in projected images.

With the spheres system described above it is at present impossible to provide the pilot with images whose luminosity equals that of natural daytime scenes. However, it can be noted in fig. 3, curve B, that as soon as a luminance level of the order of 1 candela per square meter is attained the pilot experiences no loss of resolution. That level of luminance is therefore the minimum which must be attained.

For an observer to distinguish a detail in an image, its luminance (L) or color must differ sufficiently from that of the background (I) (opticians define the contrast as the relationship $(L-I)/(L+I)$ between the difference and sum of luminances), and the apparent dimensions of the detail must be sufficient. In foveal vision the human eye can distinguish a contrast of 5 percent on extended details (over 0.5 degree), and objects of a few seconds to a minute of arc in cases where the contrast is 1 (the sector near $a=0$, curve A, fig. 3).

Thus, projected images must have the best possible contrast so that details can be observed. In a sphere whose inner surface is covered by a clear dif-

fusing coating--which seems the most favored solution at present--there occurs a phenomenon of multiple diffused reflections: each image projected onto the sphere creates parasitic light which is finally added uniformly to that which contributes to the images, thus reducing the contrast. To take a representative example (fig. 4): in a sphere, portion A_s is covered by high-luminosity images corresponding to the sky; portion A_g is covered by low-luminosity images corresponding to the terrain; and a third portion, A_d , is not seen by the pilot since it is hidden by the structure of the aircraft. If R equals the diffuse reflection factor (or albedo) of the sphere's interior coating, the ratio of useful luminance at the image (emanating from the primary reflection) to parasitic luminance (emanating from multiple reflections) equals $1-R$; to ensure that image contrast is not too degraded by multiple reflections, the value of R must be small. Considering the number of parameters involved in these calculations, it would be tedious to give a numerical example, but it may be concluded that $R=0.15$ seems a good compromise between light loss in the primary image (direct luminance being then but $2/10$ of what it would be with a pure white coating) and loss of contrast due to multiple reflections.

This situation dictates the use of image projectors capable of high luminous flux. For example, in a sphere of 5 m radius or 300 m² area, if A_s occupies half the sphere, and if $R=0.2$, then a flux exceeding 2,500 lumens will be needed to obtain an apparent luminance above 1 candela per square meter.

Concerning the third point, lag, the speed of image renewal must at least equal that of the eye's speed of perception. In daytime vision, "reaction time" of the human visual system is on the order of 1/15 sec. Images must then be renewed, without traces of prior on successive images, in a time interval appreciably shorter than that. The problem is further complicated by the fact that artificial animated images (cinema and television) are sampled in time, and thereby introduce an actual and/or apparent loss of clarity in the case of objects moving in relation to the visual framework, and in certain cases stroboscopic effects. Hence a renewal rate substantially higher than the usual rates of 25 or 30 images per second can be useful.

Resolution Requirements

In pursuing this "system" approach to the simulator based on the needs of the pilot-user we confront the fundamental requirement to provide the desired resolution in the direction of sighting and with the desired contrast and luminance level; while at the same time taking into account the pilot's overall visual field, that is, for example: 140 degrees to left and right in azimuth, 90 degrees upward, and 70 degrees downward (angle of sight, see fig. 5). For military aviation, the required field is on the order of 10 steradians, whereas small details perceptible by the human eye is of the order of a minute squared, or approximately 10^{-7} steradians; for a very realistic simulation a pilot should be presented with 10^7 to 10^9 resolved elements, data which synthetic image generators cannot today create with the desired temporal resolution.

To avoid such saturation of the computer and projection system, it is possible to take into account the relative interest of the zones observed: zone A covers the sky and needs no resolution, for the structure of the images matters little since the planned application is ground attack simulation; hence zone B is particularly concerned in searching out detail, and so requires high resolution; while zone C is rather characteristic of helicopters and is not applicable in the case of an aircraft simulator.

If we consider those zones, and particularly zone B (70×270 degrees), at least 5.10^6 resolved elements would be needed, whereas a projector can now provide only 10^6 at the very most. A compromise solution must then be found. Among the possibilities there is the choice of reducing the field of observation, or else providing high resolution only in the foveal region. A first solution could consist of covering only a horizontal field of 210 degrees, with three projectors, which leads to an average resolution on the order of 5 minutes of arc. A second solution consists of determining the orientation of the pilot's head, and the direction of his gaze by means, respectively, of a helmet sensor and oculometer. In this case, in fact, a crude image is sufficient outside the zone of foveal vision (- 10 minutes of arc), with a high-resolution image in the direction of eye focus: referring to fig. 3, we see that resolution decreases to 6 minutes of arc for a spread of 8 degrees in relation to the axis of observation. In order to insure an adequate vision, while allowing for measurement error in the sighting direction, it is sufficient to adopt a field of 20×20 degrees. Since the resolution of visualization systems is of the order of 800 points per line (corresponding to 1.5 minutes of arc), and since coming developments give promise of 1,500 points per line, it would then be possible to have an image whose local resolution would be of the same order of magnitude as that of the eye, by making use of a material capable of changing the scanning standard in zones of high resolution.

These conceptions lead to juxtaposition of images formed by different projectors, and so call for precise matching of those images in terms of both luminosity and geometry.

The Sodern Visualization System (SVS)

The Sodern Visualization System permits projection of images, free of flutter and apparent linear structure, with luminosity sufficient for screens with an area of 100 m^2 .

The system is based on the use of light-modulating optoelectronic tubes which grew out of research by the Applied Electronics and Physics Laboratory (LEP). It is being developed at Limeil and produced at Brive by RTC-Hyperelec. The tube is diagrammed in fig. 7.

The principal element in the tube is a thin blade of $\text{PO}_4\text{D}_2\text{K}$ deutero monophosphate of potassium, transparent to visible light and subject to the Pockels effect, which is defined as a double refraction induced by an electrical field parallel to the direction of light propagation.

In the tube (fig. 8) this blade is covered on the "light side" of its face by a transparent electrode (a thin semiconductor layer), and on the "electron side" by a dielectric mirror: that is, one consisting of superimposed layers of isolating materials with alternating high and low refraction indices. The light entering through the window in the tube is reflected by the mirror, so that it twice crosses the blade of PO4D2K.

The external face of the dielectric mirror is swept by an electron beam produced by thermoelectronic emission and accelerated by a difference in potential of a few hundred volts. The outer layer of the mirror is such that each incident electron thus accelerated can tear off, on an average, two secondary electrons. If the potential of the mirror surface is less than that of the metallic grill placed nearby, those electrons will be gathered by the grill, and consequently the potential of the mirror surface will rise; if on the other hand that potential is higher than that of the grill, the secondary electrons will fall back onto the mirror, and so the potential will drop. The electron beam acts as a "local flying short circuit" between the grid and the mirror. Thus it will be possible to inscribe an "electronic image" on the dielectric mirror, and so through the sheet of PO4D2K, by applying the video signal between the transparent electrode of the crystal and the metallic grid.

In the crystal the Pockels effect reflects the electrical field thus created by a double refraction: the speed of propagation of light through the crystal depends on the orientation of the polarization plane of the incident light. After crossing the PO4D2K plate, the phase difference between the two waves, which correspond to the two components according to the principal directions defined by the crystal, is proportional to the local value of the difference in applied potential. If the crystal is lighted by polarized light whose plane is at 45 degrees from the principal directions, and if the reflected light in turn crosses an analyzer oriented 90 degrees from the polarizer, then the luminous intensity transmitted is nil in the absence of double refraction: that is, when video tension v is nil, and increases with v to reach total transmission at the value $v=140$ volts. Thus temporal variations of the video signal are converted into local variations of the electrical field and of double refraction in the crystal, and ultimately of luminosity in the image field.

It is of interest to point out the characteristics of images produced by this method:

The double refracting plate and mirror are made from good dielectrics; electrical charges deposited do not shift, either in cross-section or on the surface; an inscribed image is stored without loss of detail; the tube also acts as an image memory;

The electron beam brings electrons, but can also remove more than it brings; it can raise or lower luminosity; it erases the stored image at the same time it inscribes a new one; there is no "flutter" as is the case with cathode ray tubes, or lag (undesirable remains of prior images);

Though the electron beam provides enough charge to attain the change in potential required by the video, any excess charge is rejected; in practice, this allows erasure of line structures, which are always visible and often hampering with cathode ray tubes in television scanning when viewed close-up:

In no case is light modulation created by an absorption phenomenon, since rejected light leaves the analyzer by another path; the modulator tube and associated optics are able to control considerable radiation flux without overheating to the detriment of their proper operation.

With a single tube a black-and-white projection is obtained. With conventional three-color composition of red, green and blue (additive synthesis), it is possible to obtain colored images. Fig. 9 sketches the principle of the trichromatic SVS. A xenon arc lamp placed at the focal point of an elliptical mirror illuminates with near uniformity the plane of a field diaphragm. The light then goes through a polarizer, with half the flux being undivided and lost. The other half is polarized and aimed at the tubes. Dichroic mirrors permit loss-free separation of the red, green and blue portions of the spectrum (see fig. 10), which after modulation by the tubes are recombined before passing again through the polarizer, which then acts as an analyzer. A projection optical system permits adaptation of the beam emerging from the analyzer, in terms of field angle and image distance, to the geometrical configuration selected for presentation of images to the observer.

Suitability of SVS to Requirements of Simulation and Data Presentation

In its trichromatic version, the SVS has proven capable of providing up to 2,500 lumens with a 4-kW lamp. Luminous flux exceeds 1,500 lumens with a 2.5 kW lamp, and exceeds 1,000 lumens with one of 1.6 kW. Luminous intensity emerging from the projector is uniform, +/- 20 percent, throughout the field, which is well in keeping with the needs of simulation.

Tubes in present use make it possible to attain--for an image in color and after superimposition of the three components--a modulation rate (contrast transmission factor) of 10 percent for a periodic test pattern with spatial frequency of 750 lines across the width of the field. Development work in progress aims at a substantial increase in spatial resolution capacity of tubes and equipment.

In addition, the memory capacity of the tube allows insertion of details--opponents and targets, for example--in a generalized image of landscape background at the level of the tube, and this possibly with different scanning standards, without matching problems.

Tubes operate in accordance with the same scanning principle as the cathode ray type, hence it is possible to apply geometrical corrections to the image, by adjusting lens tube, bearing, trapezium, nonlinearities, curvature, etc. This advantage can be used to provide electronically for juxtaposition of images from different projectors.

Finally, in terms of intensity dynamics (relationship between maximum or white level and minimum or black level), the trichromatic SVS can reach a value of 100, which fully meets requirements at the present stage of simulator technology.

Two types of SVS are currently produced. The trichromatic SVS 12 provides images with 1,000 scanning lines, and is presently being tested at the Ordnance Electronics Center. An improved version will be supplied to the U. S. Air Force early in 1984. The SVS 15, a single tube system producing images in black and white, will be supplied in several units to the French Air Force late in 1983.

Another SVS application is data presentation in command centers. A model of this version (SVS 23), adapted to such an application, with 1,250 scanning lines, has been delivered to the Royal Danish Navy. This version also allows real time visualization of video images at the European standard of 625 lines.

These examples show that because of its versatility and specific characteristics the SVS makes it possible to optimize computerized systems in the simulation field as well as in that of data presentation.

Graphs and Schematics

Fig. 3: Power of resolution of the eye as a function of field angle in relation to direction of focus (curve A) and luminance (curve B): pitch of a periodic test pattern of contrast 1.

Key:

1. Log of luminance (cd/m^2), curve B
2. Resolution in minutes of arc
3. Foveal region
4. Angular distance to fovea, curve A




Fig. 4: Example of imagery configuration

Key:

1. Sky
 2. Horizon
 3. Sphere
 4. Ground
 5. Blind zone
- (3) Sphere
- (4) $\text{Sol}(\text{A}_G)$




Fig. 5: Typical field of vision for a helicopter. The sphere is arbitrarily represented by a rectangle extending from -180 deg. (left) to +180 deg. (right) and from -90 deg. (nadir) to +90 deg. (zenith). The shaded area corresponds to the field of vision hidden by the cockpit itself from the pilot's eyes.

Key:

1. Directional angle
2. Angle of elevation or depression




Fig. 6: Example of scanning with different standards: small areas have higher resolutions.






Fig. 7: Structure of light modulator tube.



Key:

1. Peltier thermoelectric cooling unit
2. Entry
3. Light
4. Exit
5. PO4D2K crystal
6. Electron gun
7. Grid
8. Video entry electrode
9. Deviation and focusing spools


Fig. 8: Electro-optic component of the light modulating tube



Key:

1. Dielectric mirror
2. PO4D2K crystal
3. Transparent electrode
4. Entry
5. Light
6. Exit
7. P2Ca support
8. Video entry
9. Secondary electrons
10. Electron beam
11. Grid


Fig. 9: Principle of color image SVS



Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Green tube | 8. Projection optics |
| 2. Green filter | 9. Blue filter |
| 3. Red filter | 10. Objective |
| 4. Red tube | 11. Field diaphragm |
| 5. Dichroic mirrors | 12. Xenon arc lamp |
| 6. Objective | 13. Ellipsoid mirror |
| 7. Polarizer/analyzer | 14. Blue tube |

Fig. 10: Color restitution by SVS.



Key:

1. Zone covered in color triangle
2. Red, green, blue - SVS
3. R', G', B' - Color television cathode ray tube with shadow mask
4. R'', G'', B'' - Reference diagram, NTSC [Expansion unknown]
5. Two spectral bands corresponding to three primaries
6. Wave length (nm)

6145

CSO: 3519/199

COMMENTATOR VIEWS SUCCESSES, TASKS OF ECONOMIC POLICY

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 2 Feb 84 p 2

[News commentary by Francis Panichelli, B. S., Financial Sciences: "The Economic Policy of Martens V: The Spate of Activity and the Gamble"]

[Text] The exemplary character of the economic policy applied by the government of Martens V at the international level is rather generally misunderstood in our country.

However, in December 1982, the FINANCIAL TIMES, the newspaper of British business sectors, devoted an editorial to the new Belgian economic policy under a provocative headline: "Belgium Swallows Its Medicine." In September 1983, another article emphasized the upsurge in exports. Finally, in November Belgium was honored by a supplement which appeared simultaneously in the FINANCIAL TIMES and LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE. In the latter, an article gave the results of 2 years of austerity and described our country as a "courageous small nation."

It is, therefore, no longer (for the time being?) a question of the sick man of Europe, which was brought up here and there when our new government began operations; what is more, this government's new economic policy even received the backing of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. Finally, the sizable loans contracted by Belgium in international markets last December--\$400 million and \$600 million--were obtained under very advantageous conditions, which tends to show that these markets shared the favorable assessments made of Martens V in the international press.

At the time it began operations, the new government found itself confronting an economy manifestly in a situation of serious imbalance.

We will cite only a few of the most spectacular figures of that year, 1981:

--the deficit in public financing for the central state alone was 12.6 percent of the GNP;

--the trade deficit (transactions in goods and services) for the second consecutive year exceeded 100 billion francs, while it was still positive in 1977;

--the spectacular increase in unemployment rose from about 300,000 to nearly 400,000 persons.

At this point in time, it seems likely that these imbalances were caused at least in part by the lack of reaction by those running our economy to a profoundly convulsed international environment. In fact, all our systems for the protection of private individuals (social security in the broad sense, wage indexing) which were developed during a period of economic expansion could not in effect function correctly so long as the expansion itself persisted.

In 1973 the first oil crisis caused a deterioration of exchange rates in our economy and, therefore, economic impoverishment; the second oil shock in 1979 had the same result. Since the existing protective mechanisms were not changed, private individuals barely felt the effects of these paralyzing blows. However, the consequences were not long in making their appearance: while the economy as a whole became economically impoverished, one of its components was able to continue business as usual, but only at the expense of the other parties in interest, that is, the state enterprises.

The phenomenon is particularly striking in the public finances sector, since on the occasion of each of the two oil shocks the net balance to be financed by the state climbed to a higher level: from 50 billion per year up to 1973, it rose from 100 to 200 billion between 1975 and 1979 and reached the 400/500 billion plateau in 1981.

No matter what we may think of the measures taken by the Martens V government, we cannot blame it for the inaction of its predecessors, as it dared to attack two "sacred cows": the parity of the franc and wage indexing, among others. Other measures were taken to assure the enterprises a more equitable share of national revenue.

This spate of activity, whatever certain parties may think, in the final analysis was well received by the people, because it responded to the profound nature and solid good sense of the Belgians: slow to get moving but ready to draw all the conclusions from a clear-minded examination of the situation. It is to Wilfried Martens' credit that he was able to perceive this state of mind and to effect the change called for; it is probable that the path to follow came to him at the time of the European "summit" in Maastricht in March 1981.

The new economic policy adopted in 1982 has produced good results in several sectors:

--trade balance: in 1982 the deficit in transactions of goods and services was reduced to 64 billion, and the most recent estimates permit the expectation of a situation of quasi-balance in 1983;

--competitiveness of the enterprises: it appears that an improvement in the competitiveness of the enterprises may be deduced from the positive results of foreign trade; the devaluation in February 1982; and the abolishment of wage indexing have certainly been a factor in this regard. Similarly, the Cooreman-De Clercq law, by channeling about 250 to 300 billion into increases in the capitalizations of the companies, has strengthened their financial structures;

--inflation: the January index (plus 6.86 percent compared with January 1983) confirms the downward trend.

However, these encouraging results should not conceal what remains to be done: unemployment still affects more than a half million persons and the deficit in public financing, although not increasing, has stabilized at a very high level (12.7 percent of the GNP in 1983). Similarly, no significant recovery is yet discernible in the investment sector.

This picture in half-tones suggests that the economic policy of Martens V, knowingly or not, was also based on a double gamble:

--the hope of a revival of international trade, essential to a country such as ours which exports half of what it produces;

--the hope that the new climate thus established will restore confidence to the enterprises and will induce them to step up their investments.

It does indeed seem that these two factors will have an influence on the success of the economic policy implemented in 1982. If there is need for an example, Great Britain should remind us that a policy of austerity by itself is not enough to restart the economic machinery: in fact, 1983 may have been the year of Mrs Thatcher's reelection victory but it was also above all the first year since the Industrial Revolution in which the United Kingdom imported more manufactured products than it exported.

It would not only be catastrophic if the actions undertaken were stopped or even reduced to nothing by our Community quarrels; it would also be a pity if the enterprises failed to understand that it is in their interest and the interest of the whole country to help a government which favors them more than any in a long while.

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STOLTENBERG REVIEWS IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Feb 84 pp 34-44

[Interview with Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg by SPIEGEL editors Heiko Martens and Winfried Didzoleit in Bonn; date not indicated: "We Need a Little More Time"]

[Excerpts] [Question] Mr Stoltenberg, in 1983 you achieved everything you set out to do as finance minister. Was that a question of ability or just plain good luck?

[Answer] A mixture of both. Our fiscal decisions contributed to a revitalization of the economy. They brought about a major reduction in new debt which exceeded our own expectations. But we certainly were lucky, too. For one thing, one could not go on the assumption that we would achieve a growth rate of more than one percent in 1983 in the aftermath of the severe recession of the preceding year. And, this higher growth rate has presented us with unexpectedly high tax revenues and made it possible, to our astonishment, to take up net credits amounting to DM 31.5 billion.

[Question] Let us look at your economy program more closely. You spent DM 2.4 billion less on unemployment compensation than had been projected. Is that something to be proud of?

[Answer] It is a positive fact that we had 90,000 less unemployed on an annual average basis than we assumed early in 1983.

[Question] That may be. But on the average there were 2.26 million unemployed and that was 425,000 more than in 1982.

[Answer] That still is a sobering figure and a challenge.

[Question] Generally speaking, the success of your economy program was achieved in a different way. More and more people are unemployed for longer and longer periods of time. For a year, they get their unemployment compensation and then they get unemployment assistance and lastly they have to rely on public welfare from the community.

[Answer] Excessive unemployment that goes on for years does lead to social hardship.

[Question] You saved DM 2.4 billion because there were fewer recipients and because less was paid out on the average.

[Answer] There have been cuts in the budget of the Federal Employment Office. But I should point out that our programs have led to a twofold increase in government expenditures for the purpose of creating jobs over the past three years. In 1984, we have earmarked DM 1.6 billion for this purpose.

In other words, there are two sides to the social impact of the economy programs you and others have criticized. Economy measures serve to free more funds to invest in economic and job market policies. Added to that is the special apartment construction program and the marked increase in funds for communal undertakings which is of major regional importance for the job market as well. And for still another thing, there are the much maligned tax breaks for industry.

[Question] Let us talk some more about the success you have had. You have had to borrow almost DM 10 billion less than you originally planned and you saved DM 2.4 billion of that amount on the Federal Employment Office budget. But that no longer has anything to do with cutting down on abuse. This also affects fully accredited teachers who are out of work who have to go and collect their welfare checks right off. There are many unemployed who no longer get any checks, if they manage to land a temporary job sometime.

[Answer] I agree with the basic philosophy of my fellow cabinet minister, Norbert Bluem. He says that both old age and unemployment insurance should be oriented to the insurance principle to a greater extent. Generally speaking, only those who have paid into the system should be able to register a claim for unemployment compensation.

[Question] That might make sense in the case of old age insurance. But an individual simply cannot take out insurance to protect him against a mass phenomenon like unemployment.

[Answer] The primary goal of our policy must be to turn the job market around. That turnaround has begun. I am convinced that unemployment will go down in 1984 and employment will go up. In other words, I am not talking about extraordinary factors, like our foreign workers leaving. In the annual economic report, we are going on the cautious assumption that there will be an average unemployment of 2.2 million. There is a chance that we will get below that figure. And as far as the problem of unemployed university graduates—not just teachers—is concerned, that is a problem the federal government and the Laender will have to solve jointly.

[Question] How ?

[Answer] We intend to make it easier to get into the civil service without at the same time creating tens of thousands of new positions. We intend to get a law passed that will enable public servants to go on sabbaticals of several years' duration without pay. We intend to create better opportunities for part-time employment in the civil service.

[Question] When ?

[Answer] I hope that the parliament will take the necessary steps during the course of this year.

[Question] Although there was a slight recovery last year, the number of jobs declined by another 400,000. You are saying that this is going to change in 1984. What are your reasons ?

[Answer] There was a marked turnaround in 1983. During the last two quarters of 1983 the number of debt settlements and bankruptcies went down drastically and at the same time there was a growing number of new businesses being established. These indicators--new businesses, business expansions at the middle level even more so than in big industry--justify our expectation that the growth process will result in a tangible relaxation on the job market in 1984. Growth helps bring down unemployment. Nonetheless, there is a need for flanking measures--which is also what the council of experts has said in its most recent study. The prognosis is that if we can get to a real growth rate of 3 to 3.5 percent over several years, we will get unemployment down to about $1\frac{1}{2}$ million in this manner alone.

[Question] The council of experts says there has to be a 3 to 3.5 percent growth rate for a maximum of 7 years. In addition, growth in productivity will always occur at a one percent lower rate. That sounds too optimistic.

[Answer] If we come up with good policies and if the international situation improves along with them, then I can see good chances for a $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{1}{2}$ rate of growth over several years.

[Question] It is not so much a question of growth rate but a question of relationships...

[Answer] Let me continue. If you ask a great many questions, you will have to accept the fact that you will get fairly long answers. The economists do not agree at all on whether this schematic calculation of the relationship between the growth rate and the rate of productivity is correct. Reputable economists such as Professor Giersch have cast doubt on this simple formula.

To put it in political terms and thereby make it comprehensible for everyone: if there are other factors at work in support of a job market policy, there is indeed a chance of achieving palpable improvement on the job market under conditions of moderate growth and almost equally high rise in productivity.

[Question] How is that supposed to happen ?

[Answer] We must not drive up labor costs--such as taxes and social insurance contributions--any further. For several more years, business and labor will have to exercise great moderation and restraint in working out their wage agreements. And as for business, it must really take advantage of this favorable phase by investing in expansion and developing a more dynamic attitude instead of continuing to call for greater subsidies.

[Question] Since the early fifties, the average growth rate has always declined during a recovery cycle. During the first cycle between 1976 and 1982, real growth amounted to only 2.4 percent. In addition, it is existing capacity that is first utilized during any recovery. And new machines help save more jobs. How do you expect these additional jobs to be created which you have spoken of ?

[Answer] I have already said and tried to indicate what I mean by giving you these few examples concerning the public sector that we cannot only pin our hopes on economic growth and a rise in private investment although those are among the indispensable preconditions for an improvement on the job market.

We are also moving in other directions. We have addressed ourselves to business and labor by submitting a bill dealing with early retirement--which is to say a reduction in the lifetime work cycle of an individual. But I am not going to deny that the years until 1990 are going to be difficult--the reason being demographics. It will not be until about 1990 that our population's age structure will change.

[Question] Does that mean that the FRG will have to live with 2 million unemployed until 1990 ?

[Answer] No. It is hardly conceivable that we will get back to the situation in 1969 by the year 1990--where we had full employment and a great number of open jobs. But as worried as we still are, we are looking at these problems today in a different light from the way we did a year ago. At the time, I went over a great many studies; I listened to many a speech in the Bundestag and read newspaper and magazine articles to the effect that unemployment of 2.3 million at least, if not 3 million, was virtually foreordained over the next few years. Now our hope is that we will soon get below the 2 million mark.

[Question] But aren't there a lot of hidden problems in this, too ? For example, if a great many young people are given training and then cannot find a job ? According to some estimates, there are about 200,000 young people "on hold," as the saying goes, inside the training system.

[Answer] The occupational training experts are agreed on one thing. More people than are presently needed are being trained for jobs in business and in the public sector—which is what was asked for. Now that is a problem that can only be solved satisfactorily over the next few years, if we can increase the number of available jobs or in other words, if the number of those who have jobs rises once again.

[Question] In 1983 alone, 65,000 young people were sent out on the street immediately after finishing their apprenticeship.

[Answer] Yes, I know; but the fact also is that at the end of 1983 the number of young people who were unemployed was down by 10,000 as compared to the end of 1982. In other words, the solution of these difficult problems which I do not by any means wish to minimize always depends on the fundamental question of whether we can step up the incipient turnaround and complement it by increasing the number of those who have jobs.

[Question] The focal point of your economic policy is the matter of private investment. Net profits last year rose by almost 15 percent. Why has business invested as little as it has nonetheless ?

[Answer] In a rare display of openness, our social democratic predecessors already pointed out that a rise in profits is urgently needed. In fact, it was imperative. It is an intolerable situation that savers can get a much higher interest rate investing in government bonds than they can on the average when they invest in private enterprise with all the risks that entails.

[Question] Real interest rates are too high. Isn't that the problem ?

[Answer] No. The situation has been much the same for several years when real interest rates were not as high. Contrary to your assessment, the statistics of the past few months indicate to me that there are definite initial signs of a rise in private investment. Private demand has developed favorably over the past year. Favored by international factors among others, we have experienced a marked upturn in exports during the second half of the year. Everything speaks for the fact that private investment is on the rise now during the third stage.

[Question] The labor unions do not believe that you will be able to cut down on unemployment drastically by taking the steps you have in mind. Do you agree with the chancellor that the metal workers' union call for a 35-hour week is "silly and stupid ?"

[Answer] If that demand were met, it would result in a drastic rise in unemployment. Even if it were met only in part, I cannot see where the German shipbuilding industry or the steel industry, for example, could offer anything like a real future to their employees.

[Question] Do they have a future under any circumstances ?

[Answer] I think so; but I am afraid there will be a further reduction of and of jobs as well.

[Question] From a market economy point of view, would you not have to cut the subsidies of the shipbuilding and steel industries under these circumstances in order to make them operate more efficiently ?

[Answer] If we succeed in getting the recovery to last and to grow stronger, then we will have to cut down on subsidies more than we have in the past few years. Within the context of the upcoming tax legislation I am going to make some concrete proposals. It would please me greatly, if all those who are calling on me these days to cut down on subsidies would support these proposals.

[Question] When are you going to submit these proposals for a reduction of subsidies ?

[Answer] In 3 or 4 months--together with the plans for a tax reform.

[Question] We have been hearing that you are looking for a DM 2 billion cut in subsidies as early as 1985.

[Answer] It is too early for me to give you an exact figure.

[Question] What criteria are you employing to look into the subsidies ?

[Answer] It is important, of course, to look at the time frame and the reasons for granting subsidies and to ask whether these reasons still hold true today.

Secondly, if we achieve an appreciable reduction in income and wage taxes—which is what we are aiming for—then we could drop certain tax subsidies through a revamping of the rates. And thirdly, we will be trying to simplify the tax laws to a certain extent.

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INEVITABILITY OF 35-HOUR WORK WEEK ANALYZED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Feb 84 p 31

[Article by Stephan Burgdorff: "The Risk in Reduced Working Hours"]

[Text] It is a veritable triumph of pure reason. Week after week, reports the metal industry employers association, the number of Germans who feel that the 35-hour week is a mistake is on the rise.

Quite obviously, the German people is not listening to the con men at the union headquarters. It is banking on the wisdom of its chancellor instead. He called the 35-hour week "absurd and stupid." It is listening instead to the president of the federal bank who thinks there would be "more unemployed in the end," if the work week were reduced and to public sector economic experts, such as the head of the HWWA Institute, Armin Gutowski, who has warned of the "risk inherent in reduced working hours."

It appears that the Germans can be relied upon; that they understand what their opinion leaders have been hammering into their heads for weeks. In an economic crisis, one needs "to roll up one's sleeves," as Kohl has said; one needs to work more and not less.

All of it does sound plausible and it is understandable that men like Kohl, Poehl and Gutowski who did their apprenticeship in the fifties hate to part with the formulas of success of the reconstruction era.

The only problem is that these bits of wisdom which have been turned into economic articles of faith simply do not wash. Are millions of people out of work because the West Germans do not work hard enough? Is that the reason? Or isn't it really because fewer and fewer people are producing more and more goods and services?

Between 1981 and 1982, Veba, the energy conglomerate, increased its sales by DM 1 billion. During that same time period, the number of its employees declined by 2,500. Again during the same period, Siemens' sales went up by DM 5.5 billion while 14,000 of its employees lost their jobs. Daimler-Benz raised sales by DM 2.2 billion and while increasing production, dropped 2,400 of its employees from the rolls.

Those are the three biggest German corporations in terms of sales; it is pretty much the same in the remaining 97 which make up the top 100.

In 1983, the company managements were busy cutting positions. Overall employment declined by 442,000 compared to last year while the GNP—the balance of goods and services—rose by 1.2 percent.

Perhaps those who are always talking about rolling up your sleeves should take a walk through hall 54 at the VW plant in Wolfsburg sometime. These days, many more automobiles than just one or two years ago are being assembled by fewer—far fewer—workers in that hall.

Of course technical progress has taken a lot of work off peoples' shoulders over the past 200 years. The workers did not suffer as a result; in fact, they profited from it—especially during the past three decades. Technology, after all, is accompanied by equally rapid economic growth.

As long as demand for goods and services and efficiency were increasing at the same pace, there was enough to do for everyone. Whoever lost his job because a new machine took only one man instead of three to operate soon found one again in the new assembly hall where additional capacities were being created.

Since the early eighties this has changed; since then, economic growth is no longer keeping pace with the increase in productivity. All the pump priming in the world was of no avail. The kind of annual GNP growth rates around 8 percent such as we had in the fifties are no longer to be had today.

The bombed-out cities have been rebuilt; the apartment shortage is no more. There is hardly a household without its own refrigerator and washing machine and without a car and a color TV set.

And what about the export cure-all? The FRG still is the second-largest exporter in the world. But there is hardly any likelihood that the entire rest of the world will be buying all of its goods from Germany anytime soon.

Even if our economy does manage a growth rate of two to three percent over the next few years, as the government hopes it will—even that would not be sufficient to do away with unemployment. In order to achieve full employment, the West German economy would have to grow by five to six percent year after year.

And what that means has been made quite plain by Norbert Bluem, Kohl's minister of labor. If the annual growth rate amounted to five percent, he calculated, the GNP would increase by a factor of 32 during an individual's 70-year life span.

Nothing of the sort can or will happen, of course—even if the very last square meter of East Frisia is covered over with concrete and the very last tree in the Hunsrueck were cut down. The days of growth as a permanent employer are over. There is not more work to do but less (which in fact is a blessing). There is no way—in the long term—of getting around shorter working hours.

We will not get down to 35 hours a week all at once. The labor union leaders are aware of that, too, of course but they can do a better selling job using that round figure.

There will not be—nor should there be—full wage compensation because if there were, German industry really could no longer stay competitive on the international market. Anyone who gives up part of his work will also have to give up part of his pay (or his pay increase).

The fact that shorter work weeks will create jobs is being disputed today by business, with the vociferous support of the Kohls, Poehls and Gutowskis of this world. 20 years ago, when the work week was cut by 1½ hours, the metal industry took a different view of things. "We would need 100,000 more workers," the employers said at that time, "to make up for the reduction in the work week. But this manpower simply is not available."

Today, 2½ million are available.

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POLITICAL, FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON CABLE TV

Paris LE FIGARO in French 8 Feb 84 p F2

[Article by Jacques Perrier]

[Text] With Pierre Mauroy serving as chairman, an interministerial committee consisting of five ministries (PTT [Postal and Telecommunications], Local Communities, Economy, Communications Techniques, and Culture) was expected to define the government's policy on the "cable TV plan" today at the Hotel Matignon. Who will finance the plan? Who will authorize it? How many channels will there be? What programs will there be? "All of these are \$64,000 questions," one of the premier's close associates admitted with some annoyance. He added, "We will probably be forced to depart from the artistic and intentional wooliness which has surrounded this major project."

In a way, the decisions made late this afternoon will also provide answers to the questions which Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris, asked Pierre Mauroy at the beginning of December in a letter that has remained without reply. That is because the government's choice masks a veritable political battle and a gigantic industrial gamble.

On 3 November 1982, at the end of the grace period, a council of ministers meeting to consider a routine agenda suddenly voted to equip France with cable TV networks. Objective: 6 million homes with cable TV by 1992.

The plan was ambitious from more than one standpoint. Cable TV could become a powerful propaganda instrument and an industrial gamble which could create jobs (20,000 for the optical fiber industry).

Three men close to the president of the republic wanted to be the sponsor (and the sole responsible official) of the immense spiderweb of information and programs which was going to cover France: Georges Fillioud, then minister of communications; Jack Lang, minister of culture; and Louis Mexandeau, secretary of state for PTT. The most unpretentious man came

out on top. A loser during the preceding budgetary hearings, Mexandeau by chance on 7 October was flying aboard the presidential plane which was taking Francois Mitterrand to Zaire and the Congo. Two hours before the plane arrived in Kinshasa, he had convinced the president that he had wrapped up the "best package." Louis Mexandeau worked on the package with Jacques Attali, Francois Mitterrand's "shadow."

After Mexandeau's return from his African trip, the directorate general of telecommunications issued a call for bids and put France's principal "cable makers"--seven industrial groups--in competition with one another.

On 23 April 1983, a cable TV committee chaired by Bernard Schreiner, a socialist deputy from the seventh district of Yvelines (Mantes) for 43 years, entered the fray. "We are flying by the seat of our pants," Louis Mexandeau admits. On the eve of today's interministerial meeting what was left of intentions? What were the true figures? How could balance be maintained between short-term commercial realism and the safeguarding of long-term considerations? Finally, what was the choice to be: coaxial cable TV utilizing copper which was easy to work with but already outmoded or optical fiber (glass fiber) which still poses technical problems? In addition, just below the surface and smack in the middle of the debate on freedom of the press, a fight is shaping up over freedom of expression on cable TV.

The Financial Rules

As of yesterday, six cities had filed serious applications with the general delegation of telecommunications, the decision-making authority of last resort.

The Velec Company, a subsidiary of the Vandeputte textile group, located in Tourcoing, which owns stock in electronic firms, has been selected as the supplier of optical fiber cable. Some 100,000 drop lines have been ordered by the PTT; however, negotiations on the price have not yet been concluded. The only thing known, after the initial examinations, is that optical fiber is two to three times more costly than estimated (5,000 francs per connector) and that, consequently, the PTT will have to resort to more traditional solutions in copper for a large part of the orders from now to 1986.

In 1983, budgetary problems, moreover, reduced cable TV credits to 800 million francs instead of the 1.5 billion francs anticipated.

"It is reasonable to limit cable TV to 1 million drop lines in the next 5 years," Mexandeau's cabinet is now saying.

The financial aspect of the problem is important. The Lyonnaise des eaux State Deposit Bank has offered to service the large and solvent municipalities. For its part, the government has encouraged the private initiative of the communities with simple reasoning: "When a city has approved its cable TV budget and has begun its studies, it is obligated to carry the project through to the end."

The PTT is asking 1,500 francs per drop line from municipalities, which want to have a cable TV network, in the form of a reimbursable advance for drop-line installation and 50 francs per month for its use.

Today the interministerial committee, among other things, is supposed to establish financial rules to clear the air for dialogue between the communities, the PTT and the State Deposit and Consignment Bank which is also a party to the negotiations whose new director general, Robert Lion, realistically understands that cable TV represents a new stage in the development of cities.

"After all," a member of Mexandeau's cabinet said with tongue in cheek, "the financing of cable TV is simple: The PTT drains off the public savings managed by the State Deposit Bank which makes loans to local communities which advance the money to the PTT."

In reality, the problem is very complex instead of humorously simplistic. And 15 percent of the six applications will be turned down even though enormous sums have often been spent on various studies. The Media Marketing International Company, which was established only 2 years ago, is already generating a lot of business by proposing "simulated scenarios" to the municipalities. In fact, provisional estimates of charges and user fees have been made for the next 4 years.

Reassured in part, the municipalities have played the game in spite of a great number of unknowns: what will be the rate of development of the cable TV networks? What will the real number of subscribers be? How many hours of programming will be broadcast? What pay back can be expected from a nascent market?

The Parisian Dream

"I already have 2,000 hours of programming to offer on demand," said Schreiner, who has called upon the three French television networks and the National Audiovisual Institute, which is "managing" the television archives, whose president, Jacques Pomenti, has seen an opportunity for a new outlet.

"Exactly what programs?" asked Jacques Chirac, who has just organized at the mayor's office of the 13th arrondissement an exhibition titled quite simply: "Cable TV in Paris."

From 3 to 12 January, 30,000 visitors gazed at a dream: nine television networks (TF 1; A 2; FR 3; Tele R.T.L.; Tele Monte-Carlo; Sky TV, a British network; Canal Plus--which will not exist for a year; Canal 5 Tour Eiffel--TV Chirac; and a Canal Sport et Jeunesse, in direct collaboration with the Bercy multisport complex.)

Reality is different. Of course, the government hopes that cable TV, whether copper coaxial or glass fiber, will carry the programs of the three existing television networks and Canal Plus directed by Havas under state control. But the arrival of Tele R.T.L. and Tele Monte-Carlo will break the monopoly. What is more, the creation of a so-called municipal service network--the real, undeclared objective of all the municipalities no matter what their political labels may be--will be submitted for the approval of the audio-visual governing body with respect to which it is well to remember that six of the nine members are appointed by the government.

In other words, as with local radio, this will be the right of the prince, with a draconian notebook of charges which only the municipalities of the opposition, of course, will have to respect to the letter.

It is probable that only the financial problem will be taken up this afternoon. As regards the preparation and broadcast of programs, it is to the government's interest to remain mum. For how long?

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ASSESSMENTS OF GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARD EEC

Athens' Hardening Position

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 22-23 Jan 84 pp 1, 15

[Article by Rikhardos Someritis]

[Text] Paris--Is Athens preparing a change in emphasis in its foreign policy?

The question comes up as a result of the recent government reorganization; an event which provides certain insights.

Specifically, the reorganization which touches also upon foreign policy, had as a principal characteristic the promotion of Karolos Papoulias to alternate minister of foreign affairs, and the replacement of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for EEC Grigoris Varfis by the former Deputy Minister of Commerce Thodoros Pangalos.

Independently of in-house politics within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (i.e., the problems of Kharalambopoulos and Kapsis, and the personal perspectives and choices of Mr Varfis), it is noted that:

Both before and after the 1981 elections, Karolos Papoulias has been and continues to be one of the most consistent third-world advocates of PASOK, even though he has lived and worked for many years in West Germany. Is his promotion a mere increase in responsibilities or does it predict a new third world opening in Greek foreign policy?

If such an "opening" were to be carried out in the context of Greece's European perspectives in order to expand its horizons, it would not be in itself a negative development. The questions and doubts arise, however, when one recalls the old PASOK theories, according to which a third world alignment is an alternative solution to the present-day choices confronting the country.

Thodoros Pangalos, the former deputy minister of commerce, is replacing in the key position of deputy minister of foreign affairs for the EEC the "European" Mr Varfis, who may not be an "ideologue" of Europeanism, but is certainly not an ideological advocate of alternative solutions (which are, moreover, non-existent). Mr Pangalos is an able "activist," with experience in a series of successive leftist "mass movements" who lacks any technical or political

experience in European issues, except for his sometime participation at seminars and meetings on the critical review of the organization of the EEC. It seems logical, therefore, to wonder whether Mr Pangalos' placement in the key EEC position, especially in combination with the promotion of Mr Papoulias, does not indicate a hardening of the Greek position toward the community.

The doubts raised by the reorganization of the government are strengthened by several other indicators, such as the statements of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu concerning the future relations between Greece and the EEC. These statements, made after the failure of the recent EEC conference in Athens, appear to open the door for a reappraisal of Greece's accession to the EEC in combination with the final disposition of the "memorandum," and for a reevaluation of the "costs" and "benefits" derived from this accession.

It is not by chance that the Greek Government and those who speak for it, characterize the present indisputable EEC crisis as a "tragedy," a description which the other members refuse to accept. And this, because the latter are searching for solutions to the problems' motives rather than opportunities for disagreement.

During these relatively sensitive times for Greece, within and outside the EEC, all moves and actions of Greek foreign policy are being analyzed with special attention in order to achieve a new "ascertainment." It would have been far simpler, if the alternatives being considered by the government became the subject of official explanation and interpretation, as is done routinely elsewhere in Europe.

Possible 'Crisis of Relations'

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 27 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by K. Kolmer]

[Text] "It is impossible for an EEC member nation to have a trade policy which restricts its ability to import capital goods from outside EEC (due to EEC restrictions) but which requires it to purchase automobiles and luxury goods from the EEC." (Andreas Papandreu, speech before Parliament, 22 December 1983.)

The government of Andreas Papandreu, even though in power for over 2 years, is still ambivalent toward the EEC, and it often maintains that Greece's accession to the organization has been at the expense of Greek economic interests. To prove this contention, the government cites the nation's foreign trade statistics, even though they only partially document the real situation of the economic relations between Greece and the EEC. For instance, the government claims, Greek imports of agricultural products from EEC nations have risen by 140 percent since accession, but exports by only 27 percent. Prior to accession, the government maintains, Greece enjoyed a positive trade balance with the community for agricultural products; now, the reverse is true. "Instead of a trade surplus of 6 billion drachmas, we have a deficit of 10 billion drachmas," says Minister of Finance Pottakis.

Similar arguments are being used by other economic ministers, who are busily preparing public opinion for a 'crisis of relations' with the EEC for obvious political reasons. In this effort at disorientation, they are being supported by the government-controlled mass media. In this article, we will not be concerned with the crescendo of the government's campaign against accession, nor with the "dark political objectives" of the party in power (to use the beloved expression of the prime minister). We prefer to ask a simple question: Did our nation benefit from EEC membership during its first 2 years, and how much? If the answer is 'no--accession has hurt Greece,' then we will join the government in its demand for a reappraisal of our relations with the EEC. If the answer, however, is 'yes--Greece did benefit,' then we will inform public opinion of the facts in the case and will warn the government about the slippery road it has taken, which clearly undermines Greece's membership in the EEC.

To start out with, we should recall that the EEC is not a mere customs union, as the government spokesmen attempt to portray it, where presumably only goods move freely (and, therefore, Greece, with its 1 percent participation in the intra-community trade lacks the necessary interest to develop its transactions). The EEC is primarily an economic union. As such, it has an interest in the closer monetary and economic relations of its member states, in the harmonization of their agricultural policies, the existence of funds for the transferral of resources, the operations of investment banks, and the gradual removal of trade and other commercial barriers. In plain language, this all means, that there are major development opportunities for the lesser developed member states of the EEC.

Until quite recently, our nation had been considered an 'eastern' state. Yet, it had the good fortune to be accepted as a member by the European Community of Democratic States. Being economically underdeveloped, what did it expect, but the support of its wealthier European neighbors to finance its economy and to raise the living standards of its people? Success or failure, to date in both cannot be attributed to the EEC alone. The EEC cannot be blamed if the Greek Government's strong interference in the economy during the past 4 years hampered its growth, and if the catastrophic socialist policies caused a decline in the quality of life in Greece. The opposite is true: EEC support during the past 2 years has contributed in many ways to strengthen the income of the Greek people and to finance development. Specifically:

1. Greek farmers were paid 72 billion drachmas this year. Of these, 70 billion came from the agricultural fund (for tobacco, olive oil, grain, etc.) and 2 billion were aimed at the realignment of crops. Moreover, of the total amount, approximately 14 billion drachmas were the result of a direct increase in subsidies due to the devaluation of the "green drachma," an amount that otherwise, would not have gone so rapidly to Greek farmers. EEC supports, it is estimated, provided each Greek farm family with an average of 200,000 drachmas.

But also, urban residents of the sorely-tried Greek cities have benefited from the EEC. In Greece, where the cities carry the burden of the rural areas, 50 billion drachmas of the 70 billion paid to farmers, would necessarily have come directly or indirectly from urban sources. This year, the EEC paid the

bill, thus relieving the productive urban population of 2.5 million of the responsibility for caring for the countryside, which meant a savings of 20,000 drachmas for every city dweller. Additionally, EEC supported during 1982 training programs for the unemployed in the amount of 608 million drachmas, as against 291 million in 1981. According to data provided by the Labor Force Employment Organization this amount will increase to 1,471,000,000 in 1983. One could argue that the amounts involved are not very large; still the rate of increase is impressive: eightfold in 2 years. The outlook for the future is even more encouraging, if appropriate proposals are submitted to EKT [European Community Fund] in a timely manner. They will be funded at 55 percent of their cost.

The rate of inflation which the government has created (and only the government can create inflation) reached the annual level of 25 percent in 1978 because of strong government intervention in the economy; it has since remained at unacceptable high levels, thus ending all investments for obvious reasons: at this rate of inflation, the investor risks to lose his capital. (How? Simply through amortizations of historical levels, not at replacement levels.) As a result, no one is using any longer his own capital for investment purposes. No one, that is, except the regional fund of the EEC agro-industries and the European Investment Bank for industrial and other branches of the Greek economy, including infrastructure works. In 1983, the EPT [expansion unknown] alone provided capital in the amount of 17 billion drachmas, while the European Investment Bank made long-term, low-interest loans valued at \$350 million. Since accession to the EEC, Greece has received from ETE [expansion unknown] loans in foreign exchange totaling 68 billion drachmas. This represents 7,555 drachas for every Greek.

"It is noted--commented Mr Pottakis recently, in a moment of rare sincerity--that there is no upper limit to the loans possible from ETE. The totality of loans will depend on the appropriate presentation of the investment proposals." In other words, it is up to us, Greeks.

Last but not least, Greece benefits from the EEC, not only from the point of view of capital entry (estimated at \$700 million in 1983--which if borrowed would have required interest payments of \$70 million annually) but also from an enhanced position to borrow money. As a member of EEC, Greece borrowed \$1.7 billion in 1983 in the international market. If Greece was to leave EEC for whatever reason, it is doubtful that it would have been able to raise half this amount.

The greatest benefit from the EEC is the "expectation." Greece, after Great Britain, has the lowest per capita collections from the EEC budget (approximately 90 European units as opposed to 350 for Ireland). Additionally, the Greek gross national product is lower than the average for the EEC. Whatever happens within the EEC, our benefits are bound to increase, both from its budget and its "new" policies. Greece's accession to EEC was and remains a godsend. Any other interpretation of this event is nearsighted and undocumented.

Undocumented? But, Mr Pottakis and Mr Arsenis claim that Greek trade balance with the EEC deteriorated, since a deficit of 54 million drachmas in 1980 went to 137 million in 1981, to 166 in 1982. "This trend," maintains Mr Pottakis, "threatens to de-industrialize our nation."

As far as the concern of Mr Pottakis for the future of the Greek economy goes, there is little supporting data. But the numbers he cites would give cause to concern, if they were correct. But, they are not. The Greek trade balance deficit has not increased by 200 percent in 3 years. First: the deficit cited is expressed in drachmas, and as is well known, the drachma has lost 50 percent of its foreign value during the past 3 years. Second: because, a large part of the EEC imports was at the expense of third countries. In other words, a realignment of our imports has taken place. Instead of importing meat from Yugoslavia, we are now importing it from West Germany. And, if the argument is that we are paying higher prices now, one could answer 'so much the better': if this is happening, it would provide an incentive to the growth of our own cattle raising. Third: Greece enjoys a surplus in her transactions with the EEC. "How come?" one could ask, some innocent observer who has been raised in the poormouthing of the socialists. Yet, it is so.

Greece had in 1980 a trade deficit of \$2,544,000,000 with the remaining nine EEC nations. Imports: \$4,185 million, less exports: \$1,641 million in 1981, the first year of accession, the trade deficit increased to \$3,093 million; in 1982 to \$3,153 million; i.e., an increase of 24 percent within 2 years, due primarily to the "realignment" of our trade.

If we were to add to this deficit, the surplus of our invisible resources from the EEC, then the deficit becomes a surplus. From tourism alone from the EEC nations, Greece collected \$4,593 million in 1980, \$4,276 million in 1981 and \$4,042 million in 1982. In other words, Greece had a surplus of \$889 million in 1982 in its current transactions with the EEC and \$1,183 million in 1981. If to this amount is added another \$550 million in 1982 from EEC grants, the surplus reaches the amount of \$1,439 million, 8 percent higher than for 1981. Thus, the picture provided us by Mr Pottakis is incorrect. Of course, if the surplus from the EEC did not increase as quickly as we had wished it to, this is not the fault of the EEC.

EEC has given us plenty, "it cannot give us more," as the poet would say. It is up to us and our government to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the EEC. Our socialists, however, are unable to come to terms with the EEC because they feel uncomfortable with its free environment. This is why they are fighting it as much as they can and as long as they will last.

12557
CSO: 3521/154

INDUSTRY GROUP URGES INVESTMENT IN ONSHORE SECTOR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Feb 84 p 29

[Article by Pal Stensaas]

[Text] Industry's problems cannot be solved by calling for more offshore activity. If prosperity is to be maintained, industrial creation of assets must rise by 60 percent by the year 2000! Regardless of the size of oil revenues, industry must produce more--around 3 percent more each year, administrative director Knut Lofstad of the Norwegian Industrial League told Industrial Forum '84. Lofstad stressed that the actual industrial development we have already had cannot continue if the goal set for creating assets is to be achieved.

Lofstad emphasized that it is primarily industry itself that must solve the problems of industry. Individual firms must become better at producing and marketing their products.

"Norwegian firms have gradually become more cost-conscious. It is more and more common for people to set strict requirements for capital profitability, but there is a lot that remains to be done. Firms must become more deliberate about what they produce. Industry must simply become more market-oriented," said Knut Lofstad, who said this meant reorganization. He added that good firms always make the changes that are needed.

The Industrial League director also stressed attitudes and motivation in firms. Lofstad said that firm managements should put more emphasis on developing good forms of cooperation with their employees.

"We must begin to think more in terms of the firm and the economy than in terms of policy," he said.

Concerning the role of the authorities, Lofstad said it should be a central task for authorities to de-escalate the so-called negotiation economy, which had such a deadly effect on the industrial policy climate toward the end of the 1970's. The most harmful thing was that firms were encouraged to seek the support of the authorities through subsidies or protective measures instead of concentrating on competing on the market. "Although

it might seem advantageous for an individual firm to receive public support, the system does not serve industry as a whole," Lofstad said. But he added that it is also hard to imagine not having some forms of public transfers.

The Industrial League's director also said that they anticipate clear steps and relief from the authorities in such matters as tax policy in connection with electrical energy.

Discouraging

"It is too bad that LO [Federation of Trade Union] and sections of the labor movement take a negative stand on employee ownership of stocks in their own company. It is claimed that this is poor capital policy, poor industrial policy, and they say it would create an unfortunate bond between the employee and the firm and promote so-called 'company egoism.' These are discouraging viewpoints for 1984 and show what a big gap there still is between the views of the LO leadership and the economic realities many of us believed had made an impact long ago," the president of the Industrial League, Emil W. Martens, told Industrial Forum 1984.

Martens also took up the role assignments and expectations of firm managements.

He said that company boards are still greatly undervalued by many Norwegian companies, but that most people have gradually realized that it can be of decisive importance for a firm to have a well-composed board that works effectively.

"Unfortunately it will take a long time before we can say that Norwegian board members are adequately trained," said Martens.

6578
CSO: 3639/75

STATISTICS OFFICE ISSUES ANALYSIS OF 1983 GROWTH RATE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Feb 84 p 29

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll]

[Text] An economic growth rate of 3.3 percent in 1983 brought the Norwegian Gross National Product (GNP) to more than 400 billion kroner for the first time. Oil and gas production showed an increase of 15 percent and thus made a strong contribution both to the growth of GNP and to the record surplus in Norwegian foreign trade of 14.4 billion kroner, it appears from the Bureau of Central Statistics' "Economic Outlook for 1983."

Despite a larger growth in GNP than anticipated, there was no increase in total employment, measured in the number of man-labor years, from 1982 to 1983. The number of those working rose by only 11,000, the lowest increase in several years. The total labor force grew by 26,000 people. The average registered unemployment figure for 1983 was 63,500, which is 41,000 more than in 1980.

Disposable real income in Norway rose by 1.7 percent from 1982 to 1983. The year before there was a decline of 0.8 percent. Total household buying power rose by 2 percent. Within this sector, it was those receiving social payments who had the biggest growth in buying power.

The growth impulses for the Norwegian economy came to a large extent from a substantial increase in demand for Norwegian products in other countries. There was also an increase in investments in several branches, especially in the oil sector.

GNP growth not counting oil and shipping was 1.7 percent. In industry, 1983 was a new year with production declines. Production in industries competing abroad rose by 9 percent, while both industries competing on the domestic market and protected industries experienced substantial production declines.

Private consumption rose 1.5 percent. Norwegian net consumption abroad rose by as much as 16 percent. Total service consumption rose 4 percent. Public consumption rose 3.7 percent in 1982 and in 1983.

Overall, investments showed a weak development. Total gross investments in fixed real capital rose 0.8 percent. There was an increase of 1 percent in investments in business activities, while investments under state administration declined 0.6 percent. Investments in businesses other than in the oil sector went down 6.6 percent. Housing construction declined by 6,000 apartment starts to 31,500 apartments.

Exports showed a volume increase of 7.6 percent from 1982 to 1983. That is the sharpest export increase since 1978. Traditional product exports rose by a hefty 11.3 percent, the highest annual growth rate in 10 years. This trend led to the fact that total production in industries competing abroad were higher at the end of 1983 than in 1979, when the last production halt was noted.

The total volume of imports went down 0.8 percent in 1983. Product imports declined 4.2 percent. There was a surplus of 31.5 billion kroner in the product and services balance, while there was a deficit of 17 billion kroner in the interest and amortization balance.

Industrial operating results for 1983 are estimated at 8.6 billion kroner, which is 19 percent higher than the year before. In the 3 preceding years there have been declines in industrial profits. A sizable part of the increase in 1983 came from industries competing abroad, while there was a decline of 22 percent for industries competing on the domestic market. The construction industry and commodity trade also had declining profits in 1983.

Total wage growth per man-labor year was 8.1 percent from 1982 to 1983. Within the LO [Federation of Trade Unions]-NAF [Norwegian Employers' Confederation] sector, there was a wage growth of 8.5 percent. In the public sector it appears that the limit of 7.5-percent wage growth will hold.

In 1983 Norway's net foreign debt was reduced by 10 billion kroner and was 88.5 billion kroner at the end of the year. This corresponds to 22 percent of GNP.

Higher Demand, Reduced Cost Growth

A policy that simultaneously promotes reorganization, provides a lower cost growth and gives a stronger stimulus to demand. That is the Bureau of Central Statistics' demanding prescription for what is needed if unemployment in this country is to be reduced in the near future.

In this way the Bureau of Central Statistics is appealing to the workers' organizations to show moderation in their wage demands and to try to restrain wage drift so that cost developments can be kept under control. At the same time the wording in the "Economic Outlook" contains a clear challenge to the government to contribute to a somewhat stronger increase in total demand.

The bureau says that in the present employment situation, a policy that stimulates demand is unlikely to lead to a strong upward pressure on prices and wages in the short term. But at the same time the bureau stressed that we must break the connection between activity levels and cost growth if the goals of full employment and balance in the foreign economy are to be realized in the long term. Behind this lies a clear warning against allowing a future tendency toward reduced unemployment to result in sharper wage growth.

The Bureau of Central Statistics pointed out that the prospects of achieving full employment in this country will also depend on whether the international market upturn continues and gains in strength.

6578
CSO: 3639/75

UNION TAKES FIRST STEP IN PRESSING FOR SIX-HOUR WORK DAY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 1 Feb 84 p 8

[Article by Tone B. Jamholt]

[Text] LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions] views the demand for a 37 1/2 hour work week for everyone as the first step on the way to a 6-hour day. This appears from statements chairman Tor Halvorsen has made recently. "There is no doubt that I am glad to see these signals," the leader of the Labor Party's women's movement, Harriet Andreassen, told ARBEIDERBLADET.

There has been an at times heated debate within the labor movement on making the curtailment of work hours a priority. But a committee with representatives from both the union movement and the Labor Party is working to find a common ground.

Retirement Age

LO has asked the national authorities to introduce a flexible retirement age starting at age 62 and has requested the presentation of a government report on this within a year. The government will appoint a committee to look into various forms of cutting work hours very soon and LO's wish will probably be fulfilled within the scope of the committee's activity.

But in connection with this year's rate settlement, LO is demanding equal work time for all, or 37 1/2 hours of work a week. LO chairman Tor Halvorsen told the Oslo Labor Party's union and political conference in this context: "Such a reduction of work hours also means a step on the way with regard to another item in LO's action program, namely the long-range goal of also achieving a reduction in daily work hours. It will take some time before we have a 6-hour work day, but things are going in the right direction if this demand is implemented."

Women

The leader of the Oslo party, Bjorn Tore Godal, also said between the lines that the labor movement must step up efforts and take the initiative

in this debate. After the Professional Organization's Central Union asked the state authorities to investigate a 6-hour work day, there has been some concern that women would head for YS [Professional Organization] rather than LO. Women represent big potential membership gains for both organizations. Since LO's total membership shows a declining tendency, it is important for the labor movement that LO attract this group.

Godal said: "Let's not give associations outside LO wind in their sails by giving any support for the belief that they are more concerned with equality, the women's movement and the 6-hour work day than LO's associations and unions. That would be turning things upside down."

Harriet Andreassen told ARBEIDERBLADET that she is happy about the process that is now under way. A year ago, the National Women's Conference viewed the demand for equal work time for all as a step on the way to the 6-hour work day. "If this demand goes through in the wage negotiations, we will have gone a quarter of the way," she said.

6578
CSO: 3639/75

VIOLENT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN POLICE, SAGUNTO STEELWORKERS

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 10 Feb 84 p 3

[Text] Seven individuals were injured in the clashes between the National Police and the Mediterranean Blast Furnaces (AHM) workers in Sagunto, who gathered yesterday in front of the Ministry of Labor to demand that the blast furnace headquarters be maintained and to protest against the closing of the Sagunto Plant.

The injured were treated by the crew of a Red Cross ambulance from Sagunto. Four had minor injuries, and one woman with a bleeding head wound was only semiconscious.

The clashes occurred at about 5 in the afternoon, when a group of workers attempted to block traffic and the police forces intervened to prevent the blockage. The demonstrators then began to throw rocks, bottles and other hard objects at the agents of the forces of public order, who responded by firing rubber bullets and throwing smoke bombs, such that a pitched battle developed. According to witnesses present, a woman was injured in the head by a blow from the butt of a police weapon.

In addition to the seven injured, a number of individuals were arrested. At 6 o'clock sporadic clashes were still occurring in the streets near the Paseo de la Castellana.

Strike in Sagunto

While the workers dismissed in Madrid were urging a campaign of violence, Sagunto and the surrounding district were entirely paralyzed yesterday by the new 24-hour strike called by the Mediterranean Blast Furnaces workers in defense of their jobs. While secondary schools, businesses, workshops and all of the industry shut down, thousands of workers set out for Madrid in buses and private automobiles with the intention of appearing at the Ministry of Labor to support the negotiations scheduled to be held between representatives of the workers and the general labor director, Carlos Navarro, our correspondent, Justo de Avila, reported.

This meeting, convoked without due notice according to the trade union representatives, who added that a minimum of 48 hours' notice will be required in the future for attendance at any type of meeting, began just a few minutes

before noon. The job regulation file, setting forth the dismissal of 155 workers and the shutting down of blast furnace No 2 at that plant as an initial measure, was to be taken up at the meeting.

Clamorous Demonstration

National Police contingents posted near light trucks containing riot control equipment were stationed in the area of the Ministry of Labor from the early morning hours on. At about 9 in the morning, the buses bringing workers and residents from Sagunto, men and women as well as some children, began to arrive. The delegation also included the outgoing mayor of that locality, Jose Garcia Felipe, who stated that "the people of Sagunto will continue in their struggle to the end," adding that the factory and the headquarters of the blast furnace enterprise must not be closed.

In addition to police vigilance throughout the morning, a police helicopter hovered over the rallying point. Each approach it made elicited a clamorous banging of pots and pans by the people from Sagunto, who shouted slogans condemning the closing of the factory and the loss of their jobs, as well as criticisms of the minister of industry and labor.

A sizeable police detachment was stationed at the doors of the Ministry of Labor. The Civil Guard, aided by some porters, searched everyone entering the premises of the ministry.

As had occurred previously, the workers carried placards reading "No to the Barbarous Conversion!" "Save Sagunto!" and "No to the Dismissals!" They also wore shirts bearing the slogan "No to the Death of a People!"

Throughout the morning, traffic was blocked in La Castellana and the adjacent streets, as a result first of all of the massive arrival of buses, and later the activities of the workers, who at various times attempted to block traffic.

Irrevocable Regulation

During the meeting between the representatives of the workers and the management of the Mediterranean Blast Furnaces and the director general of labor, Francisco Jose Garcia Zapata, the latter stated the ministry's intention of going ahead with the job regulation proceedings against these 155 workers.

On behalf of the enterprise committee, the secretary general of the metal-workers' CCOO [Workers Commission], Juan Ignacio Marin, said that the committee had submitted a prior question to the director general, in the belief that prior consultations involving the administration, enterprises and trade unions had not been held concerning the proceedings. But the director general for labor made it clear that consultations had been held, and that therefore the proceedings would be carried out within the legal time limit, that is to say 30 days from the 3rd of this month.

In the view of both the enterprise committee and the CCOO leader, there is no previous industrial decision to justify the dismissal of the workers, and

they believe that only the procedural commission of the full metallurgical body has the authority to decide on the case. Marin said that the commissions will continue to struggle to the end, by all legal means within their reach, to oppose the Sagunto shutdown.

Seven thousand residents of Sagunto stormed the new ministries yesterday to demonstrate again their iron determination to keep open the blast furnace enterprise where, despite the socialist government, the best steel in the Mediterranean basin continues to be forged. Again their response was a deaf ear, because the representatives of the administration are firmly determined to shut down the steel plant.

A group of spokesmen for the workers who gathered in the Paseo de la Castellana told EL ALCAZAR reporter Eduardo Garcia following a cacophonous and dissonant pounding on empty cooking pots ("prophesying the hunger to which Carlos Solchaga wants to condemn us"), that "Sagunto will push ahead despite the shameful surrender of the government to the demands of the EEC, which does not want metallurgical competition in the Mediterranean outside the Community. We," the spokesman added, "produce high-quality steel to supply the Japanese and American markets. Why then does the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] want to shut down the plant?" "Let Jose Maria de Lucia, president of the AHM, come to the Sagunto gates, if he dares, and he will be able to see the daily departure of vessels loaded with steel bound for the United States and Japan," the workers went on to say.

With regard to the alternative job offers "made to us by the government after the closing of the AHM," the workers' spokesmen said, "they are the same as those from which the workers in the Basque steel mills are now beginning to suffer: 3 years' unemployment with the Job Promotion Fund covering 80 percent of our wages, and then more unemployment, but without any economic income after having paid quotas for many years."

Finally, the spokesmen for the AHM workers, who do not mind being called "civil rebels," said that no one, "neither Solchaga, nor Felipe, nor Guerra, nor those who win in the next elections will close down the blast furnaces while there remains a single splinter in Sagunto with which to fire them up."

5157

CSO: 3548/193

TREASURY POLICY TO LOWER DEBT FINANCING, INTEREST RATES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 10 Feb 84 p 51

[Article by Rosa Ovejero]

[Text] The definite intention of the treasury to succeed in lowering the annual profitability on promissory notes to 13 percent in the shortest possible time serves a double monetary policy goal. On the one hand, it will reduce the cost of financing the public deficit and on the other, it will force interest rates down. It will also dictate the interest on future public debt issues.

This plan was a compromise reached by the monetary authorities in the talks which culminated in the agreement with financial bodies, whereby the latter have promised to endorse 10 percent of their known liabilities as promissory notes, with a rate of profit of 15.77. One of the counterparts would be the promise by the Bank of Spain to force interest rates down, while at the same time reducing the cost of financing public expenditures and the cost of acquiring bank and fund liabilities through the issuance of assets. Traditionally, these have been placed at a profit rate of half a point less than the public debt, except for the products of some banks affiliated with the large ones and exempt from coefficients. This trend could mean a first step toward control of the cost of money.

Thus the reduced profitability of promissory notes will have the result that in future bidding, public bids will be covered with profitability up to 13 percent from the 15.24 resulting from the last ordinary bidding held on 20 January.

In any case, the Bank of Spain will have to adjust this reduction in successive bids, since it must at least in part meet the need to place about 46 billion pesetas in each instance, which it will not succeed in doing if the competitive bids received do not approach this percentage. It will also have to have the cooperation of the financial bodies, so that they will not divert public bids toward their own products.

On the other hand, the results of the placement by the Bank of Spain, one of the financial bodies, of the total promissory notes signed during the special bidding on the first of this month, which came to 1.1 billion pesetas, will be announced today. These promissory notes will have to be placed again in accordance with the special coefficient agreement negotiated between the banks and savings funds.

However, with the terms of the agreement known, it is possible to predict the results of the operation, since the bodies involved must in this 10-day period endorse an amount equivalent to 0.40 percent of their established liabilities. In the last special bidding session, the investment in promissory notes came to 7.20 percent of the liabilities, increased now to 7.60. During each 10 days of the month, the banks and funds will underwrite a volume as yet not defined, until by 30 April the investment of 10 percent promised in the agreement is reached.

5157

CSO: 3548/193

NO CONCRETE RESULTS IN OZAL-YILMAZ MEETING

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 21 Feb 84 pp 1,11

[Article by Isik Kansu in the column "Notes on Wage Summit": "'Sympathy' Only Outcome of Summit"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau) - No concrete outcome resulted from yesterday's meeting between Premier /Turgut Ozal/ and President General of Turk-Is /Sevket Yilmaz/ on the subject of wage increases to be granted by the YHK [Supreme Arbitration Council] to collective agreements which do not expire this year. Yilmaz said that after Premier Ozal consults the technical committee on this question he will relay the information to Turk-Is sometime within this week. Yilmaz let it be known that Ozal looked on the Turk-Is proposal of a 43% rate of increase /"with sympathy."/

Premier Turgut Ozal received yesterday at 12.15 at the Premier's residence the President General of Turk-Is Sevket Yilmaz. When he came out of the meeting, which lasted almost 1 hour and 20 minutes, Yilmaz declared that the Premier had told him:/"Let us not communicate through the press,"/ and spoke to the effect that:/"Let us both outline our positions and we can then review the situation."/ Yilmaz also said the following:

/"In the course of the meeting we discussed the views of Turk-Is and current estimates. The honorable Premier reacted with sympathy to the Turk-Is views and to the proposal we made. He said 'I will discuss the matter with my other qualified colleagues and inform you accordingly.' The Premier will debate the question with his colleagues once more and let us know in the course of this week."/

In reply to a question as to what will happen if the government makes a decision independently from the Turk-Is proposal, Sevket Yilmaz said:/"I will summon my competent committees, explain the situation to them and act according to the decision they will reach."/ To a journalist who asked what conclusion could be drawn from the meeting Yilmaz said:/"The result of this meeting will be whatever they are willing to grant. I cannot name a figure. We let them know our viewpoint. Once again I quoted the figure and what our demands are as Turk-Is. Turk-Is will not accept any discussion of its viewpoint."/

Yilmaz, who explained that the Premier had not issued any figure yet, said the Turkish-Is proposal of 43% would be taken up again within the week by the

Premier. To the question of:"Is there a softening in the government's position?"/ Yilmaz replied:/" In the upcoming meeting, as long as its representatives in the YHK do not change their views, we cannot count on their sympathy. Our influential friends there do not feel too close to us."/

Yilmaz noted that within the week Ozal would call a meeting of the YHK government representatives and of his own technical committee to discuss the matter, and in answer to the question:/"Are you satisfied?"/ he said:/"My satisfaction will depend on the figures they will quote. Premier Ozal/ says the minimum wage increase is 25%. But chiefly keeping in mind the difficulties we will encounter in the course of collective bargaining we rejected that." To a journalist who reminded him of Premier Ozal's words that he could not exert pressure on the YHK, Yilmaz replied:/"I do not believe that the government is powerless in the YHK. He may say so but I am not convinced of it. If he wants to, he can make the YHK accept his wishes."/

12278
CSO: 3554/157

DOGAN QUESTIONS FLAGGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SUPPORT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 21 Feb 84 p 9

[Article by Yalcin Dogan in The Column "Comments": "Expectancy Abroad..."]

[Text] Following the agreement which was concluded near the end of last month, Premier Ozal expected a declaration of "praise" from the IMF. He was expecting a declaration to the effect that the Turkish economy "was being well managed and indices conveyed positive signals." But no such declaration came.

After the World Bank Commission visit to Ankara toward the end of last month, Premier Ozal expected a "clear and reassuring" declaration regarding the credits to be granted. But no such declaration came.

On the last day of the past months, on the first day of this month, Premier Ozal expected the head of the OECD Turkey Consortium, Geberth, to make a "supportive" declaration regarding the Turkish economy. But no such declaration came.

All 3 of those international organizations visited the capital, Ankara, almost on the same days; they were all looked straight in the eye, but in vain... Yet only up to 2 or 3 months ago all 3 organizations elevated Ozal to the skies. Especially last May and June, at the time the Motherland Party was being founded and particularly before the elections the press organs which published along the lines of those 3 organizations emphasized, no one knows how many times, that "they could not conceive of a democracy without Ozal." What is it that happened in the 2 months that have elapsed which caused a change of atmosphere to emerge in the 3 economic organizations?

From the economic standpoint the factors of the change might be listed as follows:

. The IMF is satisfied up to a point with the decisions that were made. But the main point on which it insists is a freeing, in its full meaning, of imports. An elimination of all restrictions on imports.

. Furthermore, it also insists on an elimination of the funds generated from imports. Both points are in total opposition to Ozal's program. He cannot totally free imports because there is not enough foreign currency. It is not even clear how it will be possible to cope with the present liberations. He cannot eliminate the funds because the housing fund, which was one of the most effective weapons of his political campaign, depends to a large degree on the funds to be derived from imports.

.Another point on which the IMF dwells is the budget deficit. How will it be possible to close the deficit in the budget, which at present is in the vicinity of 600 to 650 billion Turkish liras?.. That is the question the IMF asks every time.

.The World Bank requires projects and makes it clear that it will give financial support to the projects it approves. The difference between the projects Turkey submits and those the World Bank wishes for throws the Bank into doubt. The Bank's reply to "the structural adjustment credit" which it was believed would be granted immediately, was that "it is still in the normal inquiry state."

.The OECD says that Turkey "lacks the proper climate" for foreign capital. Going even further, it says that: "Between 1980 and now there has not been any great change in the economic problems." And adds, moreover,: "Do not expect any OECD aid for this year."

.A series of measures are being taken with regard to foreign capital. In fact "trust" in foreign capital is being put above all else. But nothing doing. Because foreign capital relies on 2 main sources. The first one being "a wider domestic market and, consequently, a high domestic demand," while the second one is "support from domestic capital." People come and see the absence of both those 2 elements. With price increases and wage cuts closely following one another there is neither a domestic market nor any domestic demand left. As for domestic capital, with every passing day it is struggling to find a clue to the solution of its own problems. With a great deal of thrashing...

It looks like the 2 months that have gone by, from the standpoint of what international organizations hoped for with regard to positive economic measures from the Ozal government, did not bring about the expected developments. In the wake of important representatives from economic organizations, Ankara is becoming the scene of successive visits from foreign delegations. Intensive contacts between political committees follow one another. And this brings to mind the classical question of Turkish history: Do those people want something from a political angle perhaps?.. Do they bring some political messages and express some wishes in that direction?.. Is there some connection between the aloofness of economic organizations and the messages of the political delegations?..

The economic organizations may also have made another kind of observation: could it be that Ozal does not stand up, in every sense and forcefully enough, in the centers of power?..

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KETENCI ASSESSES SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 21 Feb 84 pp 1,6

[Article by Sukran Ketenci "Return to Free Agreements On Paper Only"]

[Text] According to the statistics on the branches of labor published by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security the road to signing new agreements is closed for a very large majority of the workers whose agreements expire in the first half of 1984. The number of workers who will be entitled to collective bargaining during the current period does not exceed 200,000.

As for the 1984 agreements of another half of almost 1 million workers shown on the Ministry statistics as belonging to trade unions which overcame the obstacle of authorization and as having the right to benefit from collective bargaining, the YHK [Supreme Arbitration Council] will negotiate those. The agreements of a large number of the remainder of the workers will expire during the last months of 1984 and authorization procedures regarding this group will be related to the 2nd set of statistics to be published in July by the Ministry.

When the YHK renewed the KIT [Public Economic Enterprises] agreements, most of whose employees are members of Turk-Is, and those of workplaces where the question of authorization did not arise, the periods of those agreements, as renewed by the YHK for 1984, were carried over to 1985. As for workplaces of the private sector where the DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions] network was active, contract periods were kept shorter on the whole so they would end early in 1984. With the result that, since DISK activities have been suspended, this group of workers has been trapped from the stand-point of trade union activities and, generally speaking, they either found themselves to be members of trade unions which appeared on the ministry lists as not qualifying for the 10% authorization barrier, or they remained in their initial trade union and thus found themselves in the position of being unable to use their rights to collective bargaining.

Another reason for the workers' inability to use their right to collective bargaining stems from the fact that the ministry statistics largely fail to reflect the workers' real demands and were worked out without checking the veracity of statements. Because, particularly in the case of the group of workers that was left in the lurch some trade unions widely resorted to forging old, outdated membership cards. Together with a worker's proof of membership in a trade union in accordance with the law that came into force in May

the Ministry also took into account the fake membership cards and came up thus with dual memberships. And since according to the law a dual membership is illegal, both were cancelled.

And that is why, in the lawsuits which trade unions remaining below the 10% barrier have widely initiated in the Ankara Labor Courts, with regard to the position of either their own members or that of members of other trade unions, if a realistic investigation can be carried out, the ministry lists which are full of mistakes will be revised on a large scale and become accurate.

The workers who belong to the trade unions which remained below the 10% barrier in various branches of labor and whose agreements have expired will wait first for the result of the objections that will be submitted to judicial organs. Later they will hang their hopes on the second set of statistics to be published in July. Because, in the meantime, an attempt will be made to either create new organizations or to overcome the collective agreement obstacle through mergers. However there is no possibility for the workers employed in a workplace in which agreements are up for renewal to resign from a trade union that did not overcome the barrier so as to register with one that did in order to avail themselves of their agreement rights. Because, according to article 25 of the law on trade unions, a worker's notarized resignation from a trade union of which he is a member becomes effective only 3 months later. Jurists state that in view of this legal provision, if within 3 months of his resignation a worker becomes a member of another trade union, he then finds himself in the position of being a member of 2 trade unions and, due to the ban on a dual membership in the new law, both his memberships are invalidated and he is left without a trade union.

The ministry statistics, particularly in the case where contract dates are due, have given rise to widespread discontent. The ministry has not yet disclosed its view as to what will happen with regard to wages in cases where a 10% and 50% majority are combined within 1 trade union; or in the case of a branch of labor in which a trade union was unable to secure a sufficient majority so that the right to collective bargaining cannot be used in such workplaces. But an extension of measures, which is much discussed, does not appear to be a practical solution for those workplaces. For, in order to extend measures, the signing of agreements on a collective bargaining basis may take months, even years. Whereas, even if they are few, there are contracts that have already expired since January and for the as yet unauthorized branches of labor one cannot speak of legally extending to them measures that are applicable to the agreements of other branches of labor.

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TURKISH PETROLEUM OFFICIAL ON OIL, ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 21 Feb 84 p 7

[Text] TPAO [Turkish Petroleum Corporation] Director General Ismail Kafescioglu pointed out that in order to overcome the energy crisis it was essential to develop natural oil resources and he said that the most rational way to explore for oil was to do it through reliable international oil companies.

TPAO Director General Assistant Professor Doctor Kafescioglu, in the talk he gave at the 38th Scientific and Technical Conference organized by the Geological Institute, spoke on the subject of world energy resources and on their exploitation. Assistant professor Doctor Kafescioglu drew attention to the fact that world oil production and consumption were subject to pressures from military and political factors, adding: "Up to the year 2000 the needs of the world outside the Eastern bloc, in relation to the total energy demand, will increase relatively slowly in comparison to the past. Even if not entirely, coal and nuclear energy will gradually take the place oil occupies today in the production of energy."

Kafescioglu noted that, as a reaction to the increase in oil prices, energy consuming nations had initiated unexpectedly efficient fuel economy measures and he disclosed that the U.S.A., which was one of the biggest consumers of oil in the world, achieved a 6% level of energy saving which at times went as high as 10%.

Oil Exploration

Assistant Professor Doctor Kafescioglu pointed out that their foreign oil associates, when exploring for oil in other countries, paid special attention to a nation's geological conditions, to its legal framework and agreements, to its economic and political situation and to questions such as guarantees on the money invested and on profit returns.

Kafescioglu emphasized in his talk that the foreign capital brought into China between 1979 and the end of 1983 had been \$7 billion 230 million. In comparison to Turkey's average, this figure is 60 times higher. The foreign capital which came to Turkey in the past 30 years was \$902 million. The average incoming foreign capital was thus \$30 million annually.

Director General of Electric Affairs Study Administration Suheyl Elbir, who also gave a talk at the 38th Scientific and Technical Conference of the

Geological Institute, pointed out that oil constituted 93% of our imported energy and he said: "This state of affairs makes it imperative for us to develop quickly our country's natural resources. According to current data, with a total of 1.4 billion tons of coal and 8.2 billion tons of lignite reserves, we have an economical hydroelectric potential of about 108 billion kilowatt-hours annually."

Elbir pointed out that to be able to meet our middle and long term energy demands reliably, we must develop our known energy resources in the most rational possible way and raise productivity to its highest level and he noted that we exploited only 14% of our hydroelectric potential, which was our most important natural resource so that it was imperative under the circumstances to incorporate speedily our hydroelectric potential into the nation's economy.

Suheyel Elbir disclosed that work on projects for 35 dams and hydroelectric power plants was in progress; that those power plants would have a total production capacity of about 25 billion kilowatt-hours annually, and he added that the aim of this work was to plan for a production capacity equal to the electric energy we produce today.

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INDUSTRY CRITICIZES VAGUENESS OF POLLUTION BILL

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 28 Jan 84 p 13

[Text] Tremendous problems will be created by the vagueness which characterizes the draft of an institutional law on the protection of the environment and the abolition of basic principles of law which is provided, while the businessman will be in danger of finding himself in the dock day after day.

This is stated in an announcement by the Administrative Committee of the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which met under the chairmanship of Laz. Efraimoglou and examined both the draft of the institutional law and the bill on the creation of a unified environmental agency. In the relevant announcement it is stressed, among other things:

The existing regime for the protection of the environment needs to be supplemented and improved so as to create an up-to-date and effective institutional framework which not only will provide for the protection of our natural environment but also will take into consideration the needs of our economic development.

However, a detailed study of the above two bills leads to the conclusion that they have completely ignored the need to have--in parallel with the protection of the environment--also realistic provisions for the orderly functioning of already existing productive units and the creation of new ones, which constitutes a prerequisite for the further economic development of the country and the prosperity of our society.

The vagueness which characterizes concepts and certain terms which are used in the relevant bill (for example, the concept of pollution, of the social well-being, and so forth), the overlapping of jurisdictions among the various jointly responsible ministries, the departure from the general rule of criminal law according to which the plaintiff is obligated to prove his allegations, and shifting to the defendant the burden of proof that he is not accountable, the ease with which any agency representing collective interests can appear as a plaintiff claiming damages, something which can lead to excesses, the instituting of a bureaucratic and time-consuming procedure for granting the environmental permit and the fact that receiving it is dependent on various agencies and also on separate individuals, who can cause deliberate impediments, and the misuse of the legislative

authority are some of those features which, it was pointed out, would create turmoil in the sector of productive activity if the relevant bill were to be passed as it stands.

It is not an exaggeration, concludes the announcement by the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry, that with such a law there is a danger that the businessman will find himself in the dock day after day.

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